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Study of Secularisms article

Secular, Religious Engagement beyond Power?

Can secular and religious actors engage each other beyond the discourse of power? Prof. Slavica Jakelić argued that they can in a lecture given at the University of Notre Dame on March 1, 2016. Speaking at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Jakelić recast the religious-secular binary as not merely one of contention, but also one of “enriching and chastening” exchange.

Jakelić’s lecture began with a critical rejoinder to the work of Talal Asad (Genealogies of Religion and Formations of the Secular), Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (The Politics of Secularism in International Relations), and Markus Dressler (Writing Religion). Each of these thinkers have conceptualized the relationship between religious and secular actors as principally, if not exclusively, transacted on fields of power.

The secular, according to Asad, is neither continuous with nor a break from the religious, but the two are irreducibly connected in a process of mutual construction (See Formations of the Secular). For Asad, Shakman Hurd and Dressler, religion is marginalized and constrained by the secular, the process is active and coercive.

While Jakelić affirmed the contributions of this critical project that has unmasked the progressivist narrative of secularism, she objected to the premise that secularism is the modality of power in the modern world. Historicizing the “subtraction story” that masks the secular’s inevitability, Jakelić argued that Asad and his followers have reinstated the religious-secular binary as an oppositional power struggle. By developing their critique of secularist power within the realm of secular power they reproduce the secular as a stable opposition to religion. No where is this more clear than in their representation of secularism’s alliance with the nation in which the secular organizes politics while religion is the marginalized other, used only instrumentally if at all.

Conceptualizing the relationship between the secular and religion as moving only in the register of power fails first as a description of significant cases of secular-religious collaboration and second as a normative project.

Regarding the first, Jakelić presented two cases—Solidarność in Poland and the Anti-Apartheid struggle in South Africa—as locations of religious-secular engagement and collaboration. Solidarność, the first independent labor union in the Soviet bloc, was populated by both secularly and religiously identified actors who were committed to collaborative work. For example, Fr. Jozef Tischner, friend of Pope John Paul II and the chaplain to Solidarność, worked with secular thinkers like Adam Michnik who argued in The Church and the Left: “Let us judge them [religious actors] by their deeds, not by their words…” (128)[1]

In complementary ways, the Anti-Apartheid struggle in South Africa was the site of significant religious and secular collaboration. Figures like Chris Hani argued that “certain ethical values that bind us [religious-secular partners] together” but we need to continue to “openly debate our differences.”

The alliance politics of both of these movements serve as evidence for the possibility of religious-secular collaboration that neither is premised on a thin overlapping consensus or total agreement on sources of ultimate value. Nor, Jakelić argued, are these cases about strategic resistance alone. Rather, they model a pluralistic politics of religious-secular coalition.

According to Jakelić reducing religious-secular engagement to the field of power not only fails descriptively, it also limits the constructive, normative potential of our theorizing. Jakelić drew upon William Connolly’s notion of “deep pluralism” to indicate a relational politics that holds the possibility of mutual transformation of identities (See Why I Am Not a Secularist). Such transformation requires engagement on, what Connolly calls, the “visceral registers” of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which entails not merely intellectual sparring or legislative power plays but practices like planning joint actions, or more mundanely, eating and drinking together. Such a deep pluralism allows for differences in the “final sources of morality” even as there might be the possibility of mutual learning and development of those final sources.

Jakelić’s lecture offered not only a challenge to Asad and company’s totalizing analysis of power, but also a constructive proposal to analyze the possibilities of religious-secular collaboration. The discussion after the lecture invited Jakelić to develop these ideas further. While I will not summarize that rich discussion here, two particularly critical questions emerged.

First, while Jakelić’s normative proposal allows for diversity on the final sources of morality, I wondered what sources Jakelić found operating in the cases she highlighted and beyond? What’s the nature of these moral sources? Are they principles, practices, commitments derived from history, metaphysics, sacred texts? I suspect that when digging more deeply into a genealogical account of the development of these sources, we would find surprising locations of hybridity.

Second, can this model of enriching and chastening religious-secular engagement illuminate societies that are experiencing lower levels of social turmoil? While Jakelić intends to move “beyond the discourse of power” it is not coincidental that in her two exemplary cases religious and secular actors find common cause in the very act of building oppositional power to hegemonic forces of oppression and exclusion. Are these merely strategic alliances that work when facing off against a common enemy? Or, can these models of alliance politics constructed through collaborative power travel to other contexts?


[1] Significantly, Michnik makes this commendation in order to force religious actors to offer the same charity to their secular interlocutors.

Kyle Lambelet
Kyle Lambelet, PhD is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Emory University's Candler School of Theology and a Research Associate with Contending Modernities. His research focuses on the intersections of religion, ethics, conflict, and peace with particular attention to the ethics of nonviolence.
Authority, Community & Identity article

Introducing ACI Africa

In its broad conception the Authority, Community, and Identity (ACI) Research project is about Africa’s complex modernities. Modernity is not one thing (see, for example, Eisentadt’s multiple modernities thesis). African individuals and communities find themselves at the intersection of multiple modern, global, local, traditional, secular and religious forces. In Africa, the legacies of colonialism and post-colonial liberation contend with the processes and mechanisms of international development, all the while challenging and being challenged by religious flows of people, practice, and belief. The ACI research seeks to shed light on the complex ways in which individuals and communities in Africa negotiate the challenges and opportunities at that intersection. More specifically, through the ACI project researchers will investigate how various religious (Christian, Muslim, traditional) and secular forces collaborate, compete, contend and at times implicate each other in configuring, re-configuring and/or  shaping new models of authority, community, and identity, both within and across traditions, and within the context of nation-state modalities.

The driving assumption of the research project is that these notions of “authority”, “community” and “identity” (both in their shifts and continuities) not only provide a good lens into the complex ways of negotiating the modern condition in Africa (with both its opportunities and challenges), they provide an apt and dynamic platform for exploring the relationships between secular and religious forces in modern Africa. By focusing on these three nodes of inquiry, the project will investigate questions of belonging, tradition, and change all within the particular flux of specific African contexts.

In addition to a shared sense of the complex ways in which contending modernities shape contemporary Africa, the ACI team shares a commitment to the particular, the local, by grounding our research in specific contexts. While the project takes up perennial issues of land, identity, family, and leadership, we do so in ways that honors the particularities of place by utilizing methods that help us to attend to the everyday lives of Africans. Through the diverse interests and identities of the ACI Africa research team, this attention to particularity is placed in a comparative context that allows us to engage the global-local dynamics of modernity in Africa.

It gives me great pleasure to introduce the four initial projects of the ACI Africa team:

Elias Bongmba’s (Rice University) research in Cameroon analyzes the land dispute between Ntumbaw and Njirong and the ways that it reflects a postcolonial encounter between religious and secular traditions. While paradigmatically Western and modern conceptions have tended to view land as a commodity, traditional Cameroonian practice has been to view land as a sacred trust from the ancestors. Bongmba plans to explore how these two villages develop their own understandings of the land, within the context of these competing visions of what land is.

Also in Cameroon, Cecelia Lynch (University of California Irvine) shifts the lens from land to gender to look at how religious women (Christian, Muslim, and “Traditional”) deploy their religiosity as resources for asserting rights, growing spiritually, and empowering themselves economically. By examining women’s organizations, Lynch will explore the ways the practices of scriptural study, economic development, and even eco-tourism provide platforms for women’s empowerment.

In a study complementing Lynch’s analysis of women’s organizations in Cameroon, ACI team member Ludovic Lado (Jesuit Institute of Human Rights and Dignity; Centre de Recherche et d’Action pour la Paix) will lead research examining the construction of the family in Cote d’Ivoire. International NGOs and agencies have exercised considerable influence over the construction of family, marriage gender and sexuality in this post-colonial state. Yet, other forces, often aided and supported by traditional religious authorities have contested these constructions as impositions. Lado and his team will research these cross-cutting influences to show how these competing forms of authority influence the actual construction of family life.

Finally, filling out the focus on Catholic, Islamic and secular discursive traditions, Ebenezer Obadare (University of Kansas) will study the explosion of Pentecostalism in Ghana and Nigeria and analyze its political impact in the face of deteriorating state institutions. Particularly Obadare will hone in on the Pentecostal pastor to examine the way charisma authorizes the pastor’s leadership, and whether and how that charisma travels across the lines of different discursive traditions (Catholic, Muslim and secular).

We are still expecting two or three more research projects; on youth identity in Northern Uganda; on Islam, violence and gender in Senegal; and on ecology and creation care in select African communities. Together these diverse yet complementary research projects will illuminate the dynamics of modernity as it impacts particular African communities and, in comparative perspective, the ways these dynamics impact the continent as a whole. We look forward to sharing more of our findings as the research progresses.

Emmanuel Katongole
Katongole, a Catholic priest ordained by the Archdiocese of Kampala, is a core faculty member of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. Previously, he has served as associate professor of theology and world Christianity at Duke University, where he was the founding co-director of the Duke Divinity School’s Center for Reconciliation. He is the author of books on political theology, the Christian social imagination,  and Christian approaches to justice, peace, and reconciliation. His most recent book is Who Are My People: Love, Violence and Christianity in Subsaharan Africa (2022).  
Authority, Community & Identity article

Introducing ACI Indonesia

Coordinator of the Contending Modernities ACI Working Group on Indonesia

After a careful process of selecting the core research team, the Contending Modernities Authority, Community, and Identity (ACI) working group on Indonesia formally launched last year to begin a three-year research project to better understand the complex issues facing plural societies and to foster possible collaborations among various actors, religious and secular, at different levels: local and global, individuals and communities. The working group first convened in April, 2015 to think boldly and imaginatively together about conceptualizing an interdisciplinary and cross-cultural collaboration by scholars, religious leaders, educators, and activists at the highest level of achievement.

