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Global Currents article

The Sound of Solidarity? The Adhan and the Possibility of a New Civic Body in Europe

The exterior of the Sehitlik Mosque, Berlin. Photo courtesy of author.

This week, the adhan (Muslim call to prayer) can be heard throughout Germany and the Netherlands. Sometimes, it joins with the sound of church bells, an unfamiliar and evocative symphony, as religious institutions offer support not only to their constituents, but to whole, shaken societies. For the first time in history, both countries have allowed the adhan to regularly penetrate public space. This is unquestionably a response to the COVID-19 crisis, a desperate grappling for social unity and godly protection. Calling out, with the knowledge that no one can come together, over a hundred mosques seek to soothe collective wounds. These wounds, of course, cut deeper in particular communities, as we have seen in African American communities in the United States—those already marginalized are affected at far more devastating levels than the economically and socially sheltered.

Still, this public call to prayer is remarkable not only in sound but even more so in its social meaning. Just months ago, such a move would have appeared nearly impossible. In my forthcoming book, Mosques in the Metropolis, I critique the European project of modernity by unsettling assumptions about “progress” and “civility” through two mosque communities in London and Berlin. Exposing the deep and unrelenting inequality faced by diverse Muslim populaces, as well as their capacities to exert agency, the mosque rises as both a threshold space and an interstitial opportunity for building solidarity. Such solidarity may center on fomenting deep mutual support within, and yet extending beyond, Muslim communities into the cities and states in which they live. This includes focusing on shared concerns, from the natural environment’s decay to supporting vulnerable populaces, and building knowledge that can transcend taken-for-granted assumptions about Islam. In Berlin, such solidarity emerged at the Sehitlik Mosque under the leadership of Ender Cetin, who invited the whole city into the mosque through daily tours, and yet also encouraged mosque community members to deeply engage in the city, through participation in civic activism, educating on pluralism in schools, and running for political office.

Today, as the world comes to a grinding halt, the mosque rises as such again, offering an opportunity for deepened solidarity through a medium that can touch us even in isolation, uniting us through sound.

My book project, and my personal surprise in the public adhan, are both rooted in the reality that Europe has long resisted the inclusion of its Muslim populaces, who largely migrated as post-colonial migrants and guestworkers, called to rebuild fractured European countries after World War II. It has since delimited their rights, resisting the bestowal of citizenship for decades (for instance, Germany only changed its citizenship laws from blood-based to birth-based in 2000). Even with legal equality, politicians and media outlets long continued to suggest that Muslims and/or Islam cannot fully belong to European nation-states. Over the last few years, Dutch and German politicians like German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer have continued to debate whether Islam belongs to their respective nation-state.

Muslim bodies, and institutions like mosques, have been regulated, even demonized in European public life. We have seen the Muslim body as site of conflict emerge in the so-called headscarf debates, which limit Islamic garb in public life, across countries like France, Germany, Spain, and Denmark. We have witnessed the securitization of Muslim bodies in xenophobic and violent government anti-radicalization agendas. And we have watched the form of the nation-scape shaped by fear, such as through the banning of minarets by popular referendum in Switzerland in 2006. Until recently, the far-right wing has been on the rise, building its base specifically on anti-immigrant and anti-Islam platforms. In Germany, for example, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) Party, capitalizing on discontent with the massive refugee migration in 2015, received enough votes to enter parliament in 2017.

In such contexts of resistance to plurality, discourses of tolerance have emerged. As Wendy Brown critiques in her book Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire, “tolerance” is at once a “discourse of power and practice of governmentality” (8) achieved through a practice of toleration, a making do with that which makes the dominant group in society uncomfortable. Tolerance, often attached to rhetoric about Muslims in Europe, is a bitter civilizing discourse disguised by a saccharine rhetorical wrapper of the enlightened, liberal sensitivity—a contronym, perfectly synonymous with its own antonym: intolerance.

Instead of tolerance, late sociologist and philosopher Zygmunt Bauman argued in “Postmodernity, or Living with Ambivalence,” that we must move to solidarity; in the words of Bauman scholar Shaun Best, true solidarity emerges when “the ‘I am responsible for the Other’ and ‘I am responsible for myself’ come to mean the same thing” (317). As another Bauman scholar Keither Tester asserts, this shifts the goal away from being “with” the other to being “for” the other. Solidarity in this sense does not equalize but rather locates value in each person and each community on its own grounds. A public adhan is arguably an expression of such solidarity, rather than tolerance, as it transcends the usual attempts to reshape Islam vis-à-vis mainstream secular norms.

COVID-19 has changed everything, turning our worlds upside down. It is as if we have all tumbled down Alice’s well to Wonderland, where big is small and small is big, and nothing looms larger than our new, collective fear. This new normal has, in many ways, lifted us out of ourselves. And it holds pain and lessons for us all. In Flesh and Stone, social theorist Richard Sennett eloquently argues that solidarity can emerge through a recognition of pain—of the self and of the other—creating a civic body anew. Today, support for the AfD is suddenly waning, as many of the same refugees once demonized serve as frontline medical workers, responding to a call to save lives.

From our new vantage point, former fears seem small, our former, open lives filled with the lives of others not just big but beautiful. This evokes Freud’s conceptualization of “the narcissism of minor differences”: focusing on what we do not share in order to construct distinct, and superior, selves—occurring on the cultural, as much as individual, level. Through such “narcissism of minor differences,” Europe has long defined itself against and above its religious minorities, both Muslims and Jews. And this has, over a thousand years, eroded opportunities for deep and lasting solidarity time and again.

Has COVID-19 shaken Europe, and the so-called “Western” world writ large, awake from their dreams of superiority? Does it have the power to invoke a reckoning with the deep and lasting inequalities and violence faced by Muslim communities across the continent?

These questions remain unanswered, if not unanswerable in this still-acute moment. Yet in this crisis, we are revealed together and apart as equally fragile and equally human. And our shared humanity nests within our shared fragility. Within this metaphorical set of nesting dolls, we can see solidarity emerge: in individuals devoting their days to making medical supplies and neighborhood supports for the vulnerable. And we can hear the rumblings of solidarity in the adhan, answering the so-called “question of Islam” in Europe with a prayer, perhaps once and for all laying it to rest.

Of course this has not erased a deep colonial and imperial history that led to the migration of Muslim populaces to Europe in the first place; nor the violence perpetrated against their bodies then, and their bodies now, in the form of formidable security states. But it does make visible, or rather audible, Islamic forms so long excluded from the public sphere. As Jeanette Jouili and Annelies Moors show in their special issue on Islamic soundscapes, Islam is deeply rooted in auditory practices and histories; public forms of “sonic” Islam contribute to what they term “a politics of listening.” The sound of the adhan permeating German and Dutch publics today shows the sociopolitical power of a soundscape transformed and through it, the nationscape is transformed as well. Here we are confronted with the opportunity of not only seeing or hearing, but really listening.

The interior of the Sehitlik Mosque, Berlin. Photo courtesy of author.

I visited the mosque that began this new tradition in 2014, located in Duisburg-Marxloh, a neo-Ottoman form facing a church, where tour guides stressed that their community belongs not only to the global Muslim ummah, but to Germany. I remember the face of an old man sitting on a stone bench outside of the mosque, hands folded on his lap, who greeted me with warmth, and an old woman who patted my hand when I first entered the mosque. The mosque community’s openness, its vulnerability, and its willingness to push back against the so-called Islam/Europe divide, moved me then. The soothing sound of its adhan moves me now.

Today, from Duisburg-Marxloh to Amsterdam, mosques are singing a prayer across Europe. In this prayer made out of song, a newfound togetherness rises, and with it an invigoration of a solidarity I never imagined possible (but who among us imagined the current state of the world to be possible?). Who knows if and whether it will deepen and last; that is a conscious choice to be made when the world moves to its familiar rhythm again. Yet this is a moment of reckoning not to be overlooked, where boundaries—so deeply etched in our geographies, and deeper in our imaginaries—can be overcome. Let us not forget this lesson when the dust settles, and we, of all religions, ethnicities, races, nationalities, mourn our dead. Let this serve as a reminder that so much more unites us than that which divides us, and that we can—and should—be for one another, when we begin again. And until then, let us find comfort in this harmony found in crisis, in a new civic body constructed from the pain, and the hope, that we share.

Elisabeth Becker
Elisabeth Becker is a cultural sociologist and postdoctoral fellow with the Religion & Its Publics Project and the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia. Her research explores Muslim communities in urban contexts across Europe and the United States. She is currently completing her book (Mosques in the Metropolis), a comparative ethnographic work on European mosques, contracted with University of Chicago Press, and has published with the Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Ethnic & Racial Studies, Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion, International Journal for Islamic Architecture, and Annals of Tourism Research.
Decoloniality article

Decolonial Politics and Religious Ethics: Dismantling Hierarchies

Location of detention center, 419 Emancipation Avenue, Houston, Texas. Photo Credit: Patrick Feller.

When comparing and contrasting decolonial and postcolonial approaches to ethical categories like freedom, scholars of religious ethics must address how those working in the field of ethics may uncritically reproduce power hierarchies. The need to address such concerns is not entirely new to religious ethics. Saba Mahmood’s work, as well as that of Talal Asad’s, shares with decolonial and postcolonial approaches a deep skepticism of the ability of ethical inquiry to transcend the power structures of which it is a part. If the study of ethics in religion is associated with making valuations that sustain, rather than challenge or question, existing social hierarchies, it is easy to see why those who study, and/or belong to, historically marginalized populations may be ethics-avoidant.

The decolonial ethics of Maldonado-Torres offers a conception of human freedom rooted in love, primarily through relationality or solidarity with others. This is a stronger normative claim than we would find in the ethnographic studies of Mahmood or Asad’s critical theoretical forays into ethnographic reflections. However, his focus on the moral capacities of those historically relegated to the “zone of nonbeing”— a phrase first introduced by Frantz Fanon and developed by Sylvia Wynter which insists that colonized people (and people of color more generally) lack souls and moral agency, and by implication, being—has resonance with Mahmood’s and Asad’s accounts because it attends to how racism and colonialism continue to shape the identities and politics of various communities.

“We revolt simply because for many reasons we can no longer breathe.” Frantz Fanon. Banner outside the Minneapolis Police Department fourth precinct following the officer-involved shooting of Jamar Clark on November 15, 2015. Photo: Tony Webster. tony@tonywebster.com

One question we ought to pursue more systematically is why historians of religion and anthropologists—whose work often addresses colonialism in some form or another—tend to avoid the terminology and frameworks of ethics. Maldonado-Torres illuminates how ethicists have failed to examine race in relation to religion, which may indicate that methodology in ethics on the whole has not engaged sufficiently in a systematic analysis of power. Although Mahmood does not address race specifically, it is useful to consider what she achieves by revealing the ineffectiveness of Western ethical concepts in the context of the Egyptian women’s mosque movement. Ethicists should ask: Why do scholars like Mahmood dismiss the discourse of ethics when focusing on the experiences of people who have been excluded from the shared realm of politics—or of being and freedom—on account of their otherness? How has ethical discourse been rendered inaccessible, unimportant, or even harmful to the types of inquiry at hand?

The modern field of philosophical ethics was engendered by the development of Western secular liberalism, and is connected to colonialism and Western hegemony. This has had important implications for religious ethics and the field of religious studies more generally. To name one example, Robert A. Orsi interrogates the dominance of the white liberal Protestant view as historically normative within the field of religious studies, arguing that by foregrounding questions of morality, it determined which types of religion are “good” or “bad.” This resembles the distinction that Maldonado-Torres discusses in the categories of human/subhuman and civilized/uncivilized and corresponds to the same colonial history.