While the working group addresses broad issues of the changing dynamics of authority, community, and identity, at this early stage we focus on the largest Muslim majority country in the world: Indonesia. Given that Indonesia is the third largest democratic country (after India and the United States), it has much to teach about managing religious diversity. Indonesia is a laboratory for research on the changing dynamics of authority, community, and identity with diverse religions and more than three hundred different ethnicities and languages spread across over six thousand islands. Now home to more than 200 million Muslims–and with a significant number of Christians, including Catholics–Indonesia is a newly consolidated democracy in which new models of pluralist coexistence are today reformulated, promoted, and contested.

There are at least three issues that inform the shared vision of the Indonesian working group. The first is how to generate and energize a broad conversation about the changing patterns of authority, community, and identity in the modern context. Second, how to situate this working group within a broader framework of research and, third, how to translate our research into a broader public discourse.

The first shared vision is informed by the very idea of “contending modernities” to understand the ways in which Christian, Muslim, and secular forces interact, collaborate, negotiate, and contend with one another in the modern world. While each member of the working group engages different issues, their overarching concern revolves around problems of coexistence, which involves at least some degree of interaction, cooperation, and collaboration across the lines of religious and ethnic divisions. However, in the process we can expect some tensions, contention, and contestation.

The topic of coexistence is itself of obvious importance in the context of our working group. Coexistence can be seen as a lens through which we seek to understand themes of contending authorities, communities, and identities in plural and dynamic interaction. We take seriously the rich and contending varieties of religious as well as secular actors and the ways in which they work together or contend with one another in addressing the most pressing problems at various levels.

We envision this working group to be a catalyst for conversations among various research institutes and think-tanks that will open new paths forward for constructive collaboration across religious communities and between religious and secular actors. In order to energize and shape a serious conversation–not only among a small group of scholarly academics and researchers, but with broader and diverse participation from opinion leaders–it is important for the Indonesian working group to bring other local research think-tanks and representative thinkers from the three discursive communities (Christian, Muslim, and secular) into direct conversation and collaboration.

This leads us to the last vision, namely, how to translate our research into a broader public discourse. While this working group is first and foremost a scholarly enterprise, it is also designed to impact public discourse, influence educational content and practice, and place scholarship in the service of informed policymaking. With external actors and opinion-leaders as our interlocutors, the Indonesian working group will be in position to promote deeper intercultural and interreligious conversations on issues of peaceful coexistence so as to improve the quality of public discourse and policy making.

Given the complexity of “contending modernities” in general, and the shifting nature of the authority, community, and identity in particular, the working group seeks to foster public deliberation through dialogue between Muslim and Catholic scholars, along with representatives of other religious traditions and secular perspectives. The goal is to stimulate learned public discourse, improve education, and enhance the project of peaceful coexistence through shared perspectives within pluralized societies–both locally and globally–by providing accessible information, analysis, evaluation, and policy-relevant studies.

Therefore, we anticipate that the outcomes and products of our working group will represent an unusual effort to marry theory and practice in fostering multiple forms of coexistence.

Mun’im Sirry
Field Notes article

Review – Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report

Full review can be found at the Journal of the American Academy of Religion

Saba Mahmood’s Religious Difference in a Secular Age examines how the institution of the modern secular liberal nation-state has impacted and transformed the regulation of religious difference in Egypt. Unlike the mythology of the modern liberal nation-state as a framework that enables the resolution of conflict based on religious identification, the discourse of state secularity undergirds and at times even intensifies interreligious conflict. Mahmood’s thesis likewise rejects the tired Orientalist lens that attributes the plights of minorities in the Middle East to Islamic values and principles as supposedly inhibiting the development of full-blown secularism. Instead, Mahmood’s book redirects attention to the very paradoxes and logic inherent in the institution of the modern secular liberal state (an analysis of the “nation”—the authorizing narratives of identity—is bracketed in favor of a focus on the “state”). Hence, Religious Difference in a Secular Age constitutes the most recent installment in the growing subfield of “secularism studies.” Yet, at the same time, the book also demonstrates the limits of these studies.

Click here to read the full review at the Journal of the American Academy of Religion (paywall may apply)

Atalia Omer
 Atalia Omer is Professor of Religion, Conflict, and Peace Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and at the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame in the United States. She earned her Ph.D. in Religion, Ethics, and Politics (2008) from the Committee on the Study of Religion at Harvard University. Her research focuses on Israel/Palestine; religion, violence, and peacebuilding; as well as theories and methods in the study of religion. Omer was awarded an Andrew Carnegie Fellowship in 2017, resulting in Decolonizing Religion and Peacebuilding (Oxford University Press, 2023). Among other publications, Omer is the author of When Peace is Not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp Thinks about Religion, Nationalism, and Justice (University of Chicago Press, 2015) and Days of Awe: Reimagining Jewishness in Solidarity with Palestinians (University of Chicago Press, 2019). She is also a co-editor of the Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
CM Reacts article

CM Reacts: Brussels & Beyond

In the wake of last week’s bombings in Belgium, Turkey, Pakistan, and elsewhere, Contending Modernities asked the chairs of the Global Migration & New Cosmopolitanism working groups to react. Under the leadership of Vincent D. Rougeau, Angus Ritchie and Robert Hefner, Global Migration & New Cosmopolitanism working groups have examined patterns of contentions and cooperation in several the tumultuous urban centers of Europe and North America. Additionally, Contending Modernities Co-Director Ebrahim Moosa commented on the imbalance of media coverage.

VINCENT D. ROUGEAU and ANGUS RITCHIE

Once again we have witnessed the senseless murder of innocents, this time in Brussels, at the hands of those claiming allegiance to Islamic State. Despite yet another tragedy, we must remain steadfast in our understanding of who we are and what is at stake in our response to terror.  By anticipating that we will scapegoat Muslim minorities in Europe and North America as somehow responsible for these attacks, Islamic State means to drive us into submission. They hope that we will see this terrorism as an existential threat to our way of life, and they have some very prominent politicians helping them to make that case.  But this is not an existential threat,  We have faced and fought terrorism before and we can do it again.  What we cannot do is surrender ourselves to lives controlled by hate and fear.

ROBERT HEFNER

By sheer coincidence I traveled to Paris three days after the November 2015 ISIS attacks, for long-scheduled follow up research for the Contending Modernities project on Muslims, Catholics, and secular perspectives on the challenges of pluralist co-existence in Western Europe today. A few weeks later, on January 14, 2016, I found myself driving across downtown Jakarta to speak about a related Contending Modernity project (on pluralist co-existence in Indonesia) at the Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity, a leading Indonesian Muslim democrat think-tank. En route, and a couple of miles away from my car, a small band of ISIS extremists attempted to enter a shopping mall and carry out their trademark mass slaughter. Fortunately the attackers were stopped by the quick and courageous action of Indonesia’s anti-terror police. My Indonesian hosts that day were shaken but quietly defiant. Since then, the world has had the sad opportunity to witness additional acts of ISIS terror in Brussels and Lahore. There will be more.

Like most of us, my first impulse in response to these awful acts inclines toward the ethical, humanitarian, and spiritual rather than scholarly. However, my coincidental travels near the sites of recent ISIS attacks, and the local commentaries we all have heard from Brussels and Istanbul to Lahore, do inspire a few thoughts. The first is that we have entered a new age of trial with regard to ISIS, one that is global and certain to persist for years to come. There will be further acts of violence, some perhaps on a scale more awful than those we’ve recently witnessed.

The second lesson, perhaps no less obvious, is that the breadth of this threat should unite people of all faiths and pluralist convictions. The clear basis for that unity is the recognition — heard so clearly in the comments of Indonesian colleagues in January, and in the pained but poignant observations of Pakistani authorities after the Lahore attack this week — that we share a common challenge and, notwithstanding local variation, a common moral civilization. It may strike some readers as odd to invoke the term “civilization” in today’s context, not least after two decades of hoary commentary inspired by the so-called clash-of-civilization thesis. The latter thesis drifted all too regularly into the type of culture-talk I don’t intend, and I hope we recognize we don’t need today. But it is time to take back that term, and make it the contemporary and ethical reality that it most truly is. For my Indonesian Muslim colleagues in January, and with Muslim educators and friends at Zaytuna College in Berkeley in early March (where, in the midst of a two-day discussion of al-Ghazali, thoughtful but anxious references to the moral threat ISIS represents abounded), this term felt necessary and right. The civilization we share today is a fragile tissue of thoroughly contemporary ideas, initiatives, collaborations, and friendships. It spans the globe, yet it is delicate and rare. It is moral more than it is material. Certainly, it has a distinctive richness and specificity in different parts of the world, and among different peoples. But across these differences we now share a wealth of commonality. Moreover, in a curious dialectic, the violence of ISIS, as well as the intemperate gush of some of our populist politicians intent on portraying Muslim citizens as problems rather than partners in a time of trial, reminds us all the more of this civilization we share and now find threatened.

We are in the early not later stages of this global trial. It will run its course differently in different national settings. But the challenge will be more quickly and effectively contained when we recognize that it is shared, as is this fragile moral civilization we are determined to defend.

EBRAHIM MOOSA

Several bombs go off in Turkish cities in a series of deadly acts perpetrated by Daesh, also known as the Islamic State. There are regular news reports in the Western media about these events. But there is no saturation coverage of families and loved ones of deceased and survivors by name as it happened after the Paris killings in November and the Brussels bombings in March. The injured and dead in London, Madrid, Paris and Brussels are humanized. Those who die in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Israel/Palestine are just statistics. The fight against terrorism ought to be a noble one, to retrieve human dignity and a respect for life. In life,  as in death we live in apartheid, with two kinds of humanity Us vs Them. We are now accustomed to electronic and print media that believe that thinking is a crime, common sense and humane judgment are values that will undermine their market share.  This is a double standard of two humanities normalized by the media: one standard for the West versus another for the Rest is the banality of the media.

An essay written by Hannah Arendt titled “Thinking and Moral Considerations” informs these reflections. Its ringing message haunts me as I write this. I wish the cliff-notes version of her essay was on the must-read list every journalist. Arendt talks about the lessons she learned after covering the trial of the Nazi,  Eichmann in Jerusalem. Arendt described Eichmann’s conduct in the horrendous violence he supervised during the Holocaust, in her now famous expression, as the “banality of evil.” Eichmann’s conduct was not some elaborate theory, according Arendt, but “something quite factual, the phenomenon of evil deeds…which could not be traced to any particularity of wickedness, pathology of ideological conviction in the doer, whose only personal distinction was a perhaps extraordinary shallowness.” Despite Eichmann’s monstrous deeds, writes Arendt perhaps controversially, “the doer was neither monstrous nor demonic” and the only characteristic she could identify in him was “not stupidity but a curious, quite authentic inability to think” (Arendt 417).

Our media today–corporations and journalists–should wonder whether they might too be called to give account for this “total absence of thinking” which Arendt identified as being the essence of what she called the “banality of evil.” Not to think is to commit a sin, says Arendt in short. An example of this absence of thinking has appeared in op-eds by perhaps well-meaning writers like Jochen Bittner, the political editor of the German weekly Die Zeit. Bittner wrote in the New York Times article “Europe, After Brussels” that: “For the sake of social peace, after the Madrid and London bombings, we told ourselves that Islam and Islamism had nothing to do with each other. But sadly they do.” Bittner’s unthinking judgment is this: “The peaceful religion can sometimes serve as a slope into militant anti-Western ideology, especially when this ideology offers a strong sense of belonging amid the mental discomfort of our postmodern societies.” Bittner does identify the poverty bubble in Brussels where immigrants live. But this social anomie is curable, while the purported slope from Islam to militant anti-Western ideology is incurable.

Vincent Rougeau
Vincent Rougeau has been Dean of Boston College Law School since 2011. He previously worked as a Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame.  He teaches and writes in the area of law and religion, with an emphasis on Catholic social teaching, and is the author of Christians in the American Empire: Faith and Citizenship in the New World Order (Oxford, 2008).
Angus Ritchie
Canon Dr. Angus Ritchie is an Anglican priest. For over twenty years, he has served in parishes in East London involved in community organizing, playing a leading role in campaigns for the Living Wage, affordable housing, and a cap on interest rates. He is the founding director of the Centre for Theology and Community. His latest book, Inclusive Populism: Creating Citizens in the Global Age was published by the University of Notre Dame Press in 2019, and was recently discussed by Pope Francis at a conference of Catholics involved in community organizing.
Robert Hefner
Robert W. Hefner is Professor of Anthropology and Director of the Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs at Boston University.  He has done research on religion and plurality in Southeast Asia since the late 1970s, and has been involved in projects on the comparative study of Christians, Muslims, and civic-pluralist co-existence in Western and Asian societies since the 1990s.  His books include Pentecostalism in the 21st Century (2012) and Sharia Politics: Law and Society in the Modern Muslim World (2011).
Ebrahim Moosa
Ebrahim Moosa is Mirza Family Professor of Islamic Thought and Muslim Societies in Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs and Department of History. He co-directs Contending Modernities with Atalia Omer and Scott Appleby. Moosa’s interests span both classical and modern Islamic thought with a special focus on Islamic law, history, ethics and theology. He is the author of Ghazali and the Poetics of Imagination, winner of the American Academy of Religion’s Best First Book in the History of Religions (2006), and What is a Madrasa? (2015).
Field Notes article

Catholics, Muslims and Secularists in Quebec: Citizenships in Tension in the Aftermath of the Quiet Revolution

The introduction of a proposed “Charter of Quebec values” ​​by the Government of Quebec on September 10, 2013 was as a major event which can be considered part of a long process of secularization in Quebecois society, dating back to the so-called “Quiet Revolution” of the 1960s, which achieved its last success in the late 1990s by denominating schools based on languages (French versus English) rather than religion (Catholic versus Protestant). Throughout its history, Quebecois society has been strongly tied to the Catholic Church, which historically maintained a powerful presence in education, healthcare, and even political parties. In the wake of the “Quiet Revolution”, French Canadians, who represent the majority of the province’s Catholics, have become less religiously observant. At the same time, the Quebecois national movement that had its birth within a Catholic movement—“Action sociale catholique,” which was active between 1905 and 1962—has itself become increasingly secular.

The proposed bill on a Charter of Quebec Values originated from a government led by the Parti Quebecois (PQ), an entity not particularly known for deep religiosity. The bill was criticized by many as a political manoeuvre by PQ to instrumentalize a religious issue—in particular, anxieties about Muslim migration—to reposition itself as a supporter of Quebecois culture and to win more votes in upcoming elections. In fact, for many observers, the PQ devised its strategy by learning from the example of the fast-growing popularity gains made by another political party, the ADQ (Action démocratique du Québec), which in 2006 made electoral headway by capitalizing on the controversy of “reasonable accommodations.” The PQ used similar tactics to exploit fear of foreigners and present itself as the protector of the Quebec’s identity, culture, and historical heritage. Just as the ADQ had harvested a record number of votes after capitalizing on the reasonable accommodation crisis, before disappearing thereafter, the PQ hoped to benefit from Charter of Values initiative to win the election and form a majority government.

The proposed law aimed, among other things, to prohibit the wearing of “ostentatious religious symbols” in public institutions and in private sector institutions financed even in part with public funds—institutions such as daycare centres, private clinics, private schools. The broad scope of the proposed law catalyzed great debates about citizenship equality, and quickly led to an outcry by some that the legislation was Islamophobic.

The Charter of Values is an important case to examine when considering pluralist coexistence because of the great tensions it generated—tensions which drove even the least interested citizens to participate and to express their opinions in the subsequent public debate. Amiraux and Koussens see in this kind of proposal the difficulties that liberal democracies in the West face in managing diversity in general, and especially religious pluralism. It is this confrontation among different visions of nation, and between those promoting a greater measure of cultural, linguistic, and religious homogeneity and those advocating for a more inclusive “interculturalism,” (the preferred French phrase in Quebec for what in English is usually referred to as multiculturalism) that makes the Charter of Values debate so important. The commission on Reasonable Accommodation, held in 2008, proposed in its report the concept of interculturalism as an alternative to Canadian multiculturalism, justifying this choice by the fact that multiculturalism in its Canadian version is not well suited to the reality of Quebec. Indeed, the French Canadian Quebecois are a cultural minority in Canada and North America and fear for their cultural survival as a nation.

Needless to say, most religious communities did not welcome the Charter bill. While many nationalist politicians, artists, and intellectuals tried to position themselves as protectors of Catholicism, most Catholic clergy in Quebec denounced the bill. In addition to the clergy, represented by the Assemblée Nationale des Évêques du Québec, Dominicans and Jesuits played a leading role in opposing the proposed law. At the same time, however, other nationalists tried to use Quebec’s Catholic heritage as a basis for excluding Islam and Muslims.

The official flyer detailing the proposed law was entitled: “parce que nos valeurs, on y croit ”— “because we believe in our values”. Phonetically, the French word “croit” (from the verb to believe) in the title is pronounced like “croix” (a cross). That fact did not escape the eye of critics, who circulated an image of the first page of the booklet with a red cross Untitledon the letter “t” transforming it to “x”, thus changing the meaning from “believe’ to “cross”.
These critics pointed to inconsistencies within the charter’s goal of banning ostentatious religious symbols from public institutions, including the cross, while intending to keep the large crucifix installed during the government of Maurice Duplessis in the main chamber of the National Assembly.

Public Controversy as an Accelerator of Cultural Change

Not surprisingly, Muslims perceived the law to be directed against them. Notwithstanding their internal diversity and organic decentralization, Muslims tried to organize themselves by creating a united coalition known by the acronym, QMDL (Québécois Musulmans pour les Droits et Libertés). The organization sponsored numerous press conferences, demonstrations, and rallies.

A few weeks after the official announcement of the proposed charter legislation, on Thursday, October 10, 2013, the “Centre Justice et Foi,” a public affairs center linked to the Jesuit Order, organized a conference under the title “remettre l’égalité citoyenne au cœur du débat” (relocating citizen equality at the heart of the debate). I entered the main hall of the Centre the evening of the conference and was surprised to find people from the entire metropolitan Montreal region.  For the majority of similar events, the room half full at best. That night, the room was filled beyond capacity and the organizers were forced to add chairs to accommodate the overflow.

The panel that evening brought together speakers from diverse backgrounds: Elisabeth Garant, a Catholic and director of the “Centre Justice et Foi”; Dominique Peschard, a largely secular figure and president of the “Ligue des droits et libertés,” a provincial human rights NGO; Alexa Conradi, a feminist and president of the “Fédération des Femmes du Quebec”; Asmaa Ibnouzahir, a Muslim feminist; and Michel Seymour, a secular nationalist and well-known intellectual. The speaker forum thus included Catholics, Muslims, and secular-minded people. The diversity of the alliance was seen in other meetings and rallies, and showed that the Charter of Values legislation had touched a deep public nerve. One of the participants summarized the reality in an ironic way, thanking the Prime Minister of the government of the Parti Quebecois, Pauline Marois, because her project produced a large participation in dialogue and activities related to citizenship: “Je veux dire merci à Mme Pauline Marois. C’est grâce à ce projet qu’on est rassemblé là!  — I want to say thank you to Pauline Marois. It is because of this project that we are together here!” (This sentence and similar sentences were repeated by several speakers at the conference of October 10, 2013 at Centre Justice et Foi and on other occasions).