Both decolonial and ethnographic approaches confront scholars of religious ethics with several important tasks. First, we must consider how the fields of religious and philosophical ethics have been shaped by political interests and power differences. Specifically, this work entails engaging the question of how colonialism and racism continue to influence who, how, and what we study. There is an imperative for scholars to recognize how the modern history of categorizing others in the zone of nonbeing has filtered into our consciousness, our assumptions, and at times, our arguments.

Second, to Maldonado-Torres’s point, ethicists have a responsibility to include—by inquiring about, describing, and attending to—the moral agency of subjects on the social margins, and who reside in the (ontological) zone of nonbeing. ­­That imbalances of power shape frameworks and categories does not obviate the need to conceptualize the agency of the disempowered. Yet we cannot do so at the cost of excluding their voices, and thus it is necessary to develop more inclusive methods and frameworks. Feminist ethnography constitutes a strong resource in this regard. In the context of American Islam, the work of Juliane Hammer, Debra Majeed, and others offers insight into how we can better theorize moral agency in light of colonial histories of violence, patriarchy, and the evolving question of religious and cultural identity.

Additionally, scholars in the field of religious ethics can continue to develop a more robust discourse around agency and power using the insights of feminist philosophy. Such work focuses on the relationality of persons and the ways that structural injustices shape ethical subjects and their choices. It also addresses how relative differences in social power and material resources can generate different degrees, and types, of responsibility. My work on feminist virtue ethics and religious freedom is critical of how ethical discourses exclude women on topics pertaining to their embodied and material flourishing. In feminist ethical inquiry generally, we are less interested in identifying the obligations of a universal subject, and more invested in comprehending the conditions under which subjectivity and responsibility are possible, and whether they are recognizable as such by others.

Overcrowding of families observed by OIG on June 10, 2019, at Border Patrol’s McAllen, TX, Station. Faces were digitally obscured by OIG. Photo Credit: US Office of Inspector General.

A more inclusive approach to ethics follows from a willingness to question and modify our ethical categories, as well as our methods, when they do not comport with, or omit, the experiences of marginalized communities. To put it another way: the integrity of religious ethics as a field depends on scholars’ ability to listen to, and take seriously, structural oppression and its relation to definitions of personhood. According to Maldonado-Torres, sub-ontological difference serves as a basis for structural injustices. When we consider the case of migrant children and others who are imprisoned at the U.S.-Mexico border, a relationship between the zone of nonbeing and the reality of material and legal deprivation becomes clear. Hannah Arendt’s observation of the paradoxical “right to have rights” (296) is particularly salient: if only citizens can claim human rights, what about the human rights of those who languish at the border? Scholars of religious ethics must attend to the political and ethical realities that emerge from these places of contradiction.

In summary, scholars in religious ethics must work consistently to produce approaches to ethical inquiry that counter exclusionary variants of it that have been practiced in the past. We must continue to dismantle the binaries of good/bad and civilized/uncivilized religion and people, and to pursue clarity in our descriptions of moral agency. How religious ethicists respond to these challenges will shape the direction and viability of the field in future years.

 

 

Shannon Dunn
Shannon Dunn is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Gonzaga University. Her research addresses gender, violence, and human rights, with particular focus on global Muslim communities. She is currently the president of the Society for the Study of Muslim Ethics (SSME).
Global Currents article

Who Are We the People? Unpopular Sovereignties in the United States and India

United States President Donald J. Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stand together on stage before a cheering crowd at the Namaste Trump Rally Monday, Feb. 24, 2020, at the Motera Stadium in Ahmedabad, India. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)

Following a massive rally with India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, in Gujarat last month, Donald Trump tweeted a message of international comity. “Our two national constitutions begin with the same three beautiful words: ‘We the people.’ That means,” he wrote, “that in America and India alike, we honor, respect, trust, empower, and fight for the citizens we proudly serve!”

Hours earlier, three people—a police officer and two Muslim civilians—had been killed in Delhi in protests over India’s new Citizenship Amendment Act, which excludes Muslim migrants from amnesty. At least 51 people have now been killed, three-quarters of whom were Muslim, and the Delhi police have been implicated in the violence.

During his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump had promoted a ban on Muslim immigrants to the United States and a wall along its southern border with Mexico, and his term in office has been marked by anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric.

The U.S. president’s reference to the respective preambles to the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of India resonates with a core principle of modern democracy, the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Governments—the American Declaration of Independence declares—derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.”

In its insistence that power belongs to the people, popular sovereignty is a liberal, potentially emancipatory, ideal. But it has repeatedly been invoked historically to oppress and exclude. Speaking in Minnesota recently, Trump sought to rouse anti-immigrant sentiment against the “large numbers of refugees to your state from Somalia” by appealing to popular sovereignty: “You should be able to decide what is best for your own cities and for your own neighborhoods and that’s what you have the right to do right now,” he told his supporters. Ostensibly a secular republic, India has recently invoked the doctrine on behalf of laws widely viewed as discriminatory toward Muslims.

This ambivalence points to a perennial question at the heart of democratic citizenship. Who are “we the people?” What makes this question puzzling is that it cannot, without circularity, be answered democratically, by appealing to the will of the people.

While the doctrine of popular sovereignty presupposes the existence of a “people”—or demos—to which government is answerable, “peoples” are not naturally occurring, well-bounded units. The respective histories of the United States and India suggest a more complicated picture: the state helps to create and maintain, through force, the people from which it claims to derive its authority.

Following independence from British colonial rule and the trauma of partition from Pakistan along a line carved by the British, which resulted in countless deaths and ongoing population transfers on a scale of approximately 14.5 million, the contemporary nation of India came into existence along with Pakistan at midnight of August 14–15, 1947. In his novel Midnight’s Children, Salman Rushdie recalls the anticipation as the clock counted down:

[T]here was an extra festival on the calendar, a new myth to celebrate, because a nation which had never previously existed was about to win its freedom, catapulting us into a world which, although it had five thousand years of history, although it had invented the game of chess and traded with Middle Kingdom Egypt, was nevertheless quite imaginary; into a mythical land, a country which would never exist except by the efforts of a phenomenal collective will—except in a dream we all agreed to dream; it was a massive fantasy . . . and would periodically need the sanctification and renewal which can only be provide by rituals of blood. (112)

News headline announcing partition and creation of the sovereign nations of Pakistan and India. Photo Credit: Shankar S.

One hundred seventy-one years earlier, the United States had similarly imagined itself into existence by force of will. As Jacques Derrida has noted with respect to the Declaration of Independence, “this people does not exist. They do not exist as an entity, it does not exist, before this declaration, not as such. If it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, as possible signer, this can hold only in the act of the signature. The signature invents the signer” (10). By speaking in the name of a nation yet to exist, the signers invented the sovereign “people” they claimed to represent, and from whom they purported to draw their authority.

The American Revolution was not, like India’s independence struggle, a de-colonial movement but a settler-colonial revolt, which drew upon colonial tropes to imagine a “good people,” oppressed from above by the British crown and harried from below by what the Declaration of Independence calls “merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.” Alluding to this dramatic performance of auto-authorization, the philosopher Stanley Cavell has written, “[B]efore there was America there was no America. America was discovered, and what was discovered was not a place, one among others, but a setting, the backdrop of a destiny. It began as theater” (344).

The paradox of popular sovereignty—the inevitable circularity of appealing to “the people” for the authority required to decide who the people are—haunts the origins of both nations, their differences notwithstanding, and reverberates through their respective histories, permitting the co-existence of lofty democratic ideals with ruthless oppression, a performative fantasy requiring periodic renewal through blood ritual.

Thomas Jefferson, who penned the words “All men are created equal,” enslaved more than 600 people over the course of his lifetime, and at the time of independence, twenty percent of the U.S. population lived in bondage. How ought we to make sense of the relationship between these brutal facts of history and the philosophical ideal of popular sovereignty? According to the Supreme Court’s infamous 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the former are entirely consistent with the latter, because persons of African descent were never part of “the people.”

We The People Inscription at the National Constitution Center. Photo Credit: Housefinch1787.

The case involved Dred Scott, an enslaved man who had been brought from Missouri—a state where slavery was legal—to a free territory and back again. Scott argued that, by residing in a free territory (a territory in which slavery had been outlawed) he had effectively been freed and could not legally be re-enslaved in Missouri. The Court disagreed: being of African descent, Scott was not one of “the people” and so lacked the legal standing necessary to challenge his effective statelessness and the legally sanctioned oppression it made possible.

“The language of the Declaration of Independence is . . . conclusive,” Chief Justice Roger Taney wrote. It says, he acknowledged, that “all men are created equal,” and that governments derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.” Nevertheless, he opined, the founders did not intend to include the “African race”: “The general words quoted above would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day, would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this Declaration.”

To construe the words of the Declaration so as to include persons of African descent would be to imply a mismatch between the Founders’ words and their actions, which included enslaving human persons. Since, according to the Court, “the men who framed this Declaration were great men—high in literary acquirements—high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting,” they cannot have had in mind “the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized governments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery” (italics added).

Before the Court, Scott was rendered mute, unable to lodge an audible complaint. Scott did not sue for his freedom and lose; rather, he was not permitted to sue. To borrow a phrase from Hannah Arendt, what Scott lacked, in the opinion of the Court, was “the right to have rights” (296).

Beyond the light it casts on the white supremacy at the heart of the Republic—the normative whiteness of the body politic—what  Dred Scott’s case reveals is that ostensibly democratic government constructs the people from which it purports to draw its authority. In its insistence that “the people” is determined by the law and does not name a preexistent reality, Dred Scott v. Sandford exposes the sleight of hand on which the law’s legitimacy depends: the state is materially prior, if conceptually subsequent, to the ostensible source of its legitimation.

In effect, the Dred Scott decision gerrymanders the boundaries of “the people” by constructing a nation which confers legitimacy on the state’s exclusions and silences its victims. To put it another way, it is the consent not of the governed as such that matters, but of those comprised by the popular sovereign, where the latter cannot itself on pain of regress or circularity be constituted democratically, by allowing the people to decide who are the people.

Not only was the doctrine of popular sovereignty not thought to be at odds with slavery, in the Antebellum period it was repeatedly invoked on its behalf. During his three terms representing Illinois in the Senate, Stephen Douglas argued that each state should be allowed to decide for itself whether or not to permit or outlaw slavery, an approach he termed popular sovereignty. In his famous debates with Abraham Lincoln in 1858, Douglas sought to reconcile slavery with democratic ideals by appealing to the sovereign power of each state:

Mr. Lincoln, following the example and lead of all the little Abolition orators, who go around and lecture in the basements of schools and churches, reads from the Declaration of Independence, that all men were created equal, and then asks, how can you deprive a negro of that equality which God and the Declaration of Independence awards to him? … Now, I hold that Illinois had a right to abolish and prohibit slavery as she did, and I hold that Kentucky has the same right to continue and protect slavery that Illinois had to abolish it. I hold that New York had as much right to abolish slavery as Virginia has to continue it, and that each and every State of this Union is a sovereign power, with the right to do as it pleases upon this question of slavery, and upon all its domestic institutions. … And why can we not adhere to the great principle of self-government, upon which our institutions were originally based.