We can thus ask, did the social tension generated by the Charter have a positive effect, unwittingly broadening citizen participation? At a dialogue with a representative of Bel Agir, a Muslim association that organized a rally against the charter in the Palais des Congrès de Montréal on December 14, 2014, one activist told me that ‘to mobilize this large number of associations of civil society, would have required several years in a normal situation. But with the issue of the charter, we work under pressure and we saved a lot of time reaching people faster and seeking partnership with others in struggle against the charter.”

 When Public Engagement Serves to Protect Private Life

One of the reasons people reacted strongly to the Charter legislation was their feeling that their private lives, including how they dress and what they believe, were threatened. The following comment from social media was typical: “On ne donnera à personne le droit d’entrer aux garde-robes de nos femmes! — We will not give anyone the right to enter to our women’s wardrobes”. The “wardrobe” in this expression is what a Muslim woman I met called “mon éthique vestimentaire”—“my dress ethics”, referring to the Charter’s proposal to ban the hijab for Muslim women. In this instance, the state’s ambition of entering into the protected circle of the individual’s privacy did not weaken citizenship involvement, but activated it. For these actors, citizen participation sought to protect individual rights, freedom of conscience, and family values. Contrary to some critics’ claims, the opposition was not the result of the Charter touching on something “sacred” and thus unquestionable. How else can we understand Quebecois Muslims’ mobilization, notwithstanding an unemployment rate far in excess of the national average? The answer is that social marginalisation and discrimination were perceived by these actors as directly affecting their private and public lives.

Obviously, banning the hijab doesn’t touch only the private life of individuals, but it would also greatly weaken women’s public participation, a point raised by the Women’s Federation of Quebec during their interventions in public debates. Also, very conservative circles inside the Muslim Community saw in the proposed law a way to serve their plans to bring back women to their homes and to keep them focusing on their “main purpose” by educating their kids. Accordingly, Muslim women were motivated to participate by the fear to lose their jobs and to be confined to housekeeping.

Pluralism in Solitude

Although there is diversity in actors’ religious tendencies and thoughts, it is interesting to discover that at some levels there nonetheless remains a wide isolation between different initiatives and a deep lack of representativeness of the antagonists’ positions by both camps. Despite the diversity on display at the aforementioned Centre Justice et Foi event, Charter supporters were notably absent among the panel of speakers, something that the audience did not fail to notice. On the other side, at events sponsored by those in favor of the Charter, a similar situation occurred: there were almost no instances of multi-sided debate.  It is true, then, that the controversy surrounding the Charter of Values bill deepened public interest in pluralism, but it also prevented the representation of the various parties in the debate in their full plurality. One reason for this is the difficulty of managing the intensity of interactions in real-and-existing public squares. Who can assume such a responsibility and ensure that the “civic” confrontational nature does not take precedence over the courtesy of the “civil” character of citizenship? Despite all this diversity produced by a focal event like the project of the charter of Quebec values, it was characterized by a measure of solitude in plurality.

On April 7th, 2014, the Parti Quebecois lost the vote in the provincial elections. One of the reasons behind its defeat was the controversy caused by the Charter of Values legislation. Religious and ethnic minorities, especially Muslims, felt relieved by the outcome of the vote. However, tensions related to Islam, as the religion of the “other,” are still widespread and unresolved. The precise formula for religion, public ethics, and citizenship in a post-Quiet Revolution Quebec remains unclear. But the mobilization and social networking set in motion by the Charter of Values debate, in particular that between Muslim associations, Catholic institutions, and other groupings in civil society remains a genuine social presence. Future challenges may yet make these ties stronger and more sustainable.

Azeddine Hmimssa
Azeddine Hmimssa recieved his Ph.D. in religious studies from the University of Montreal in 2018. Azeddine earned a master’s degree in religious studies and sociology from the same university where he wrote his thesis on citizenship as seen by Muslims in Quebec. He also holds a M.Sc. from ETS in Montreal, and a diploma in Islamic traditional studies from Nouakchott, Mauritania. Azeddine has worked as a researcher for the Canada Research Chair on Islam, Pluralism, and Globalization at the University of Montreal, and is a contributor to Contending Modernities’ Public Ethics And Citizenship In Plural Societies project. His research focuses on citizenship and pluralism in Islamic thought.
Field Notes article

The Un-Dutchable Challenge of Pluralism

Every year on December 5th, tens of thousands of Dutch people paint their faces black, dress up in antique costume, and assume the persona of Zwarte Piet (“Black Pete”) to help Sinterklaas (St. Nicholas) distribute candy and presents to children throughout the Netherlands. In recent years, Dutch citizens of Caribbean ancestry have spoken out against the portrayal of Black Pete as a racist caricature. In early October of 2013, Quinsy Gario, a Curaçao-born Dutch performance artist, argued on TV that Black Pete perpetuates a stereotype of African people as second-class citizens in Dutch society. The following week, the mayor of Amsterdam met with residents who asked that Black Pete be removed from the city’s Sinterklaas parade. Most white Dutch reacted angrily to accusations that the Black Pete tradition is racist, and the character continues to be popular in society. According to a 2013 survey, 92% of the Dutch public do not perceive Black Pete as racist or associate him with slavery, and 91% are opposed to altering the character’s appearance.

Challenges of the New Plurality

This example illustrates how the Dutch, otherwise known for their pragmatism and tolerance, are being tested by the new plurality that marks their society. Until the 1990s, Dutch nationals approached ethnic, racial, religious, and sectarian differences, themselves the result of migration and colonialism, with some of Europe’s stronger multiculturalist policies. However, such government policies did not make many demands on Dutch society’s longstanding habits. Rethinking one’s own traditions requires more than just tolerating difference; it also involves rethinking your self-identity to accommodate the “other.” One of my Muslim informants tweeted on the matter, reminding Dutch folks to empathize with the Muslim immigrants who are constantly asked to change their beliefs and traditions to adapt to their lives in the Netherlands.

I have been conducting fieldwork among Muslims in the Netherlands since 2003, focusing on questions of how they adapt their beliefs to their new homes . Our project on the New Western Plurality allowed me to extend my research into the Catholic and Secular communities. My previous research involved two years of fieldwork, beginning in 2003-2004 followed up by summer research between 2006 and 2011. For this new project, I carried out three months of fieldwork in Amsterdam especially focusing on Catholic and Secular communities. The focus on the three ethical “communities” means that the project was not intended to be exhaustive, in covering all the groups within each tradition. Instead, I sampled organizations to illustrate their different approaches to the challenge of the new national plurality.

As the Black Pete debate illustrates, most people are willing to make some incremental changes to the character. This year, they have removed the earring. Next year, they might paint the character with lighter color to fit the story line that Black Pete is black only because he enters homes from chimneys to drop the gifts. However, Geert Wilders, the leader of the far right Freedom Party, has proposed the adoption of a law to protect Black Pete against any alterations in his appearance “to protect our (Dutch) culture.” This incident is one among many that indicates that once “received” understandings of integration, including various models of multiculturalism, are now in question. This has pushed questions of pluralist co-existence to the center of discussion in the Netherlands.

The Netherlands officially adopted multicultural policies in 1983 but by the 1990s assimilationist policies became ascendant. The verzuiling or pillarization system enshrined in the Dutch constitution still provides the legal basis for recognition of religious group rights. Nevertheless, even for countries like the Netherlands with a long tradition of tolerance and acceptance, it has become a challenge to incorporate immigrants while respecting their differences. Thus, there is a need for new approaches to understand how people respond to pluralism in their daily lives in Western Europe. The Making Multiculturalism Work report from Contending Modernities’ London research team, that argues for the role of political friendships in fostering pluralism is an example of this line of research. My book, Localizing Islam in Europe, also provides examples of this approach, such as the transformation of Muslim activists through interfaith settings. However, activities like these actually have a limited impact on the larger society that is exposed to the sensationalism of a public media that everyday stigmatizes and marginalizes “the other.”

The Limits of Dutch Multiculturalism

The Netherlands provides an interesting setting to pursue research on the new Western plurality because it has historically had an institutionalized solution to ethico-religious plurality, grounded on the so-called verzuiling or pillarization system. The Dutch state has recognized religious and ideological groups since the second half of the 19th century. Accordingly, the state supported each ideological or religious group to organize its own schools, hospitals, media, and political representation. Despite some debate on the exact number of pillars, for most of the twentieth century there were four. They consisted of Social Democrats, (secular) Humanists, Protestants, and Catholics. Among the pillars, Catholics led the way in creating these institutions followed by Protestants. The “secular” pillars of Social Democrats and Liberals did not create as extensive an assortment of pillar institutions. With regard to education, for example, the secular humanists were satisfied with the public schools; by contrast, Catholics wanted to have their own schools funded by the state. In fact, whether the liberals and the socialists had formed a pillar of their own is still debatable because they had formed too few organizations in too small areas to be called a “pillar.” Moreover, liberals were against voluntary segregation based on ideological and denominational lines.

The confessional pillars suffered great strains under the secularization process that swept the Netherlands from the 1960s onwards, as witnessed by the decline in church membership and attendance. In an interview with Vatican Radio on December 5, 2013, Willem Jacobus Eijk Cardinal, Archbishop of Utrecht said that the Catholic Church in the Netherlands is facing a near collapse. “The number of practicing Catholics is diminishing very quickly,” he said. “In the 1950s 90 percent of Catholics still went to church every Sunday. Now, it’s only five percent.” He quickly added that the Church officials would soon be “forced to close many churches.” He quoted from the Dutch Office for National Statistics that in 2010 just under 16 percent of the population identified itself as Catholic. This number is expected to drop to about 10 percent by 2020. The same office estimates that Islam will become the second largest religion in the Netherlands the same year.

As the pillarization system was dissolving as a result of the Netherlands’ secularization, the number of Muslims increased steadily as a result of labor migration from Turkey and Morocco from the 1960s onward. They were the second wave of migration, the first having been from ex-colonies in the Caribbean. At present, the Netherlands has a population of some 850,000 Muslims, making up nearly 6 percent of the population; 329,000 of them have historical ties to Turkey and 314,000 to Morocco. There are other Muslims who have arrived from former and current areas of conflict such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. In addition, there are nearly 10,000 native “Dutch” convert Muslims.

Multiculturalism as a state policy began with these major increases in immigration during the 1950s and 1960s. An official national policy of multiculturalism was adopted in 1983, with the introduction of the “Ethnic Minorities Policy.” This has allowed state support for the cultural, religious, and linguistic development of immigrant groups based on their ethnic origins. This approach was also tied in principle to the pillarization system, on the assumption that minorities would be empowered and emancipated in society through self-organization and group identification.

Questions were soon raised about multicultural policies, however, as a result of the continuing social and economic marginalization of immigrants. By the 1990s, the national policy had shifted markedly to more assimilationist programs. Anxious about their religious traditions, Muslims invoked the principle of verzuiling and applied for state funding for their social, educational, and media programs. Although some funding was granted, the state stopped short of supporting a full Muslim pillar, since opinion had shifted and the idea was that society required more cultural cohesion than the retention of cultural difference.

Since the September 11 attacks in the U.S., Dutch public opinion has shifted even more forcefully away from multicultural accommodation. The change has caused many minority leaders to perceive integration as a cover-up for full-scale assimilation and assimilationist goals. Nonetheless, the policy shift continued, and even accelerated after the tragic murder of the film-maker and anti-Muslim polemicist Theo Van Gogh by an Islamist extremist in November 2004—an event that event caused a veritable moral panic in Dutch society.

Mapping the Ethico-Religious Communities: Catholics

Although the Catholic Church has long been known for its hierarchical administration, effective central control over an increasingly diverse Catholic population has become a challenge for the Dutch Church. On the basis of interviews and conversations with representatives from the Catholic Church, both clergy and laypeople, I would tentatively divide up the Catholic community into three groups: the Bishops who represent the official position that is closest to the Vatican’s views; civic Catholic organizations that are semi-independent of the Church; and individuals of nominal Catholic affiliation.

There are seven dioceses in the Netherlands, with Amsterdam coming under the authority of the Bishop of Haarlem. During my interview on February 17th, 2014 with a representative from the Haarlem Diocese, he began by stating that “the Catholic Church in the Netherlands is in a deplorable state.” He explained that Church attendance is plummeting; there is a desperate shortage of priests; the active volunteers in the Church are elderly; and there is internal strife between priests and laymen as well as among the country’s bishops.

Despite these great challenges, all dioceses subscribe to the Second Vatican Council’s call for interfaith relations, carrying out interfaith dialogue activities through various councils with many groups and sections of society in the Netherlands. There are constant and intense ecumenical relationships, including the one within the Council of Churches. Additionally, regular contacts take place with Jewish representatives, especially through the Episcopal Commission for the relationship with Judaism. There is also contact with believers of other religions through the Contact Council for Interreligious Dialogue.

The Catholic Church’s interfaith activities assessment document for 2012 describes relations with Muslims, laying out principles for the dialogue for Muslims, including calling for honest and open dialogue, and asking “difficult questions” such as textual references to violence in Islam. The document is critical of the “anti-Islam campaign” launched by the PVV (Freedom Party) of Geert Wilders. The Catholic Contact Council for Inter-religious Dialogue (CID) has strengthened its ties with Muslims through interfaith dialogue, and messages of goodwill to all Muslim organizations in the Netherlands during Ramadan. This has occurred despite the problems posed by some Muslims’ withdrawal from dialogue in the aftermath of the PVV’s election victory in 2010, which is thought to have benefited from substantial Catholic support. The document refers to an interesting finding about maintaining dialogue in such difficult times. It sums up the response in parishes to the “negative coverage of Islam” especially the film “Fitna” produced by Wilders as follows: “Where contacts between Christians and Muslims were good, ties became stronger, meetings and talks increased. Where there were few, if any, contacts, fear of Islam and distrust of Muslims grew.”

One example of this trend is Volendam, which is a small fishing town in the north where PVV has won nearly 40 percent of the votes in 2009 European parliamentary elections. Although there are no Muslims living there, the voters explain their support for Wilders by almost quoting him verbatim “This country is being taken over by the Muslims and their violent religion.” Despite such regional support for PVV among Catholics, the representative of the Catholic Church emphasized that churchgoing Catholics can empathize with immigrants and minorities because Catholics too have been a religious minority in this country. In other words, he underlined that the Catholic Church is not contributing to the support for PVV. However, it seems that the Church is not able to prevent the party’s popularity among some Catholic circles either.

Muslims

The Muslim minority population shares all the disadvantages of low socioeconomic standing, which limits and constrains their engagement with the larger society. A weak middle class, and very limited intellectual capital among Muslims makes them dependent on scholars from their countries of origins, most of whom are not familiar with the Dutch context. Muslims also lack the professional and intellectual cadres to engage systematically with public debates. There are a number of transnational Islamic movements that originated from the countries of origin and incrementally adapting their agendas to Europe, which can be categorized into three clusters that are influential and relevant for the pluralism debate: transnational branches of political Islamic movements; movements engaged with dialogue and pluralism; and Salafi Muslims.

There are, first, Islamic organizations that have originated as the transnational branches of the political Islamic movement in the Middle East such as Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), Milli Görüş (Turkey), and Jamaat-i Islami (Pakistan). Their original agendas in their countries of origins such as ushering in pro-Islamic regimes have, in the context of Europe, shifted to developing a Muslim identity in public life by getting Islam recognized as an equal religion to other religions in Europe. These groups demand to be recognized as legitimate organizations within European states in return for spreading a “moderate” Islamic cause that condemns violence, accepts secularism, and calls Muslims to identify with their new societies.

There are a number of other movements that promote interfaith dialogue, active citizenship, and engagement with pluralism. According to this civil Islam, which refers to an interpretation of Islam that is compatible with the principles of democratic governance, Muslims are encouraged to play an active role in society while negotiating their religious and ethical commitments with the larger society. Jamaat al-Adl wal Ihsan from Morocco and the Gülen movement from Turkey have activists in the Netherlands and across Western Europe committed to these values. All of these individuals and groups utilize bridging activities in educational, interfaith and artistic venues to promote an active role for Muslims in larger society.

There is also a small but vocal group of Salafi Muslims, estimated to be several thousands. Salafis tend to avoid avoid engagement with a plural society, citing their interpretation of the principle of Al Wala’ Wal Bara’ (literally meaning loyalty and disavowal) which calls for disengagement with non-Muslims and even other non-Salafi Muslims. There are, however, different trends within Salafi Islam. Apolitical Salafis denounce violence but call for a literalist and puritanical interpretation of Islam. They consider the presence of Muslims in Europe as temporary. Although apolitical Salafis have been in principle against democracy and voting in elections (because this violates God’s authority as the only ruler, in their view) they have decided to vote in the elections in the Netherlands to counter the rise of Geert Wilders by using the traditional Islamic law principle of “maslaha” or public interest.

Normen en Waarden: Public Debate on Dutch “Norms and Values”

The murder of Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan Jihadi in Amsterdam in 2004 greatly intensified the public debate on Dutch norms and values. “Dutchness” has been presented by Far Right parties such as Wilders’ PVV as standing for freedom of speech, in opposition to Islam and Muslims, who are perceived as wanting to negate this principle. In this politically charged environment, social pressures on immigrants to accept the communal norms of Dutch society have increased exponentially.

This pressure has been expressed in several important policy changes. The Christian Democratic government has made it more difficult to immigrate to the Netherlands from outside the EU. A striking illustration of policy changes, since September 30, 1998 the Integration of Newcomers Act requires newcomers to take 600 hours of Dutch language and culture courses to become legal immigrants. Moreover, since March 15, 2006, immigrants are required to pass an exam testing their knowledge of Dutch language and society before they can come to the Netherlands to be reunited with their families. The Netherlands is also the first country in Europe to implement compulsory training for imams entering the country. Since September 2002, imams are obliged to attend courses on Dutch values, soft drugs, prostitution, gay marriage, and euthanasia. It is debatable whether these policies are effectively promoting cultural integration.

In short, both Muslims and the Dutch liberal tradition of multiculturalism have come to face new and significant challenges. Declining support for multicultural policies, new anti-immigration laws, and the end of political correctness toward Muslims have all created an atmosphere in which Islam and Muslims have become “the other” of the “tolerant” Dutch society. The Muslim “other” is portrayed as not tolerating homosexuals, mistreating women, and denying freedom of speech. Actual Muslims, of course, have widely varying opinions on all of these questions. However, the murder of Theo Van Gogh and the statement of the Moroccan Imam el-Moumni about gays, which referred to homosexuality as a disease, have been enough to confirm to many Dutch citizens that all Muslims share these views.

The “norms and Values” debate has informed new policies on civic integration (inburgering) and citizenship education (burgerschapsvorming). Since January 2007 the Civic Integration Act obliges most non-Dutch and non-EU nationals living in the Netherlands to speak Dutch and have some general knowledge of the country. This general knowledge about the society included topics such as homosexuality and gender equality. In order to promote integration, the Civic Integration Act obliges most foreigners to take part in language and civic integration courses. If you are between the ages of 16 and 65 and come from outside the European Union you will need to pass the integration exam.