Douglas’s argument operates within the same logic as Dred Scott: popular sovereignty refers not to the sovereignty of people conceived of independently of their juridical relation to the state—would-be social contractors endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights—but to the sovereignty of the people considered as a single, transtemporal entity, membership in which is determined by the law it is invoked to underwrite.

Seal of Nebraska Territory. “Popular Sovereignty. Progress.”

Although, following the Civil War, the Dred Scott decision would eventually be superseded by the Fourteenth Amendment, which granted citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States,” its peculiar logic affords an important, if uncomfortable, insight into the deep structure of democratic state citizenship: “popular sovereignty” can be constrained by radically non-democratic conceptions of personhood, citizenship, and nation.

In these instances, the rhetorical function of appealing to the “will of the people” is precisely to render void the opinions of significant numbers of the governed. This is the notion of “we the people” Trump invoked in Minnesota, and which informs the exclusion of Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam from the National Register of Citizens. It is necessarily by means of exclusion that the state empowers the citizens it serves.

This circularity coils through American history. It underwrote the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. It lurks behind nativist antipathies toward Catholics, Communists, Jews, Muslims, and Mexicans. It explains why, in 1919, only men were allowed to vote on whether to extend the franchise to women. It was pointed out by the dissenting Justices in Rucho v. Common Cause, a partisan gerrymandering case decided by the Supreme Court last summer, who observed that allowing politicians to pick their voters turns “upside-down the core American idea that all governmental power derives from the people.” In a republic that purports to derive its just powers from the consent of the governed, it should come as no surprise that the biggest political disagreements and struggles have always concerned precisely the question of who belongs to the popular sovereign.

Often described as the world’s largest democracy, India today faces fundamental questions about its identity. So too, albeit in a different way, does the United States. Indeed, these questions constitute a receding horizon for any politics that purports to draw legitimacy from “the people.”

The circular logic of popular sovereignty means that legitimation can never quite catch up with itself. States invent peoples, but “the people” can be imagined to take many forms, some narrow and exclusionary, others open and expansive, and the people on which democratic politics relies need not be configured nationalistically at all. Democracy is not reducible to the modalities of state power. If, as Miguel Abensour has argued, “democracy is essentially a political institution of human sociality, then tensions, conflicts and even contradictions emerge between democracy and the State” (xlv). Rather than something given, the people is always a work in progress, a failure, an aspiration yet to be achieved.

 

Suggested Further Reading

Anderson, Benedict. 2006 [1983]. Imagined Communities. London: Verso.

Arendt, Hannah. 1963. On Revolution. London: Penguin Books.

Friedland, Roger. “The Institutional Logic of Religious Nationalism: Sex, Violence, and the Ends of History.” Politics, Religion, & Ideology 12.1: 65–88.

Honig, Bonnie. 1991. “Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding a Republic.”American Political Science Review 85.1 (March): 97–113.

Kahn, Paul W. 2006. “Political Time: Sovereignty and the Transtemporal Community.” Cardozo Law Review 28.1: 259–76.

Marx, Anthony W. 2003. Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Anthony. 1998. Nationalism and Modernism. London: Routledge.

Wynter, Sylvia. 2003. “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom.” The New Centennial Review 3.3 (Fall): 257–337.

 

Richard Amesbury
Richard Amesbury works at the intersection of philosophy of religion and political theory. He is Professor of Religious Studies and Director of the School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies at Arizona State University.
Decoloniality article

The Promise of Decolonization for the Study of Religions

 

Stockholm public library. Photo courtesy of the author.

Since the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism in 1978, scholars of religion and other disciplines in the humanities have been looking for alternative methods and theories to represent the Other. But finding this alternative has been elusive. In a recent reflection, Birgit Meyer lamented the fact that the humanities remain Eurocentric. One of the challenges of decolonization is to address this desire for an alternative method and theory against the reality of a distorted field. Whilst scholarship has become steadily global, the field continues to be dominated by what V. Y. Mudimbe called a Colonial library.

The study of Islam in the modern world offers an opportunity to address this dilemma in a concrete way. From the US to Pakistan, there has been a renewed interest in applying theories of religion to Islam. In doing so, scholars turn to the comparative study of religions that emerged in nineteenth-century Europe during the highpoint of colonialism. While a postmodernist skepticism of the discipline of comparative religion is readily embraced in the field, there is no equivalent skepticism of the colonial condition. Thus, J. Z. Smith’s critical reflections on the study of religions are easily remembered against theologians who work in the field. In contrast, the colonial imbrication of the discipline is ignored or only briefly acknowledged. For example, Russell McCutcheon’s critical review of phenomenology is directed against Eliade and most scholars of religion who betray a hint of theological or sui generis thinking, but is virtually silent on the colonial condition of the discipline. Scholarship monitors the intrusion of theology into the discipline, while allowing colonialist assumptions to go unchecked and unthought. Colonialism is often euphemistically represented as modernization or a benign intervention that changed the world.

For Islamic and religious studies, critical voices within Islam offer a decolonial perspective that challenges these assumptions. These critical voices emerged in response to colonialism in different parts of the world, at the very time that the study of religions was taking off in the colonial centers of power. The contrast between the scholarship of the colonizers and colonized has, to my mind, never been seriously discussed. Critical voices in Islam have certainly not been ignored, but they have been evaluated against the backdrop of social processes or political alliances created by colonialism. For example, modernization, traditionalization, and postmodernism are first found in the West, and then adjusted and hyphenated for the rest of the world. Political alliances are similarly measured against new political realities created in the colonial and post-colonial centers of global power.

The author with the bust of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Photo courtesy of author.

Paying close attention to the intellectual labour of critical voices from colonized contexts leads us to new insights on how to think about religion. In a book published in 2009, I focussed on how intellectuals like Muhammad Abduh and Sayyid Ahmad Khan grappled with new definitions for thinking about religion and Islam. I argued that a new intellectual discourse was developed on Islam for Muslim societies. This discourse was entangled with colonialism, but its intellectual labor on religion as a concept was unmistakable. My work was inspired by Talal Asad and David Chidester’s critical reflections on the construction of a discourse of religion in the Western tradition, in which Asad provincialized the discourse of religion in the history of the West, while Chidester showed its colonial roots. In a twist of irony, Asad and Chidester have been followed by many other reflections on Western scholars; their critical reflection has accentuated Western scholarship. As in similar navel-gazing exercises of critical scholarship, the Colonial Library became even more dominant than before.

In my book, I took a different approach. Following Asad and Chidester diligently, I could have paid attention to how the category of religion was used implicitly and explicitly by Western scholars of Islam. But taking a different course of action in this book, I paid attention to the intellectual labor of Muslim critical voices instead. In a decolonial gesture, I turned my gaze away from Western scholars on religion, and paid attention to how religion was theorized in different political and social contexts.

I have since realized that taking these critical voices seriously as intellectual labor goes against a dominant view of the study of religion. Since the nineteenth century, religion has been conceptualized in a number of diverse ways. But one dominant thread running through the discourse is captured in Peter Berger’s metaphor of a sacred canopy. Functionalist theories from Durkheim onwards emphasized that religion totally and completely envelops its members. Adherents to religious traditions can only see the world through its rituals, narratives, and beliefs. In a famous phrase by Clifford Geertz, religious symbols clothe the social world “with … an aura of factuality” (4). Notwithstanding critical reflections of religion, this perception of the power of religion remains dominant. Critique is not expected from religious discourse.

Alongside the totalizing effect of religions, the study of religion generally argues or assumes that only the modern scholar can see the truth of reality. Unlike the religious subject, the scholar is not enveloped in an “aura” of factuality, but sees things as they are really are. Self-criticism is not entirely missing in the study of religions, but it is believed that eventually secular critique is the only critique worthy of its name. In contrast, I would like to suggest that critical voices within Islam and other religious traditions should be counted within the tradition, and recognized for the work they do against such totalizing accounts of religious experience. These critical voices shatter the vision of religion as a sacred canopy, and call for a more complex and differentiated model of thinking about religion.

In conclusion, critical studies of religion have accepted the fragility of the concept of religion, but they have problematically focused entirely on the Western tradition. In response to Asad, Chidester, and others, the Western tradition is sometimes provincialized and exceptionalized in one move. In this latter practice, no other theorizing of religion is said to be possible. Religion belongs to the West and its academy. A decolonial approach such as I have offered pursues a comparative exercise in which the Western tradition is neither universal nor exceptional. It must enter into dialogue and conversation with other ways of thinking of religion and the religious.

A decolonial gesture in the study of religion must address the challenge laid down by Said. Since his significant publication, scholars have searched relentlessly for an alternative. But over this period of time, the Colonial/Western Library has become even more dominant and hegemonic. One way of addressing this anomaly is to seriously look at the critical intellectual labor that is found within religious traditions. Such a gesture may unseat a deep-seated assumption about religion, shared by nineteenth- and early twenty-first-century scholars, that religious worlds are totalizing.

 

Cited References

Asad, Talal. 1993. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Chidester, David. 1996. Savage Systems: Colonialism and Comparative Religion in Southern Africa. Charlottesville; London: University Press of Virginia.

Geertz, Clifford. 1966. “Religion as a Cultural System.” In Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, edited by Michael Banton, 1–45. London: Tavistock Publications.

McCutcheon, R. T. (1995). Review: The Category “Religion” in Recent Publications: A Critical Survey. Numen, 42(3), 284-309.

McCutcheon, R. T. (1997). Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Meyer, Birgit. 2019. “Sozial-Und Geistenwissenchaften Und Die Welt.” Accessed 15 April, 2019.

Mudimbe, V.Y. 1997. Tales of Faith: Religion as Political Performance in Central Africa. New Jersey: The Athlone Press.

Tayob, Abdulkader. 2009. Religion in Modern Islamic Discourse. London: C. Hurst & Co.

Abdulkader Tayob
Prof. Abdulkader Tayob holds the chair in Islam, African Publics and Religious Values at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. He has published on Islam in South Africa, modern Islamic Thought, and Islam and the History of Religions.
Decoloniality article

Religious Studies and/in the Decolonial Turn

The Waldseemüller map from 1507 is the first map to include the name “America” and the first to depict the Americas as separate from Asia. There is only one surviving copy of the map, which was purchased by the Library of Congress in 2001 for $10 million. Credit: Martin Waldseemüller / Public domain.

The history and study of the anthropological category of religion is deeply entangled with the formation of modernity/coloniality. In this context, whoever defines, identifies, and explains religion wields much power. Modernity/coloniality is not meant to describe the experience of modernity in the colonial territories, as opposed to modernity in the metropolitan European empires or the “developed” world. Rather, modernity/coloniality refers to the logic of colonial differences and hierarchies that are constitutive of the idea and project of Western modernity since at least the sixteenth century.

It was in the context of the early formation of Western modernity as an idea and a project that the category of religion emerged as an indispensable term for making sense of the difference between the colonizers and the colonized. Since then, “religion” as a category of classification and analysis has served as a dispositive of the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being in the formation and solidification of “modern Western civilization.” It has been crucial in the constitution of the “secular line” and the “color-line,” understood broadly, that are at the center of how the globalized Western human sciences and the modern state understand and forcibly construct a “world.”

Religious Studies and the various sub-fields that constitute it can participate in the collective struggle for ideas, practices, and institutions that aim to overcome the limit of the “modern world order” by engaging in a decolonial turn. This turn involves enriching, complicating, and sometimes moving away from a focus on the classical debates in the field of Religious Studies and Theology to an embrace of fields and epistemic practices grounded in decolonial transdisciplinarity, such as Ethnic studies and related bodies of thought and practice.

Religion and the Colonial Project

An initial question that scholars during the sixteenth century pursued in the context of conquest and colonization was whether the indigenous peoples of the Americas had religion or not. The question indicated a break with the general presumption that the Orbis Christianus (Christian world) was populated by people with religion and that the main difference between them resided in the degree of truth or falsity in their beliefs. It was a dangerous question to explore: having no religion could indicate the lack of a soul, which pointed to an ontological difference, and not merely to an epistemological difference, between the beliefs of conquistadors and those they colonized. In short, if religion was a universal characteristic of humans, then not having religion indicated a lack of humanity.

In the Christian theocentric paradigm, a religious other was someone whose beliefs can be questioned, and the main goal was conversion. In the emerging paradigm, on the contrary, the non-religious other is someone whose very humanity is put into question, which opens up a horizon of unexpected possibilities in terms of practices of engagement and behavior. Determining who has religion and who doesn’t, as well as what kind of religion they have, then, became crucial not only for social organization, but also for making sense of the globe. This was not a small matter given that European Christian kingdoms and the emerging nation-states became the largest empires that the world has ever seen, and that European travel narratives, racial thinking, as well as economic and geo-political ambitions, informed the creation of maps and narratives that were used to navigate, order, and make sense of space and time in the world.

The differentiation between people with religion and those without it had important precedents in the “Old World,” which is why Columbus was able to deploy the concept in his first contact with Taino peoples on the island of Guanahani in 1492. It is necessary to continue studying these uses prior to 1492, just like it is important to consider the Middle Passage, after 1492, to understand the full scope of how the differentiation between people with religion and people without it came to define Western attitudes toward colonized peoples in the unparalleled planetary expansion of the system of presuppositions, symbols, and institutions that is called Western modernity. It is also important to consider that more crucial than the specific categorical distinction between people with religion and people without it is what it creates: an environment where, no matter how well a racialized group performs, demonstrates, or is simply assumed to have “religion” or any features reserved for humans, their full humanity is still continually put into question.

Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois. Credit: Bain News Service, publisher / Public domain.

Looking back from the vantage point of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the formidable social scientist and thinker W. E. B. Du Bois recognized the problem well when he wrote, “Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question”: “How does it feel to be a problem?”[1] This perpetual question is a manifestation of the Manichean misanthropic skeptical attitude toward Black people, indigenous people, and people of color that entered Western modernity perhaps most clearly through the distinctions between having religion (and a soul) and not having religion.[2] This skeptical attitude is like a dangerous poison that turns a desire for progress and civilization into genocidal acts.

Du Bois confirms the ever-present character and reach of this modern/colonial attitude when he writes that “above [the] actual words and obligato of tune and tone” of “even the sweeter souls of the dominant world” continually plays the following recommendation:

‘My poor, un-white thing! Weep not nor rage. I know too well, that the curse of God lies heavy on you. Why? That is not for me to say, but be brave! Do your work in your lowly sphere, praying the good Lord that into heaven above, where all is love, you may, one day, be born—white!’”[3]

Du Bois describes a social reality where Manichean misanthropic skepticism is no longer a doubt or a question, and not merely a matter of science and fact that can be refuted with evidence, but a belief and a tenet of faith. The audacity of such a religion, a “religion of whiteness” or “white religion,” to use Du Bois’s terms, is such that the recommendation of a prayer for whiteness turns the racist question about the humanity of someone into the expectation of self-annihilation—to kill the Black in oneself so that the white can be born.

Misanthropic skepticism thus generates its own colonial and racist spirituality as well as a prayer that serves as a constant reminder about the meaning and value of whiteness: “whiteness is the ownership of the earth forever and ever, Amen!”[4] The identification and critical analyses of questions, attitudes, prayers, religions, and spiritualities that harbor and reproduce coloniality is as important as the analysis of “religious” formations that counter the prayers and spirituality of whiteness. These are all important areas for decolonial religious studies, decolonial philosophy of religion, and decolonial theologies.

In short, the anthropological discourse about religion was from the outset deeply implicated in the discourse of race and in projects of global expansion and socio-political control. It is thus not possible to understand the genesis and power of the anthropological category of religion without understanding race and modern colonialism, and it is not possible to understand the formation and workings of race without understanding the various uses and functions of “religion” in the modern/colonial world. Determining who has religion and what kind of religion they have is clearly then, not merely a disinterested scholarly affair, but a crucial endeavor in the design of an increasingly globalized modern/colonial order.

The Spread of Colonial Logics

Surely, with time, Western societies conceded (or were made to concede) that basically all peoples around the globe had one religion or another, just as they had culture. But it is important to recognize that this only happened in a context where the West found other markers by which to distinguish itself and maintain its sense of superiority over non-Western others. This was the case especially in relation to “Black” people, whom they regarded as natural slaves. The new terms used to discriminate were philosophy and science, which opened up the possibility of formally conceiving the study of religion as a scientific affair or as an extension of philosophical reflections on religion or religious ethics.

The entanglement of science and philosophy in the reproduction of modernity/coloniality is clear in the reproduction of racist taxonomies, craniometry, and presuppositions about the intellectual capacities and autonomy of non-Western peoples through the 19th century, for example. In the United States, these found a home, probably less in religious seminaries than in the emerging universities of the time, which in turn became homes for Religious Studies. There were also notions of high culture and low culture, as well as of rational religions and primitive religions that came to inform work in the field. The classification of the religions of the colonized as primitive or irrational was instrumental to sustain the dehumanizing logic that justified colonialism and slavery.

The conception of religion as truly universal, including collectives that had been considered as lacking religion before—although not so clearly including people who were considered to be natural slaves—did not challenge the racist differentiation between the colonizers and the colonized. It rather became another form of colonization via inclusion. That is, Christian categories for understanding Christianity—as well as modern/colonial distinctions between the religious and the secular—became the optics through which other “religions” would be observed and analyzed. The religious would be distinguished from the secular, and Christianity would often be conceived as the religious formation most attuned with modernity and the secular organization of society.

In this framework, non-Western religions could only aspire to be represented as “world religions.” However, achieving this status would still keep them at odds with modernity because the number of followers and geographical extension of a religion does not endow it with the capacity to offer a ground for or to complement a rationally organized society. For regardless of geographical reach and size, in relation to Christianity any “world religion” could be represented as irrational. The political repercussions of this should be clear since the more irrational any “religion” is represented the more threatening it appears—take the discourse on Islam and Islamophobia today, for instance. Coloniality, therefore, takes place not only when certain practices are excluded from the category of religion, but also when they are included in it. A decolonial turn in the study of religion takes a critical engagement with this logic of categorization as a necessary step in the production of any new knowledge about religion or the religious.

Religious Studies and Decoloniality

Religious Studies has certain advantages over traditional disciplinary formations when it comes to engaging in a decolonial turn. To start, its interdisciplinary character can make the religious studies scholar less attached to the methods and organizing principles of any discipline than mono-disciplinary scholars. Interdisciplinarity can lead to a healthy skepticism of the powers of any given discipline in light of the way the categories it employs are bound up with categories central to other disciplines. And yet, interdisciplinarity falls short of introducing a decolonial turn because the modern Western disciplines are themselves typically built on the epistemological edifice of coloniality.

“La presión” by Giovani Diaz Morales. Mural in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico. Photo courtesy of the author.

Combining Western-centric disciplines does not make the combination any less Western-centric or colonial. For example, religious studies scholars could employ linguistics and geography to study the Middle East and still reproduce Orientalism. Studying Judaism through the lenses of archaeology and hermeneutics could remain confined within and reproduce an anti-Semitic framework. Cultural anthropologists could add area studies to their scholarly tool set and also remain limited by explicitly or implicitly approaching indigenous populations as if they are passive or largely ignorant. In short, the proliferation of inter-disciplinarity by itself does not challenge the color-line. The same is true of reassertions of mono-disciplinary formations and of defenses of science, the humanities, and the liberal arts. More creative and audacious thinking is needed to turn academic disciplines and inter-disciplines, including Religious Studies, into consistent engines of decoloniality.

Given how instrumental the identification and study of religion has been for the conceptualization and legitimization of the modern/colonial order, Religious Studies has to engage in self-critique along with a wider critique of the modern European sciences to help dispel the limitations and dangerous effects of modernity/coloniality. For this, a positive relation with emancipatory and decolonial transdisciplinary spaces such as Ethnic Studies and related fields becomes necessary. These fields not only have a long history of critical engagement with the traditional disciplines, but they have also formulated questions and produced approaches that are crucial in uncovering coloniality. They generate knowledge that contributes to decolonization, and seek to create border zones of decolonial activity in between the university and a wide array of knowledges that are found outside it. A decolonial turn in Religious Studies through a generative interaction with Ethnic Studies and related fields, and with other decolonial projects inside and outside the university as well as in different parts of the world, is crucial to produce a twenty-first century Religious Studies. Likewise, as I hope that the analysis of white religion and prayer above demonstrates, fields such as Ethnic Studies and decolonial projects outside the academy could gain much from the analyses and insights of decolonial Religious Studies, decolonial philosophy of religion, and decolonial forms of religious thought and theology.

 

[1] W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk. Authoritative Text. Contexts. Criticisms, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Terri Hume Oliver (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999), p. 9.

[2] For an exploration of misanthropy, white supremacy, and an analysis of a white God in an anti-black world see Lewis R. Gordon, Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1995).

[3] W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Souls of White Folk,” in Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil (New York: Humanity Books, 2002 [1920]), p. 56.

[4] ibid., 56. A picture of “religious leaders” praying in the Oval Office with Donald Trump after he signed the proclamation for a national day of prayer on Sept. 1, 2017 lends itself to further analysis of the prayer of whiteness, white religion, and white Christianity. J. Kameron Carter uses the picture in his column entitled “Behind Christianity Today’s Editorial is a Deeper Crisis of America’s Religion of Whiteness,” Religion News Service, Dec. 24, 2019.

Nelson Maldonado-Torres
Nelson Maldonado-Torres is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, Professor Extraordinarious at the University of South Africa, and Honorary Professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban, South Africa. A former President of the Caribbean Philosophical Association, he co-chairs the Frantz Fanon Foundation, and is a senior associate of the Soweto-based Blackhouse Kollective. His work focuses on the philosophical dimensions of coloniality, race, and decoloniality, and he has published extensively in phenomenology, the theory of religion, the philosophy of race, and the theoretical foundations of ethnic studies. His publications in English include the monograph Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity (Duke University Press, 2008), and the co-edited anthologies Latin@s in the World-System: Decolonization Struggles in the 21st Century U.S. Empire (Routledge, 2005), and Decolonial Feminism in Abya Yala: Caribbean, Meso, and South American Contributions and Challenges (Rowman and Littlefield, 2022). Relevant articles and book chapters include “Religion, Modernity, and Coloniality,” Religion, Conquest, and Race in the Foundations of the Modern/Colonial World,” “The Meaning and Function of Religion in an Imperial World,” “Secularism and Religion in the Modern/Colonial World System: From Secular Postcoloniality to Postsecular Transmodernity,” “What is Decolonial Critique?,” and the forthcoming “Combative Decoloniality and the Abolition of the Humanities” (Routledge Companion to Postcolonial and Decolonial Literature, ed. L.R. Brueck, and P. Gopinath).
Decoloniality article

A Decolonial Theory of Religion

Columbus Before the Queen (1843) by Emanuel Leutze. Linking key events in the timeline of Ibero-colonial encounters, Leutze anachronistically depicts Columbus before the “Catholic Monarchs” inside the Alhambra palace of the recently conquered Emirate of Granada. {{PD-US}}

Decolonial thought presents important challenges to the academic study of religion. Numerous studies probing its relation to religion have been published in recent years within the various sub-disciplines in the field, yet the full significance decolonial thought offers for the study of religion needs yet to be unpacked. Decolonial thought and its analytic of modernity/coloniality as a theory and method for the study of religion calls for a careful reconsideration of the dominant—yet often unmarked and unnoticed–Eurocentric epistemic framework dictating the field.