Since 2005, Dutch schools have also been required to include citizenship education in their curriculum. The Ministry of education has come up with core goals or kerndoelen as the goals for citizenship education of students; however, each school is allowed to implement the goals in its own way. For instance, one of these goals is “active citizenship.” Each school aims to reach this goal differently. The De Roose Islamic School I visited aims to reach this through the “universal language of music,” as the principle put it. School officials believe that if their students learn to make music and use musical instruments they can become more active in the larger society. They organize fieldtrips to nursing homes and invite local authorities to talk to their students. Among the Catholic Schools in low income and immigrant neighborhoods that I visited, there were attempts to make the students more involved and responsible for the rest of the society and active citizens. However, for the Catholic schools in “white” neighborhoods with high economic standards, teachers and parents have admitted that they do not do much of anything with regard to citizenship education. Because they believe that citizenship education is not aimed for their students and that the inspectors know this as well and do not question them on it. A similar pattern was seen in secular schools. Overall, the priority for all schools was reading and math skills; citizenship education was way down on their “to do” list.

Liberal and social democratic critics of these new programs of citizenship education programs are worried that the government is moving in the direction of using education to create “good citizens of the state” whereas the goal of education should be to teach the students how to think critically. More generally, however, new policies and public debates on “norms and values” demonstrate that, even as Dutch society may have reached the limits of an earlier multicultural tolerance, programs designed to inculcate a common moral vision may be causing more tension than cohesion. For the moment, the path forward to a more effective pluralist co-existence remains uncertain.

Ahmet Yükleyen
Ahmet Yükleyen is currently head of the Istanbul office for College admissions advising company "Great College Advice". He was previously Associate Professor of Anthropology and International Studies at Mississippi University's Croft Institute for International Studies as well as Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul Commerce University. He received his Ph.D. in Cultural Anthropology from Boston University in 2007. His book titled “Localizing Islam in Europe: Turkish Islamic Communities in Germany and the Netherlands” was published by Syracuse University Press in 2012. .
Field Notes article

Struggling to Mieux Vivre Ensemble: The Sobering Reality of France’s new Plurality

 2015 was a devastating year for France. At the end of my 15-month fieldwork research in December of 2014, the country was already dealing with an ongoing economic recession, a wildly unpopular president, and a fervent and growing far-right political party. Furthermore, social tensions surrounding Islam, laïcité, and immigration had been escalating over the past few decades, with same-sex marriage being added to the heated public debates in recent years. The Charlie Hebdo attacks of January 2015 took a heavy toll on the already vulnerable state of the country. But ensuing unifying events such as the Marche Republicane – the biggest rally (~3.7 million people nationwide) in France since the liberation in 1944 – helped France to pull together and brush off at least some of the dust.

But the violence wasn’t over. The November 2015 terrorist attacks on the Stade de France, the Bataclan concert hall, and nearby cafes and restaurants, that killed 130 randomly targeted individuals, rattled the nation to its core. As opposed to the Charlie Hebdo attacks, which can be seen as a violent overreaction to a provocative media outlet, the November attacks personally touched the lives of thousands of innocent, ordinary French civilians, injecting angst and fear into homes, schools, and everyday social outings. As is the case after nearly every incident of global terrorism linked to Islam, French Muslims again find themselves in the precarious position of being targeted by both the terrorists and by French society; the latter demanding apologies for the actions of despicable individuals who have very little to do with the religion that the vast majority of ordinary Muslims know and practice.

Immediately following the attacks, President Hollande enacted the nation’s state of emergency laws for the first time since the Algerian war—an important step for being able to track and detain necessary suspects, but a controversial one in terms of potentially sacrificing civil liberties for debatable improvements in national security. In just the first three days after the attacks, 414 homes were searched, 29 people were arrested, and 118 people were place on house arrest. Nearly 800 police raids took place in the two weeks following the attacks, including disruptive and destructive overnight raids of local and otherwise peaceful mosques, stirring up significant protest and fear in France’s Muslim communities. While at least a handful of these raids were touted publicly as being useful or successful, the tangible benefits of such extensive and invasive investigations remain unclear.

The misleading and deleterious amalgams made between Islam and terrorism that, although certainly a preexisting condition, have increased exponentially in the aftermath of these events, foment social distrust across the population, and fuel volatile hostilities within French society. How can France’s vibrantly plural population avoid falling into the destabilizing trap of blaming their co-citizens and pointing fingers at innocent Muslims? How can French society find peace and ways to coexist or embrace pluralism in the aftermath of these painful events and amid this social turbulence – especially with the looming and unsettling reality that there may be more violence to come? (An estimated 1,200-1,450 French nationals had left to join the forces of Daesch—also known as ISIS/ISIL—as of early 2015, and the figure has undoubtedly grown since. As a direct consequence of this recruitment, French and Belgium nationals made up a majority of the teams involved in the November attack, and this “internality” factor makes it exponentially more difficult for authorities to impede French born terrorists from re-entering the country and to track them once they cross the border). The unanswered questions, suspicion, fear, and aftermath of these horrific events have, among other things, spurred a new urgency for leaders and for social actors to find new and more effective strategies to mieux vivre ensemble (live better together).

The mieux vivre ensemble slogan and its various manifestations figured heavily in my fieldwork since it relates closely to my research interests and had been a headlining strategy for politicians and social organizations since the early 2000s. Mieux vivre ensemble projects and initiatives come in many forms, but tend to focus on (re)locating an operating consensus for French society, or at least for certain groups within French society—an operating consensus based on a set of values, beliefs, guidelines, or similar that allow France’s diverse population to live together…better. Some groups—such as the youth interfaith group Coexister—interpret mieux vivre ensemble as being an engaged coexistence for both religious and non-religious individuals; in other words, actively living together, celebrating religious and non-religious diversity, and embracing pluralism. Other groups such as SNRM (National service for relations with Muslims) and GAIC (Group of Islamic-Christian amity), which have been around for approximately 40 and 30 years respectively, take a strictly interreligious approach to working toward this goal, focusing on Christian-Muslim relations. These projects to mieux vivre ensemble, which are more thoroughly explored later in this blog, represent just a few of the widely varying responses to France’s new plurality – a plurality that demands new models for plural citizenship, new strategies for making multiculturalism work, and new interpretations of pluralism.

My 15 months of research in 2013 – 2014 involved digging deeper into this modern French plurality and the religious and social tensions that simultaneously influence and emerge from the ways that this plurality manifests itself in the hearts and minds of French citizens. Spending time in various ethico-religious communities of France—primarily pious Muslim and Catholic communities juxtaposed with the secular majority—I sought to learn how these different communities reacted to, ignored, and/or engaged with the new plurality and/or pluralism (plurality refers to the presence and interaction of multiple ethico-religious traditions within a given context, while pluralism refers to a principle or ethical tradition that seeks to embrace and affirm the reality of plurality), and subsequently with laïcité and “Frenchness.” How did their understandings of French citizenship differ; how did they work toward shaping and producing model(s) of “Frenchness,” and how did their concepts of “being French” clash and/or imbricate? Moreover, I tried to better understand how these communities managed (or not) to vivre ensemble (live together) despite varied and often opposed understandings of what religious pluralism is and should be in France.

Being a French Catholic in Plural France

In order to contextualize being a Catholic in today’s France—or a religious citizen of any denomination for that matter—we must first glance quickly back through history to understand the “chain of memory” of France’s majority religion. Prior to the French Revolution in 1789, the Catholic Church was an integral part of French life. Post-Revolution France underwent a number of political shifts, ultimately becoming known as a European exception with its strong laïque movements and anti-clericalism. Despite its plurality in terms of language, pockets of religious minorities, and regionally based cultural differences, France remained a majority Catholic country until the late 19th century. In the 1880s France developed its modern public, laïque (or secular/neutral) school system. The school reformers, led by Jules Ferry, set out to create a public school system free to all, without religious instruction, and with the intent to instill the Republic’s Revolutionary values of liberté, égalité, and fraternité in the minds of young citizens. This school reform was followed by the formal separation of Church and State in 1905, and lastly, the 1959 alteration of the constitution to describe France as a “laïque” Republic.

The steady movement away from a Catholic nation toward a “laïque” Republic significantly changed France’s social and cultural fabric. Catholic religious observance went through various stages, but showed an overall decrease during the 19th and 20th centuries. Some authors suggest that the final and decisive turning point was during the post-1960s era, which was characterized by “the gradual loosening of the ties between church and society”. In 1986 the Institut CSA reported that 81% of the French population claimed to be Catholic; in 2012, the figure had fallen to 56%. A different study by l’Institut nationale d’etudes demographiques (INED- INSEE) reported that in 2010 only 43% of the adult French population self-defined as Catholic. Another 2010 study reported that only 7% of Catholics attended mass on a monthly basis while 57% of Catholics considered themselves non-practicing Catholics.

The relatively new “minority” status of the modern Catholic Church was evident in my discussions with priests and parishioners across France. As one Parisian priest explained, “the Church is at the same time alive and dynamic and has also become a minority in a country where everyone has forgotten the Church and religion.” Along with the decline, there has also been a diversification of Catholic practice, giving way to a wide-ranging spectrum of what it means to be a French Catholic. For some, “being Catholic” means weekly mass; for others, it’s more about defining what they’re not – for example, not being atheist or Muslim. For many of those who comprise the 57% of Catholics who are non-practicing, Catholic is more a declared cultural affiliation than it is a religious observance.