The emergence of decolonial thought in the Americas is rooted in the long history of anti-colonial movement and criticism in Latin America and the Caribbean dating back to the first colonial encounter. It is, however, in the recent works of the Argentinean-Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel and the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano that a clearer notion of decolonial thinking emerges that parallels and complements postcolonial theory as developed by Edward Said and his interlocutors. Quijano’s notion of the coloniality of power highlights the polychronic nature of power that is operative in colonialism. On this account, coloniality manifests itself beyond the historical institution of colonization.

In his genealogical study of the modern category of religion, Talal Asad shows how the category of religion came to refer to a privatized notion of religion, one which essentializes religions based on their compatibility with the universalizing norm of secular rationality. Many have argued, after Asad, that the construction and the essentialization of the category of religion is itself a problematic endeavor because it reinforces the colonial framework of knowledge (Fitzgerald 2000). Likewise, because their definitions are dependent on one another, the emergence of the secular cannot be separated from the category of religion. Recent debates about secularism interrogate the modern concept of religion, pointing out the undying influence of religion in the constitution of the modern West (Charles Taylor, Jurgen Habermas, Jose Casanova). Yet others point at secularism’s significant role in the constitution of the modern colonial world. A critical study of secularism, they insist, attends to the complex structure of power configuration and power exchange at work in (neo)colonial governance as well. These complex structures both inform the construction of the secular and obscure the normativization of Western liberalism. In other words, the secular has been serving as the ideological banner of modern Western universalism which preserves Western/Christian hegemony while depoliticizing (the notion of) religion. [1]

A protest in Barcelona, where multiple organizations marched towards the statue of Columbus denouncing the genocide and the plundering of the entire colonial process of Latin America. Photo Credit: Flickr user fotomovimiento.org

The modern notion of religion can therefore be viewed as a product of the emergence of modernity/coloniality. Here, secularism functions as the mirror twin of modern religion that welds together the two ends of modernity/coloniality. As Walter Mignolo and Nelson Maldonado Torres have shown, the invention of race cannot be articulated apart from the emergence of the modern concept of religion. The traditional lines demarcating ontological difference between people shifted from a religious language (religious difference) to a secular language of scientific reason (racial difference). In other words, Europe’s colonial imaginary was constituted by the newly emerging racial categories which now replaced religion’s role of drawing lines of hierarchal difference among diverse populations. From the fifteenth-century Spanish inquisition to the sixteenth-century Valladolid debate, and from the missionary activities in the new world to the rise of comparative study of religion in nineteenth century Europe, religion—in its secularized iteration—was racialized and became instrumental in marking off ontological differences which aligned with Europe’s colonial interests.[2]

The substantial role religion has played in the historical trajectory of modernity/coloniality is obscured by the hegemonic installation of secularism as the ideology dictating the Western epistemic framework. This means that the secular can be viewed as the medium through which religion enacts coloniality. The large absence of engagement with religion in the study of modernity/coloniality is symptomatic of the coloniality of knowledge which informs the religious/secular binary. Taking decolonial thought seriously means considering the challenges and insights decolonial thought offers to the study of religion, especially as they pertain to questions about methods, texts, sites, and conceptual frameworks. There is an urgent need for a Trans-Atlantic, decolonial theory (or a decolonial method) for the study of religion in which scholars re-situate the Americas and the Trans-Atlantic historical experience as primary sites for theorizing modern religion. The collusion between the colonial encounter and the emergence of the modern study of religion has been pointed out by many already. Many suggest that the eighteenth and nineteenth century of colonialism are primary reference points for this collusion. While the modern discipline of the academic study of religion was certainly informed by the more recent imperialist enterprises of Europe, there is a much older and more important time and place for understanding the symbiotic relation between the simultaneous invention of the colonial other and the modern imaginary of the West: the colonial encounter of 1492.

Using the Spanish-American colonial encounter as a frame of reference for the study of religion and modernity/coloniality offers a more efficient starting point for interrogating the fundamental epistemic assumptions inscribed in the conceptual-theoretical frameworks employed in the study of modern religion. At the same time, focusing here also helps us to read the Latin American intervention in religion from a decolonial angle, highlighting the decolonial seeds that existed all along in Latin American religious thought. Eventually, this endeavor will lead to the call for an engagement with Latin American/Caribbean intellectual traditions among scholars of religion in the North American academy.

A decolonial theory of religion would involve reconsidering the Trans-Atlantic process of imperial designing as the primary site for analyzing modern religion—a process which involves the reconfiguration of the religious (racial) cartography in the Iberian peninsula (Spanish Inquisition), the colonial encounter, and the theological-legal debates on the humanity of the colonial other (Valladolid debates).[3] Other key sites that deserve equally important attention include the various anti-colonial indigenous thoughts and movements, liberation philosophies and theologies, as well as the work of scholars who turn to the historical experience of the African diaspora in order to probe and reflect on an alternative to the modern/colonial order and its worldview that is based on anti-blackness.

An auto-da-fé of the Spanish Inquisition and the execution of sentences by burning heretics on the stake in a market place. Wood engraving by Bocort after H.D. Linton.

The general lack of engagement with religion in the field of decolonial theory is indicative of the hegemonic secularist regime which informs the theoretical categories employed for identifying and analyzing religion. Consequently, not only is the role of religion in coloniality unexplored, but so are the complex intellectual genealogies constituting diverse forms of anti-colonial movements and ideas (many of which are inspired and informed by religious sources). This is why engaging secular texts and thinkers deserves equally as much attention as religious ideas and movements in the Americas. When considering the mutual imbrication of religious/aesthetic/cultural sensibilities and political vision in the Americas, it is highly imperative that we reconsider these secular texts (such as Frantz Fanon’s or José Martí’s) as sources for theorizing religion. Failure to do so results in the continuous loss of nuanced critiques and understandings of religion in those texts, as well as an understanding of the full implication of their political vision. The fact that the study of Latin American and Caribbean religions is primarily dominated by the study of local communities’ “practice” elements, while little attention is given to their intellectual production, might be symptomatic of the practitioner-scholar divide in religious studies that Aisha M Beliso-De Jesús has recently observed. Such a divide reproduces the academic division of labor between the West and the non-West, or between the northern hemisphere and the global south, in which the Christian West/North produces knowledge through theory (text), while the contribution of the non-Christian global South is consigned to practice (ritual).

Using the Ibero-colonial encounter as the primary reference for the study of religion and colonialism offers critical resources for reconsidering the problem of knowledge and power inscribed in the process of knowledge production within the field of religious studies. It exposes the complex layers of coloniality of power in which religion (and its study) is implicated. The analytics of modernity/coloniality allows us to see the critical importance of re-situating the study of Western religion in the Trans-Atlantic framework. At the same time, examining the colonial Americas from the Trans-Atlantic perspective leads us to a fuller understanding of Western-secular modernity which emerges with its inseparable other, coloniality.

 

[1] On these points see Richard King, Peter Van der Veer (here and here), Talal Asad, and Tomoko Masuzawa.

[2] These issues are discussed in the works by J. Z. Smith; David Chidester; Brent Nongbri; Charles Long, and  Nelson Maldonado-Torres

[3] Lewis Hanke and Anthony Pagden have published numerous studies on the impact of the Valladolid Debates in the colonial encounter.

An Yountae
An Yountae is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at California State University, Northridge. He specializes in Religions of the Americas with a particular focus on Latin American/Caribbean religion and philosophy. He is the author of The Decolonial Abyss (Fordham University Press, 2016) as well as the co-editor with Eleanor Craig of Beyond Man: Race, Coloniality, and Philosophy of Religion (Duke University Press, 2021). His new book, The Coloniality of the Secular: Race, Religion, and Poetics of World Making is forthcoming from Duke University Press (2023).
Decoloniality article

Introduction to Decoloniality and the Study of Religion

Mexico City – Palacio Nacional. Mural by Diego Rivera showing the History of Mexico: Detail showing the burning of Maya literature by the Catholic Church. Image Credit: Wolfgang Sauber.

Theories of (de)coloniality raise profound questions and possibilities for the study of religion. Decolonial theory names and challenges enduring social, economic, political, and epistemic Eurocentrism that continues to define modernity even beyond the era of direct colonial domination. Bringing a decolonial lens to Contending Modernities opens up crucial new sites of analysis and engagement, as we consider how the academic study of religion—and the concept of religion itself—has helped to perpetuate modernity’s violences, and might yet contribute to the project of decoloniality. Contending Modernities’ new series, “Decoloniality and the Study of Religion,” brings together preliminary reflections from thinkers exploring the intersection between decolonial thought and the academic study of religion, with future posts planned that will delve into different sub-disciplines in the study of religion such as comparative religious ethics, philosophy of religion, and theory and method in the study of religion.

The Co-Constitution of Racial and Religious Difference

The essays in this series have two goals. First, they show how modern, Western conceptions of religion reinforce a global system of power that decolonial thinkers refer to as modernity/coloniality, revealing the complicity of the academic study of religion in these enduring patterns of violence. As An Yountae’s essay shows, decolonial thinkers draw an explicit linkage between the emergence of the category of religion itself and the simultaneous construction of racial and geographical (European/non-European) difference. In particular, decolonial thinkers point to 1492 and the completion of the settler-colonial Christian conquest of the Iberian Peninsula and the subsequent expulsion or forced conversion of the peninsula’s Jewish and Muslim inhabitants. In the aftermath of the fall of Granada, Jews and Muslims who converted to Catholicism remained persecuted as marranos (“swine”) under suspicions of crypto-Jewish and crypto-Islamic practices, revealing a novel co-mingling of religious and racial difference articulated in contrast with its constitutive (white/Christian/European) other through an emergent racial logic of blood purity. These interlinked Iberian constructions of racial and religious difference were subsequently globalized through European colonial encounters with indigenous peoples on the land that would become the Americas, and through the explosion of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans.

In the centuries since, this foundational construction of religious difference has functioned alongside interrelated and intersecting constructions of racial, gender, and geographical difference to frame systems of social, economic, and political domination—the conditions of coloniality—that reinforce the supremacy of a Eurocentered modernity over and against the perceived inferiority of those it has relegated to its darker side. As Kwok Pui Lan’s essay illustrates, the colonial construction of religion vis-à-vis the referent of a Eurocentered modernity has also been subsequently transmuted through modernity’s “secularist myth,” further reinforcing the othering of non-Western religions as backwards, irrational, and even violent in contrast to the modern, rational, and supposedly peaceful West.