Being a French Muslim in Plural France

While the Catholic Church watches its social and cultural capital decrease, another prominent minority religion has been on the rise. Islam has been considered France’s “second religion” since at least the 1960s and today it is estimated that approximately 5-8% of the French population is Muslim. France’s historical relationship with Islam has been long, complex, and often tumultuous. The battles of colonialism and the grueling Algerian war still weigh heavily in the memories of many Muslim (and non-Muslim) citizens of France (about 2 million French residents trace their roots to Algeria, and approximately 75% of the country’s Muslims have family origins in Algeria, Morocco, or Tunisia—however, despite common misperceptions and mistaken amalgams, only about half of the Muslims in France are of Arab descent). Along with more recent examples of oppression, discrimination, and inequality targeting Arabs and/or Muslims in France, these painful memories have given shape to complicated and sometimes volatile boundaries of nationality, belonging, and identity making among second and third generation youth – a prevalent topic in current discussions of youth radicalization.

According to at least one recent study, approximately 78% of French Muslims self-declare that religion is of great or moderate significance in their lives; only 24% of French Catholics would make the same statement. This, along with its relative newness and the highly mediatized political debates surrounding Muslim clothing and rituals, makes Islam a very public and practiced religion by comparison with Catholicism. That said, similar to the diverse ways that French Catholics practice, believe in, and belong to their faith, there are myriad ways to be a French Muslim – from nominal belonging and believing to pious devotion.

Furthermore, and also like their Catholic counterparts, French Muslim individuals and communities are engaged in a variety of responses to plurality, and demonstrate a variety of interpretations of Frenchness, laïcité, and “French Muslimness.” Some Muslims stand behind a discourse of strong laïcité—or the strict privatization of their religion, insisting that it does not impinge on their beliefs or practices, but rather allows them to practice their religion privately, freely, and unperturbed. Others make a stronger claim to their rights to freedom of expression and religion in the public sphere. (While these claims to the freedom of religion are wide ranging, many revolve around women’s dress—notably the headscarf, which, along with other ostensible religious signs, was banned from public schools in 2004 and is not permitted for public service employees, and the burka which was banned from public spaces in 2011—the source of significant controversy and hiring discrimination in the private sector). For every controversy and debate surrounding Islam in France, one can find Muslims supporting both or all of the different camps involved. It is precisely this diversity of practice and devotion that has led to significant intra-religious turmoil among certain Muslim communities in France – again, similar to intra-religious struggles found between French Catholic communities.

Finding a Friend in Faith

Over the past 50 years, the Catholic Church has been increasingly interested in engaging and supporting co-citizens from other faith traditions. In 1964, just after the Second Vatican Council, the French Catholic Church launched the Conseil pour les relations interreligieuses. In an effort to bolster its interfaith outreach, the Church later established one branch specifically aimed at relations with Judaism and another aimed toward relations with Islam. The latter Service nationale pour relations avec les musulmans (SNRM) was created in 1973 and is today the most active branch of Church-sponsored interreligious efforts. SNRM’s mission is to promote dialogue between Catholics and Muslims, to educate Catholics about Islam and interreligious work, to provide support for diocesan interreligious efforts, and to forge relationships with Muslim leaders.

From 2006 to 2015, SNRM’s was presided over by Father Christophe Roucou. Having lived for 9 years in Egypt, holding a degree from the Pontifical Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies in Rome, and above all, believing firmly in the importance of interreligious dialogue, Father Roucou was the perfect candidate to take over the SNRM presidency in 2006. In collaboration with Tariq Oubrou, the Imam of the Grande Mosquée de Bordeaux, Father Roucou wrote “Le prêtre et l’imam” (The Priest and the Imam). The book uses a frank and far-ranging dialogue between the two men to discuss some of the topics that sometimes derail interreligious dialogue. Stepping down in 2015, Father Roucou was replaced by Father Vincent Feroldi, a religious historian by training, a longtime chaplain, and an invested participant in interreligious dialogue for more than 40 years. Father Feroldi has spent more than 6 year in Morocco and has travelled extensively throughout the Muslim world. The primary responsibility of the SNRM President is to maintain relations with Muslim leaders at the national level, as well as to serve as the national representative for the Church in Islamo-Christian and interfaith events across France. Both Father Roucou and Father Feroldi play an active role in an impressive number of dialogue efforts across the country and throughout Europe, and participate in many youth initiatives such as Coexister (see below).

Similar in some regards to the SNRM, Le Groupe d’Amitié Islamo-Chrétienne (GAIC) was co-founded by Muslim and Catholic leaders in 1984. The official goal of the group is to, “contribute to the development of an improved mutual knowledge of the Christian and Muslim communities and to promote the common ethical and spiritual values of Islam and Christianity within the framework of an open laïcité”. GAIC maintains Christian and Muslim co-presidents at all times, and in recent years this latter position has been filled by Imam and Chaplain Said Ali Koussay. Having emigrated from Madagascar more than 20 years ago, Koussay first became involved with GAIC in 1996. As he explained in an interview, he was searching for the same friendly, interreligious relations to which he was accustomed in Madagascar. As with Fathers Roucou and Feroldi, one can find Imam Koussay at local interreligious dialogue events on an almost weekly basis, as a speaker, guest, or simply in support of friends and colleagues involved in the event. Despite, or perhaps thanks to, their divergent backgrounds and different faiths, Fathers Roucou and Feroldi and Imam Koussay all believe firmly in the importance of interfaith work, community dialogue, and the necessity of setting a good moral example for all in one’s daily life.

There are a number of prominent Islamo-Christian groups and initiatives in France, many owing their founding to the Catholic Church’s role in fostering the integration of minority religions into French society. In addition to these Islamo-Christian initiatives, there are a wide variety of other interfaith groups in France as well. For example, the association Coexister was established by a group of young people in 2009, and is today the most prominent grassroots interfaith youth group in France with more than 12,000 supporters from across the world. Their primary ambition is to bring youth with diverse perspectives together, including atheists and agnostics, for the purpose of inspiring community and social engagement. The group focuses not only on dialogue, but also on sensitization of high school youth, citizen and social action to build solidarity, formation/education, and interfaith travel in order to learn from other countries and inspire new forms of interfaith involvement in France.

Challenges to Cooperative Coexistence

SNRM, GAIC, and Coexister are important examples of interreligious groups striving to mieux vivre ensemble. Nonetheless, there are significant challenges facing these and other interfaith cooperation efforts in today’s social turbulent France. In a northern Parisian suburb, for example, one priest involved in interreligious work through the local branch of SNRM lamented recent changes in his community. He said he used to be invited into Catholic classrooms on a regular basis to talk about Islam, but now the kids have stopped wanting to engage with the topic. “One kid told me, ‘we already spend all day with them. After all, we’re not here [in the Catholic school] for a class on Islam’.” He added that Catholics were becoming less interested in engaging in interreligious dialogue and events in the area because of a perceived increase in a threatening, “communitarianistor closed-off Islam. In some cases, it is possible to point to communities that are experiencing a repli or “turning in” toward each other and away from the greater French society. In a small minority of cases this is due to the following of a specific religious doctrine, although often it is in reaction to polarizing public debates or as an alternative to otherwise feeling outcast from French society. However, a large part this perceived threat stems from negative media portrayal of certain populations, notably Muslims and certain ethnic groups, which is exacerbated by events such as the January and November Paris attacks. These kinds of events, perceptions, suspicions, and fears can quickly snowball into a destructive force, diminishing social trust and wreaking havoc on interfaith cooperation efforts.

Also contributing to the challenges of coexistence is the internal diversity of viewpoints within France’s various ethico-religious communities—an internal diversity that often points to more similarities between religions than within them. Thus, opinions about Frances’s new religious and cultural plurality do not align neatly along ethico-religious lines. Although many of the Catholics and Muslims with whom I spoke complained of a moral decline in French society, in many cases their characterizations of French morals differed more as a result of their neighborhood circumstances than it did their religious orientation. Furthermore, there are Catholics, Muslims, and atheists who agree that religion should remain strictly private and that religious symbols should not be allowed in public schools or public administrative positions. On the other hand, there are members of each ethico-religious community who disagree with and even staunchly oppose these opinions. Often times, both sides of such debates will make claims in the name of laïcité simply using opposing interpretations of the concept. This intra-community plurality poses a challenge to interreligious dialogue since there is much intrareligious debate to be had before interreligious dialogue can fruitfully move forward. This is particularly the case for those varieties of dialogue that seek to invoke text-based orthodoxy so as to highlight commonalities across ethico-religious traditions. Where dialogue is based upon a faith-community’s presumed homogeneity the result can be superficial conversation or and even reinforced stereotypes.

Furthermore interfaith efforts in France tend to be limited to dialogue rather than creating sustainable projects of working across faiths toward a common goal. Dialoguing is recognized by nearly all those involved in interreligious work as an important and crucial contribution. However, as the Coexister founders (among others) have suggested, establishing local, grass roots, sustainable efforts to come together as religious communities to advance specific social causes can perhaps better affect real change. Another shortcoming of some interfaith events in France is the failure to include atheist or agnostic representatives, thus leaving out more than 1/3 of France’s population from the discussion. In many of the events I attended, a priest, a rabbi, and an imam would discuss their common, often religiously grounded, views on a theme. Even those religious representatives who believed in including all voices in the dialogue, as to mieux vivre ensemble, would often slip into a religiously grounded moral discourse that tended to exclude atheist and agnostic perspectives. This was especially commonplace in interreligious events organized to discuss recent topics such as gay marriage and adoption, as well as gender equality education in primary schools.