Against this historical backdrop, the academic study of religion has itself functioned as an active participant in the perpetuation of modernity/coloniality’s Eurocentric hierarchy of knowledge production. Both during and beyond the era of direct European colonization, Western scholars of religion have played an active role in the imposition of Western concepts that have invisibilized non-Western ways of knowing and being in the world, flattening the epistemologies and ontologies of non-Western peoples within universalizing categories to fit within modernity’s self-narration. The Western academic delineation of “culture” from “religion” as distinct objects of study functioned through the age of colonial expansion to reductively categorize any number of non-Western epistemologies and constituted ontologies—that is, lived non-Western ways of knowing and being in the world—into the “backwards” or “primitive” categories of folklore, myth, and superstition. Nelson Maldonado-Torres’s essay elucidates a similar Eurocentric logic at work in the construction of the category of non-Western “world religions,” a thinly-veiled proxy indicator for racial, geographic, and even temporal (not “fully modern”) difference that marks the non-Christian religious as constitutively outside the modern West. As Tomoko Masuzawa explains in The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (also quoted by Maldonado-Torres), rather than affirming global religious pluralism as Western scholars might claim, the imposition of the category of “world religions” itself naturalizes an explicitly Christian theological lens for understanding what constitutes a religion in the first place, while simultaneously inscribing all non-Christian religions within a hierarchal system of rank-ordering that continually reaffirms (modern, Western) Christian hegemony. Through these two interpretive categories—world religions and culture—Western scholars thus continue to advance narratives of racialized religious difference whose shared logics are traceable to the encounters of 1492, dividing non-Europeans into those possessed of the wrong religions (Iberian Jews and Muslims first, and later adherents to any of the various non-Christian “world religions”) and those possessed of no religion recognizable as such (especially the indigenous peoples of the Americas).

De-Linking Religion From Modernity/Coloniality

Anti-neoliberalism protestors display flags and other symbols of Chile’s indigenous Mapuche people. Image Credit: Maximiliano Vega.

The second goal of these essays is to contribute to a burgeoning focus on the possibilities of imagining religion de-linked from the universalizing logics of modernity/coloniality. Such an approach rejects a modern Western conception of religion as a unitary, discrete variable that can be neatly disaggregated from other facets of human experience—what Kwok Pui Lan describes as “sui generis and separated from other cultural, social, and political aspects.” Instead, while highlighting the insufficiency of an unreconstructed understanding of religion, these essays also indicate the possibility of reconceptualizing religion in a way not reducible to the all-encompassing epistemological claims of a Westernized modernity. To this end, the essays in this series indicate the vital importance of the many ways of knowing and being in the world that have been suppressed in part through the use of the modern, Western category of religion itself.

Despite religion’s problematic genealogy as a category of Western analysis, these essays indicate the vital roles that decolonized accounts of religion might play in the formation of what decolonial thinkers refer to as “loci of enunciation“—a sense of positionality that reflects how one is acted upon by the global colonial matrix of power—from which ethical and political alternatives to modernity/coloniality can be imagined and enacted. Abdulkader Tayob’s essay in particular highlights the possibilities of a decolonized approach to Islamic Studies—and the study of religion more broadly—rooted not in the universalizing comparative hermeneutics of the colonizers, which presume a neutral vantage point that somehow transcends their subjects of study, but rather in the critical intellectual productions of Muslim communities themselves. Such an approach, to borrow a phrase from Tayob, helps to effect the provincialization of modern, Western approaches to the study of religion without simultaneously re-exceptionalizing them, opening the doors to dialogical possibilities between “other ways of thinking of religion and the religious.”

Decolonial thought unmasks the histories of violence that undergird Europe’s self-appointed status as the sole producer and purveyor of knowledge. Confronting these histories and their enduring structural manifestations requires that we also confront the epistemic legacies of colonialism that inhere within the Western academy. In the study of religion, this includes confronting the Eurocentrism of the field’s definitional concepts and categories and admitting the roles they have played in legitimizing the historic and enduring violences of Europe’s colonial projects. To that end, these essays offer an important and timely intervention into conversations on how the academic study of religion has participated in the maintenance of the modern/colonial world-system’s social, political, economic, and epistemic hierarchicalizations, while also indicating ways forward for the decolonial study of religion.

Garrett FitzGerald
Garrett FitzGerald is a PhD candidate of Political Science & Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame and Research Associate for Contending Modernities. Garrett’s research interests focus on translating religious resources of meaning into political action, especially around the genesis, conduct, cessation, and processes of reconciliation that follow communal violence. In particular, he hopes to build upon previous field research in Honduras, exploring ways in which religious actors and communities articulate and enact alternatives to violence.
Theorizing Modernities article

Mobility beyond Modernity: A Response to Baum, Englund, Grillo, and Obadare

Landscape of northern Mozambique. Photo Courtesy of Devaka Premawardhana.

It is an author’s dream-come-true to have their work carefully read and thoughtfully evaluated. Even more so in this case, where the interlocutors with my book are among its most important influences. I sincerely thank Robert Baum, Harri Englund, Laura Grillo, and Ebenezer Obadare for their collegial and considerable engagements with Faith in Flux, for capturing as well as they have what I hoped would read as the book’s main interventions, and for continuing the conversation with incisive questions and critiques. Thanks also to Joshua Lupo and the entire editorial team of Contending Modernities for hosting this symposium.

It is significant that each of the interlocutors is an Africanist, a specialist in the continent long considered to be little more than a supplier of data for western knowledge production. Yet each of them has advanced in their own way a necessary corrective: that Africa provides not just raw materials but the very frameworks and paradigms that themselves can illuminate social and historical processes on the continent, but also in different parts of the world and, indeed, with respect to global modernity itself.

Regrettably, the popular and, in even some academic quarters, prevailing view is of Africa as a place of negation. Germane to the argument of Faith in Flux is the Hegelian depiction of Africa having “no movement or development to exhibit.” This trope of stasis finds expression in the unguardedly racist remarks of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy when he says, “The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered into history.” Yet it is there even in benign pronouncements from Time magazine and the Economist magazine about “Africa rising,” or in  US President Barack Obama’s declaration that Africa is “on the move.” These latter comments refer to Africa’s recent economic gains, health advances, and inroads against corruption. All of these are worth celebrating, of course, but when is it that Africa was not rising, not on the move?

I am grateful to the interlocutors with Faith in Flux for noting as its central argument that the image of “traditional” Africa as timeless and immobile is not just wrong. It runs diametrically counter to much empirical evidence. Mobility as associated with transnationalism, diaspora, and long-distance migration has become a buzzword in the study of modernity. But modernity, it must not be forgotten, has also introduced border regimes and border thinking, promoted settlement and sedentariness, and privileged bounded identities and permanent residents. By looking at mobility beyond Eurocentric accounts of modernity, Faith in Flux aims to disrupt the top-down projects of self-conscious modernizers—whether agents of the state, of Pentecostalism, or of reductive social science—who favor the singular and stable over the multiple and mobile.

For the Makhuwa-speaking people among whom I worked, stasis is tantamount to death. To live is to move, to be is to become, and to endure is to embrace the potentialities—and vulnerabilities—of continuous change. The Makhuwa privilege fluidity and flexibility. Thus, what I document about their ambivalent reception of Pentecostalism should not suggest an incapacity of any sort. The title of my book, Faith in Flux, is not meant to indict the Makhuwa for having a faith that is in flux, but to highlight their capacity for putting their faith in flux—in the virtue or the value of adaptability, elasticity, and change.

Makhuwa carpenters transporting finished products to market. Photo Courtesy of Devaka Premawardhana.

The concern has been raised—not by the interlocutors here—that my book’s focus is too narrow to be of relevance beyond the very small number of researchers who also care about rural Mozambique. Here again is the tendency to find mobility interesting only if it applies transnationally or to consider Pentecostalism significant only with respect to its global reach. But the hope of Faith in Flux is (to invoke the anthropological dictum) to explore large issues from small places. It is also to show that if prominent themes in contemporary theory—hybridity, heterogeneity, mobility, diaspora—are truly relevant, their relevance must hold not only in obviously cosmopolitan sites (urban centers, transnational networks, the World Wide Web), but even in such “out-of-the-way” spaces as rural Africa.

Yet it is concerning that both African studies and anthropology have come of late to spurn the rural in favor of the urban and cosmopolitan. There are highly generative ways of studying African Pentecostalism in relation to state power, civil society, and other macro-scale phenomena. Obadare’s groundbreaking scholarship out of Nigeria demonstrates this well. But, in general, as Englund has suggested, the study of Pentecostalism in Africa has focused so much on urban and middle-class populations that much has been missed—for example, “the intricate webs of relationships within which the majority of African Pentecostals live their lives, never quite able, or even willing, to confine their social and spiritual existence to the church.” Baum and Grillo, in their respective long-term projects, exemplify well the value of contextualized research sensitive to cultural complexities even in seemingly remote settings. Against trends within religious studies that see Islam and Christianity displacing what came before, both argue for the resilience of the indigenous in the contemporary world. Evident in the work of all four interlocutors is that to spend time conducting long-term and localized fieldwork is not to dwell on so many irrelevancies, but to take the measure of modernity—or modernities—itself.

I turn now from common ground to questions, critiques, and challenges. For these I also am grateful, not just because they provide an opportunity to clarify key parts of my project, but also because they demonstrate about scholarship what the Makhuwa illustrate about life: it, too, is never static or complete, but rather ever-unfolding with each new encounter.

The first of Obadare’s provocations regards what I describe as the banality of conversion—its regularity and reversibility in the Makhuwa context. He notes from his own work on Nigerian Pentecostals the premium placed on being “born again,” on breaking with one’s former self. I would not deny that a similar understanding operates among the Makhuwa. I only question whether breaking with the past precludes breaking back to it, particularly when that “past” is already marked by an openness to change. There is indeed something powerful about “born again” experiences, but it may be presumptuous to associate them only with born-again Christians, or to assume that being born again cannot be followed by being born again again. Obadare also asks whether Pentecostalism’s presence in the farthest reaches of Mozambique in fact confirms claims of Pentecostal explosion that I call into question. Even if Pentecostalism has failed to take root there, it is there, and that may be the point. This entirely legitimate interpretation allows me to clarify that my critique of the “Pentecostal explosion” narrative does not mean to question the empirical fact of Pentecostal expansion (even “to the ends of the Earth”) but rather the demographic claim that wherever Pentecostalism goes it grows. It is also to question the assumption that wherever Pentecostalism goes it displaces what stands in its way. This notion of rupture does not apply in the case I observed because indigenous traditions persist even in and through the lives of Pentecostal converts—and this is because Makhuwa “tradition” is itself elastic enough to encompass the kinds of radical change demanded by Pentecostal conversion. Finally, Obadare questions my questioning of the bourgeois tendency to locate well-being in secure and stable identities. My worry is the ease with which those who live by this tendency naturalize it, viewing not just themselves but everyone else through what anthropologist Liisa Malkki calls a “sedentarist bias.” This bias makes structurally invisible such liminal figures as refugees (the focus of her research) and converts (the focus of mine) and blinds us to how such people manage to make meaningful lives not despite, but by, living on the edge.

The author with spouse Kalinka Caldas Premawardhana outside their home in Kaveya village. Photo courtesy of Devaka Premawardhana.

In his response, Englund raises fair critiques of the existential-phenomenological approach for which I advocate insofar as it carries with it the potential to shortchange such issues as hierarchy, inequality, and structure. Englund pushes me to practice what I (or the Makhuwa) preach: to be less fixed on agency and improvisation and, instead, to oscillate between a privileging of individual subjectivity and a reckoning with conditions and constraints. I appreciate that Englund notes where I do acknowledge the heavy-handed border policing of state actors, development workers, and Pentecostal evangelists. I also appreciate Englund’s own language of human interactions being “structured and yet not determined.” Precisely this is the dialectic I try to uphold with my theorizing of existential mobility (16-21). My argument there is that some people may be prone to move, and prone to convert, not in spite of cultural conditions and structural constraints, but (at least partially) because of them. Both Makhuwa and Pentecostal frameworks promote mobility from within. The more grounded one is in either, the more conditioned one is to make moves—sometimes within, sometimes beyond. This attempt at reconciling existential and structural approaches may not convince, but if I err I am not ashamed to err on the side of agency and improvisation, on Englund’s “and yet not determined.” Social scientific analyses too often omit living and breathing human beings—individuals in all their indeterminacy and irreducibility. If it is an over-correction to privilege what historian Michel de Certeau terms “the practice of everyday life” or anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski “the imponderabilia of actual life,” it is one that is badly needed, one incidentally that ethnographers are particularly well equipped to make.

Turning to Grillo, I am afraid she misreads me when she writes of my “reach[ing] for an overarching vision” having to do with maternity and matricentric. I did not set out to study gender among the Makhuwa. I wrote as much as I did on the topic only because it presented itself to me in the field. My book does not aim or claim to exhaust the topic, and could not have anyway because my positionality as a male researcher made female perspectives largely inaccessible to me. Grillo faults me for basing my analysis of gender on a male, but not a female, initiation rite. In my defense, I could only go where I was allowed. Perhaps, then, I should have remained silent on gender, but that would have courted a different and well-deserved critique. It also would have caused me to miss extraordinary insights into what was, indeed, the “overarching vision” to which I was reaching: an appreciative understanding of the circularity of religious conversion. With regard to that theme, Grillo rightly raises the issue of maternal return in Makhuwa male initiation. Anthropologists have typically cast male initiation as a unilinear transition—from sexually amorphous childhood to strictly male adulthood—but the prominence of the maternal in Makhuwa male initiation suggests more a “rite of return” than a “rite of passage.” This, I argue, helps us understand why conversion, analogous in many ways to initiation, is frequently also circular, also reversible. Respecting my discussion of the masculinization of social life via modernization, and the ability of Makhuwa women to still retain a degree of autonomy, Grillo is clearly unconvinced. But she oddly dwells more on my argument’s style than on its substance. Her one example of “hard facts” countermanding my “seductive” and “clever” analysis is on a different issue, and here again she misreads me. My assessment of corporeal continuity between Pentecostalism and indigenous traditions does not deny that Pentecostal pastors enact a bodily rigidity at odds with Makhuwa mobility. It does, however, refuse to make pastors the only, or even the best, representatives of Pentecostalism. The “bottom up” approach by which Grillo describes my work entails attending at least as much to the movements of ordinary women and men—movements that cross, and cut across, traditions—as to the efforts of elites to arrest such movements.

The amplification of marginal perspectives is a defining virtue of Baum’s scholarship. It is tremendously gratifying, therefore, to read his generous response to Faith in Flux. Baum has consistently argued for the persistence of the indigenous not despite, but often in and through, processes of modernization, Christianization, and Islamization. He is right to have critiqued Robin Horton’s influential theory of conversion in his 1990 article, and he is kind to say that my approach adds a layer of nuance to his critique. What Baum’s own reading of my work through his earlier reading of Horton calls to mind is a problem with yet another of Horton’s influential discussions—on rationality—in which he bifurcates “closed” traditional cultures and “open” scientific ones. This is precisely the kind of dualism—between tradition and modernity, continuity and change, Africa and the West—against which my book strenuously argues. If anything, it may ironically be African tradition, despite what “tradition” connotes, that does more to promote openness and engagement. It draws not on western metaphysics with its mania for separation, differentiation, and closure, but on African metaphysics, which, as critical theorist Achille Mbembe argues, allows us to think of identity in movement. Thus, what Baum calls “reconversion” may owe not only to the failure of Christianity to respond to “local experience,” but to the ways “local experience” promotes endogenously the kinds of mobility and creativity often associated with the West and denied to Africa.

Let me close by again expressing deep gratitude to Baum, Englund, Grillo, and Obadare for attending so carefully to the arguments of Faith in Flux. What revisiting my book through their eyes, and for this forum, has helped clarify is not just the nature of mobility beyond modernity, but also the many forms mobility may take: local and global, religious and ritual, constrained and gendered, spatial and existential. We have learned to speak of multiple modernities. Going forward, we might now speak of multiple mobilities.

Devaka Premawardhana
Devaka Premawardhana is Associate Professor in the Department of Religion at Emory University. His first book, Faith in Flux: Pentecostalism and Mobility in Rural Mozambique, received the best book award from the Society for Pentecostal Studies and was a finalist for the best book award of the Journal of Africana Religions. It was also the subject of an earlier Contending Modernities book symposium.
Theorizing Modernities article

Mobility Without Rupture: Makhuwa, Pentecostalism, and Conversion in Mozambique

Makhuwa women participating in a traditional ritual. Photo courtesy of Devaka Premawardhana.

I was delighted to read Devaka Premawardhana’s recent book, Faith in Flux: Pentecostalism and Mobility in Rural Mozambique. This book offers a rich description of the complex process of sustained interaction between Makhuwa religious traditions, Islam and Catholicism, and new religious traditions associated with Pentecostalism that have become important influences since the end of the Mozambican civil war. Premawardhana builds on careful and sustained field research and an ability to step back and interpret his data with an impressive command of theories relevant to the study of religious change, from Robin Horton to Pierre Bourdieu. In far too many studies of the history of Christianity in Africa, authors assume the steady growth of new religious traditions, treating any resurgence of African traditions as backsliding, rather than a creative response to the challenges of an invasive religion. For example, Robin Horton asserts that African religious influence reaches “the limit of its potential for expansion and development,” (107) before traditions ultimately succumb to what Horton sees as depersonalized forms of religion which are better adapted to modernity. These then become the forms of religion which prevail in the future. Premawardhana complicates the assertion both by scholars and by Pentecostals themselves who claim that conversion to their form of Christianity represents a rupture with prior religious traditions. He demonstrates the ways in which the Mahkuwa’s stress on mobility asserts itself even within Pentecostal movements which strive to separate themselves from the more fluid border between Catholicism and Makhuwa traditions. Throughout the work, Premawardhana moves back and forth between rich descriptive materials and insightful interpretations. This book will be useful not only to students of African religions, but also to anthropologists, historians of religion, psychologists interested in religious conversion, and development specialists interested in the ways that indigenous knowledge systems insert themselves into new situations and make them more understandable and controllable.

Premawardhana immediately takes the reader into the community where he worked, showing how Pentecostals, Catholics, and adherents of Makhuwa traditions cope with the challenges of post-colonial Mozambique, a nation that gained its independence after a long insurgency, only to be divided by a bitter civil war. He examines the way that these different religious traditions are used to explain success and failure in the economic sphere, as well as the tragic death of a young girl within his host family. He brings us into the lives of the community by situating himself and his wife within it, following the best traditions of reflective anthropology. He also provides the readers with insights into the Mozambican Pentecostal minister and teachers who are deeply troubled by the persistent demands of Makhuwa to move between the new teachings and their own received traditions. The ministers complain that Makhuwa converts maintain “one foot in the church and one foot in tradition” (97). This is strikingly similar to their willingness to build houses in settled communities along the road and their insistence on living out in the bush. Outsiders, from government agents to development specialists to religious teachers, express their frustration with their inability to sustain the changes they seek to impose in Makhuwa communities. These communities insist on incorporating new ideas and practices within their cultural frameworks. He provides interesting examples of the way that the post-Vatican II missionaries have embraced Makhuwa cultural practices and been allowed to play a central religious role in such important events as male initiation. Teachings, however, are carefully separated for the initiates. Catholic teachings are taught in the daytime and Makhuwa traditions are taught at night. Premawardhana’s understanding of this form of community ritual practice allows him to critique ideas of syncretism and hybridity in favor of mobility.

Part of the reason that this mobility persists, however, is the far greater prominence of women healers and ritual specialists in Makhuwa practice than either among Catholics or Muslims. Despite the strenuous opposition of Pentecostals to local traditions, they are the only ones who have a parallel practice of women as healers. Neither Muslim nor Catholic women exercise leadership roles in any way comparable to that of Makhuwa practitioners or the Pentecostals. The parallels between Pentecostal and Makhuwa traditions are not just limited to matters of gender. Their emphasis on using ritual to directly influence people’s daily lives are similar. But Pentecostals place these rituals within the context of rupture, and of a linear progression toward their religious community. Makhuwa seek to shape them in more fluid ways.

I write this as someone who has had a long engagement with these issues, albeit on the opposite end of the continent, among the Diola of Senegal. In a 1990 article, “The Emergence of a Diola Christianity,” I critiqued Robin Horton’s intellectualist theory of conversion by focusing on conversion as a long process in which conflicts between older systems of belief and the demands of the new religious tradition must be resolved, though in a variety of ways. Horton explicitly links conversion to Islam or Christianity from African religious traditions to the colonial-inspired breakdown of localism and a perceived need to emphasize a supreme being which would be better able to deal with problems of what he calls the “macrocosm” than local spirits who dominate what Horton calls the “microcosm.” One way that Diola converts confronted these issues was through what I called “reconversion,” which occurred when the Church did not allow questions arising from local experience to be addressed in the new religious community. When the need for these spiritual questions grew to such an extent that they could not be ignored, converts renounced their new religion and returned to their original religious community, carrying with them new ideas and experiences. Looking back on that article that I wrote 20 years ago, I am struck by how much more nuanced Premawardhana’s approach is. He shows us how Makhuwa assert their own cultural values, and how their ways of understanding community, locations, and mobility were inserted into their new religious communities right from the beginning. His insights into religious mobility will definitely influence my next book project on women prophets in post-colonial Senegal, a book project that I am just beginning to write. In several cases, women raised within the Islamic or Christian tradition became prophets in the Diola religious tradition. In other cases, they have remained outside but aware of these traditions, while embracing their new prophetic roles. Like the Makhuwa, the Diola continue to find understandings of their contemporary situation arising from Diola traditions quite compelling, both within and outside of Christian or Muslim contexts. The concept of religious mobility will help me understand the persistence of the Diola religion within a Senegalese environment dominated by Islam and Christianity.

Devaka Premawardhana has written an important book on the sustained encounter between Makhuwa communities, Christians, and Muslims. His careful field research provides a firm base from which he can shed light on many of the long-standing debates within the study of post-colonial societies and the religious transformations that are so important to understanding them.

Robert Baum
Robert M. Baum is an associate professor of African and African American Studies and Religion at Dartmouth College. He is an affiliated faculty member of the Program in Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies. He is the author of the award-winning book, Shrines of the Slave Trade: Diola Religion and Society in Precolonial Senegambia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), which received the American Academy of Religion’s prize for the best first book in the history of religions. He is also the author of West Africa’s Women of God: Alinesitoué and the Diola Prophetic Tradition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). From 2013 through 2019 he served as Executive Editor of The Journal of Religion. He is currently writing a continent-wide history of African religions, primarily focused on indigenous religions.
Theorizing Modernities article

Evading Masculinized Modernity

Makhuwa women in Mozambique. Photo Credit: Steve Evans.

Devaka Premawardhana’s Faith in Flux is a beautifully written and conceptually rich work that successfully challenges central theoretical assumptions about Pentecostalism in Africa today: that it entails a rupture with the past, especially “traditional” ways of being, and that its spread and imaginal hold has been ubiquitous. Asked to reflect on how Premawardhana’s book resonates with my own, An Intimate Rebuke (2018), I wondered how my study of female genital power (FGP) in the indigenous traditions of West Africa could possibly relate to a work on Pentecostalism in northern Mozambique. Most consonant is a common claim that underlying matrifocal traditions endure and have the capacity to evade the encroachments of a masculinized modernity.

Both our works employ a “bottom up” approach, one that does not deny or minimize the “influence of global forces on local worlds” but reasserts the primacy of local ontologies. Premawardhana’s focus on the “easily overlooked registers” of lived practice (15) is akin to my efforts to make visible the subjugated knowledge of female power. My book strings together the beads of evidence of an ancient and widespread, but often overlooked, “local” ritual of anti-witchcraft, and shows it to embody a foundational African principal: Post-menopausal women, called the Mothers, wield an innate moral authority. Stripping and exposing their breasts and genitals as the seat of their power, they curse any who violate the moral mandates. Women deploy their “bottom power” as a spiritual weapon, but also mobilize and perform FGP to protest the state’s abuse of secular authority. So I argue that the Mothers’ embodied rebuke challenges the meta-narratives of modernity that assume that only a rupture with traditional ways can usher in greater liberation and empowerment. Likewise, Premawardhana reads the everyday occurrences of the Makhuwa people against the grain of well-worked theoretical assumptions about tradition’s inflexibility. Challenging the idea that African Pentecostalism is experienced as a radical break from local tradition, his “counternarrative” relates a more fluid account of conversion, presenting it as an oscillation between different ways of being (19). Living for a year among the Makhuwa, Premawardhana notices that their “pluralistic disposition” allows them to subscribe to multiple, conflicting religious doctrines, depending on context (104). This is not so much a matter of “syncretism” as an expression of their value of community and the “imperative of intersubjectivity” (105). It allows “conversion” to be sincere, even if fleeting or occasional.

The nomadic Makhuwa have a “long history of not just mobility, but mobility of the circular kind” that allows for return and renewal (64). Their “existential mobility” keeps their traditions vital; when faced with the external pressures of masculinizing modernity, the “matricentric” Makhuwa choose migration over confrontation and capitulation. Such flexibility contrasts sharply with the fixity of the state and its development policies that depend on firmly situating its peasantry within its borders. But Makhuwa mobility only challenges the impositions of the state obliquely. By contrast, in West Africa the Mothers’ public performance of the spectacular rite of FGP directly confronts the postcolonial state and condemns its cruel and brutal violence overtly.

An Intimate Rebuke makes “matrifocal morality” the principle underlying the various manifestations of FGP in ritual and politics, and also shows it to be the founding knowledge and binding power that lends cultural coherence to a plethora of traditions in the region. Premawardhana similarly reaches for an overarching vision, aiming to interpret Makhuwa Pentecostalism as a variation on “the theme of centripetal motherhood traced throughout this book” (165). However the book actually offers only two points of entry for understanding “the matricentric character of Makhuwa society” (25). Ironically, the first and main one is Premawardhana’s analysis of male initiation.

Interior of a Pentecostal church in Mozambique. Photo courtesy of Devaka Premawardhana.

Building on Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner’s classic analyses of the symbolic meaning and transformative power of movement through spatial planes, Premawardhana emphasizes the initiates’ multiple, literal processions to show that they foster “border consciousness” (90). His thesis is that the site of self-making is “full of discontinuous and non-contiguous domains” that instill “dispositions toward malleability” and make Makhuwa see rupture as “routine” (90–91). However, the most crucial moment of initiation is not about clean borders and discontinuities. It is a ritual genital modification that inscribes on the body a symbolic conflation of genders. Premawardhana calls it “circumcision,” although he acknowledges that the operation “does not entail the removal of foreskin, but rather a slit across the top of it” (86). Unlike circumcision that “purifies” men of gender ambiguity by removing excess flesh suggestive of the labia, the object is to draw blood. This “mimesis of menstruation” is clearly referenced by the boys’ ritual guardians who sing, “The vagina has opened!” They explicitly state, “you are imitating your mother,” and make the boys submit to the taboos of menstruating women (86–87). Significantly, Makhuwa neophytes are not permanently separated from the female domain but are returned to their mothers who readily identify and reclaim them. Consideration of penile subincision rites elsewhere would have revealed the procedure’s significance as a symbolic usurpation of female power and gender doubling. In a subsequent chapter we belatedly learn that the Makhuwa measure time by the phases of the moon, which are associated with the cyclical rhythm of women’s menses; that the full moon is the time of contact with the ancestral spirits; and that women exclusively act as healers who perform their work at night (124). Subincision and bleeding clearly allow men to capture ritually the natural cyclical movement and innate capacity for renewal as their own. Premawardhana suggests the boys temporarily “pass through womanhood” in order to become differentiated from women (89). But Makhuwa subincision actually seems to establish the permanent assimilation of men with women in order to acquire their innate sacrality.

Whether through initiation “gender boundaries are thus simultaneously constructed and traversed” (91) remains a question, rather than a conclusion, for although Premawardhana notes that Makhuwa girls’ initiation takes place at the same time as the boys’, we learn nothing more about it. The male ritual stands as the sole basis of Premawardhana’s theory. Premawardhana’s focus on the male ritual reinforces the stereotype of women’s natural profaneness and subordinates their biological capacities to male religious culture. However, Makhuwa tradition, stories, song-riddles, and even the etymology of the sacred mountain who is mother of humanity (“she who menstruates”),  combine to demonstrate that for the Makhuwa, God is not just “conceived of in feminine terms” but is female (124).

The second, more promising point of entry for understanding Makhuwa matricentricity is an exclusively female healing society. When Premawardhana finally turns attention to this traditional domain, he allows himself to be teased by men into intruding into the women’s sacred circle (124). He submits that he was authorized to “violate the gendered divide” by the healer’s husband who urges Premawardhana to observe it “up close,” and who accompanies him into the hut (124). As in the case of female initiation, however, we never learn any details. More might have been made of the woman’s ability to make bodies whole, or of the sinuous meanderings of the eyinlo, the dance ceremony performed “almost entirely by women” that Premawardhana mentions earlier and only in passing (138). As it stands Makhuwa matricentricity remains an abstraction, a shadow, known essentially through the “side-stepping” moves taken to avoid the fixity and permanence that conversion to Pentecostalism supposedly demands.

Chapter 5 in Part III alone attends to the subject of women directly, especially their status in Makhuwa society. It attempts to account for informants’ regular assertion that “Makhua women have no religion” (117). By “religion” they mean Christianity or Islam, and the comment refers to the fact that “girls follow the religion of their maternal uncles; wives follow the religion of their husbands” (117–18). Premawardhana reinterprets the statement, suggesting that it is not about the modern patriarchal constraints that make it impossible for women to choose their own affiliations voluntarily, but something “quite the opposite of internalized oppression” (129). His creative analysis regularly represents the current women’s situation, no matter how diminished or subjugated, as a defiant retention of traditional power, arguing that it is women’s exclusion from the processes of modernization that has enabled them to preserve matricentric Makhuwa ways (117).

Although he recognizes that women’s lack of access to education was “a travesty” that undermined their prospects in an increasingly cash-based economy, he proposes that this made women “the more accomplished evaders” of a masculinized modernity (131–32). By Premawardhana’s reasoning, it is “because of, not in spite of, the prestige they ‘lack’ today” that women have been able to retain social standing (131). He builds his case on the fact that “in the realm of domestic cults… it is not the wife who follows the ‘religion’ of the husband but exactly the opposite” (126). Even so, he questions whether the matrilineal “domestic ancestral cults” qualify as “religions” (126). With this clever move Premawardhana simultaneously makes the assertion that “women have no religion” appear liberating, and establishes an affinity between women’s indigenous traditions and the embodied, oral expressions characteristic of Pentecostal forms of worship which, he argues, similarly “barely register as religions” (129). Another supposed “collateral benefit” of women’s marginalization from “world religions” (a loaded term that Premawardhana unfortunately uses throughout unproblematically) is that women are able to “draw seamlessly from a variety of traditions, unburdened by the normative concerns of religious elites” (136). Such intellectual acrobatics also allow him to account for women’s disproportionate numbers in the otherwise flailing rural congregations and to deem it a sign of female agency. Women are supposedly attracted not because they enjoy “enhanced authority and autonomy” in that religion but “because it is not a religion” at all (129). Here it felt like truth was sacrificed to rhetoric.

Makhuwa women dancing in Pentecostal church. Photo courtesy of Devaka Premawardhana.

Premawardhana’s poetic prose pairs “conceptual antinomies,” like mobility and return or firmness and flexibility, and works them to persuasive effect (154). His arguments hinge on the generative connection that he draws between them. But, such conceptual brilliance should not blind us from hard facts that push back against otherwise seductive intellectual reconciliations. For example, Premawardhana argues on one hand that “Pentecostal and indigenous traditions are corporeally continuous in ways that defy Pentecostalism’s rhetoric of rupture” with the past (156, emphasis mine). On the other hand, he notes elsewhere that the male Pastor’s firm handshake and rigid upright posture intentionally contrast with women’s sinuous dances and therefore represents a conscious break with the fluid dispositions of the Makhuwa somatic habitus (141, emphasis mine).

The book concludes with an anecdote about a dull Pentecostal church meeting enlivened when the minister puts forth a riddle that invites men to consider whether they owe primary duty to their mother or wife. Presented in the style of an African dilemma tale and palaver, the circular discussion is recounted to illustrate the Makhuwa “skill of polyontological mobility” (169). This ability to dissolve dilemma by embracing seemingly opposing possibilities ostensibly keeps Makhuwa “faith in flux.” (169–70). Ironically, these men “on the move” seem not to notice or care that missing from their circle of church leadership are the very women they purport to revere. While the Makhuwa case may not conform to the scholarly trend that characterizes Pentecostalism as a radical break with tradition, neither does it convincingly portray a fluid retention or cyclical movement of return to the “’Mother’ religions” that Premawardhana suggests are the essence of local ontology.

Laura S. Grillo
Laura S. Grillo earned her Ph.D. in History of Religions from The University of Chicago, and M.Div. from Union Theological Seminary. Her book,
An Intimate Rebuke: Female Genital Power in Ritual and Politics in West Africa (Duke UP, 2018) was a finalist for the Raboteau Prize in Africana Studies. Laura is co-author of the innovative textbook,
Religions in Contemporary Africa (Routledge 2019) as well as author of numerous peer-reviewed journal articles, encyclopedia entries, and chapters in critical anthologies on African and African Diaspora religions and religious ethics. She has held Fellowships at Harvard Divinity School and the Institute for Advanced Studies at Chicago, and was awarded research grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the West Africa Research Association and the American Academy of Religions (AAR). For six years Laura led the African Religions Group in the AAR; she is now on the steering committee of the Women’s Caucus of the African Studies Association (ASA). She has served on the Editorial Board of the Journal of the American Academy of Religion and is currently an editor for Religion Compass Journal as well as the
Bloomsbury Book Series in “Religion, Gender, and Sexuality.”