These publically contested and controversial topics illustrate the complexities and challenges of the new French plurality. In May 2013, France passed a law granting homosexuals the right to marry. In the months leading up to the vote, there were strong protests in support of and against the proposed law. After the law passed, the protests grew and became more volatile. More than religious values as such, the majority of protestors rallied to the idea of the importance of traditional family values. However, the media did not let France ignore the strong Catholic and Muslim support for the protests, as well as support from the far right. Some observers pointed to the irony of Muslims and the far-right being bedfellows. Others noted the unique opportunity for a very publicized form of collaboration between Muslims and Catholics, although the actual degree of cooperation varied across protest groups and locations. It seems that there was a considerable degree of collaborative effort in Lyon, for example, where the Muslim and Catholic populations have a particularly close relationship. However, in Paris, the pattern was more one of Catholics and Muslims protesting side by side, but not hand in hand. Again, the level of intra-community diversity of those involved played an important role in fostering or hindering inter-community collaboration.

The last major protest was held in February 2014, almost a year after the law’s passage. The protest drew fewer but still substantial numbers of people into the streets of Paris, Lyon, and Lille. Added to the protest agenda was the new gender equality program, scheduled for introduction into state primary schools in the fall of 2014. The program, known as ABC De l’Egalite, caused an uproar in Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish communities (among others), when rumors spread that young children were to be taught that gender is a “choice” rather than a naturally ascribed characteristic, that homosexuality is as normal as heterosexuality, and that masturbation is healthy and natural.

Mieux Vivre Ensemble?

Although the mariage pour tous protests and gender education remain salient issues in French society, the gravity of the 2015 attacks have, for the most part, overshadowed such debates. The public and political focus is now nearly-exclusively oriented toward Islam, Muslims (both French and non-French), terrorism, Syrian refugees, and immigration—sometimes spoken of as one monolithic amalgam—especially as citizens look ahead to the 2017 presidential elections. Even the economy has slipped into second place to some extent. The necessity of finding solutions to mieux vivre ensemble has not been so strikingly apparent for decades. How can French society and leaders negotiate and attenuate the current social turmoil? Are the policies of laïcité and assimilatory citizenship working? Are policy revisions necessary? Or do new models of secularism and citizenship need to be considered? Should “Frenchness” be redefined to make room for the new plurality and if so, how, and where should the boundaries of belonging be placed? Where should the line between public order and freedom of expression be drawn? How “public” should religion be allowed to be and what difference does this actually make to security concerns? Groups like SNRM, GAIC, and Coexister represent the optimistic vanguard for dialogue, tolerance, and cooperation. However, today’s conflict of interpretations with regard to Frenchness and plurality, exacerbated by a climate of fear, suspicion, and social distrust, present formidable and as of yet unresolved challenges to France’s enduring mission to mieux vivre ensemble.

Carol Ferrara
Carol Ferrara is professor Emerson college, teaching courses on Islam, Applied Anthropology, and Religion and Secularism. She earned her Ph.D. in Anthropology at Boston University. Since April 2013 Carol has led the Paris leg of the Public Ethics and Citizenship in Plural Societies Project, as part of a team of researchers at Boston University’s Institute on Religion Culture and World Affairs (CURA) working with Contending Modernities.
Field Notes article

Los Angeles: A Microcosm for National Conversations on Religion, Public Life and Deep Diversity

The intellectual enterprise of talking about multiculturalism and pluralist co-existence carries an inherent tension. On the one hand, the gap between theorizing and empirical research points to the need to embed ourselves in a dialectical understanding of both spheres. On the other hand, the field carries the exciting and yet traumatizing effects of a dynamically changing landscape, rendering long-term analysis difficult. The public debate often becomes overly focused on the day-to-day developments and makes co-imbricated realities all the more complex. Having experienced this difficulty during my fieldwork within the Muslim communities in Boston and the San Francisco Bay Area, where I spent considerable time among six Muslim communities, I wanted my research in Los Angeles to focus more exclusively on the wider narratives that defined the public conversation on religion in Southern California.

Faced with this challenge I travelled to the Los Angeles metropolitan area in June 2013 to observe how Muslim, Catholic and secular communities interacted not only with each other but also within themselves, and how they perceived the deep pluralities of the modern age in an increasingly cosmopolitan, diverse landscape. It soon became clear that this city with 13 million residents stands out as a not-too-small laboratory for the national debates in the U.S., from immigration reform to the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College decisions in 2014, to more recent national conversations on sexual identities, racial discrimination, criminal justice reform, and the challenge of ISIS. In many ways Los Angeles is a microcosm for the many difficult conversations that haunt academics, policy-makers and lay citizens alike.

The full-scale representation of the nation’s most pressing conversations in Los Angeles becomes all the more important when its religious roots are considered. Los Angeles has been a major center of Catholic immigration and institutionalization from the early 17th century onwards; it witnessed the birth of the Pentecostal tradition in early 20th century; and has been home to one of the most diverse populations of American Muslims. From West Hollywood’s famous celebrity-sighting spot Urth Caffé, a product of the cooperation between an interfaith couple and their ecumenical-Christian-new-age religious networks, to the role of inner-city religious congregations in healing the city after the 1992 Rodney King riots, religious identities and actors are markedly important in constituting the city’s moral economy even as Los Angeles continues to lead the production of materialist/secular ethos that shapes not only local and national, but also global perceptions of the contemporary world.

Global Challenges, Local Dynamics and Securitization

The illustrative debates in Los Angeles indicate the need for urgency in unpacking what liberal citizenship can—and fails to—offer to help make sense of “deep plurality” in both the theoretical and the everyday realms. In a 2014 interview with the New York Times, President Obama argued that what went wrong in the Arab Spring and the Muslim world, in general, was the failure to bring together multiple political, ethnic, and religious identities in a pluralist ethics. Several months later, in a statement in the aftermath of Charlie Hebdo attacks, Obama also argued that unlike in the case of America’s Muslim immigrants, Western European countries failed to develop inclusive policies of integration toward their Muslim populations. While Obama’s earlier reference was directed towards the dynamics between Democrats and the Republicans, and American Muslims feel they are advantaged compared to most European Muslims, it is imperative to take this problem seriously and realize that despite the political and cultural legitimacy attained by most religious minorities in the United States, American civil religion is not free of challenges.

My Muslim interlocutors in California increasingly recognize that while part of the country and the political elite grant them a public role and legitimacy, there are others who have found ample public space to delegitimize and securitize Muslim Americans. Even optimists are quick to criticize Obama, who enjoys overwhelming support among American Muslims. They argue that while the Federal government has invested a lot in optics when it comes to engaging with American Muslims, the President has carefully avoided stepping his foot in a mosque in the United States due to fear of electoral politics. They also point to the FBI’s continuous surveillance of mosques and use of informants to argue that meaningful engagement with Muslim Americans has not found adequate attention on the part of the Federal government, and that often times Muslims are treated “publicly as partners and privately as suspects.” While several meetings in the White House over the last year have started to address this problem, a long-term perspective underlines that not only federal but also local dynamics and partnerships will be a crucial component in overcoming anti-Muslim populist bias.

And yet, the exploitation of populist fears and discourses have become only more pronounced in the aftermath of the November 13, 2015 Paris and December 2, 2015 San Bernardino terrorist attacks. The fallout from both attacks has further increased the already unprecedented spike in anti-Muslim hate crimes and sentiment, creating historic levels of anxiety across American Muslim landscape. More promising developments, however, have also been seen. Building on earlier relationships developed in interfaith and civic settings, numerous nationally prominent Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and Evangelical leaders have condemned anti-Muslim rhetoric, in addition to public statements and displays of support from local civic and faith leaders, including many in Los Angeles, Boston and San Francisco. As Muslim Americans claim a greater space in the public sphere and adopt the language and practice of civil rights activism and political lobbying at the local and national scene, these developments have also highlighted efforts of local organizations such as Sahaba Initiative who have been addressing social problems in the economically challenged landscape of San Bernardino over the past 5 years.

Even as most politicians condemned anti-Muslim rhetoric, recent polls suggest that public fear of refugees/immigrants and Muslims seems to have coalesced around partisan lines, much in line with America’s culture wars. Muslim American leaders face the challenging multiple tasks of defending their faith against organizations such as ISIS, combating Islamophobia, and responding to demands to root out extremism—a demand many rightfully argue is not burdened on followers of other faith traditions. Additionally, post-San Bernardino conversations have shed light on some government policies that have come to be perceived as normal in the securitized atmosphere of post 9/11 era. There is an understandable concern that the challenge of ISIS may result in further government involvement in the management of American religious life despite constitutional safeguards, and that public perception of Islam will be shaped mainly around questions of terrorism and radicalization.

Ever since the US Attorney’s office designated Los Angeles in September 2014 as one of the three pilot cities – along with Boston and Minneapolis – where authorities have started to engage Muslim communities to counter violent extremism (CVE) in light of ISIS’s perceived reach among Western Muslims, these perceptions and dynamics have become all the more crucial. The CVE Summit in Washington last year created a flurry of positive and critical commentary, public posturing, and heated debate on the potential negative implications of a CVE-specific engagement with Muslim communities. Even though the White House has refused charges of singling out and securitizing Muslim communities and President Obama gave a reassuring speech at the summit, many observers, including some who were part of the meetings, point out that the political scene may soon change, rendering these programs potentially problematic in the long-run, much like their failed precedents in Britain. A telling example of the securitization of muslim communities was the September 2015 arrest of Sudanese-American high-school student Ahmed Mohamed of Irving, Texas. The 14-year old Ahmed brought to his school an alarm clock he built at home, hoping to get accolades from his teachers. Instead, he was arrested after a teacher found the home-made clock suspicious. Whereas the public outpouring of support from high-tech giants to President Obama seem to have made up for the mistake, opponents of CVE initiatives point out that the Muslim teen’s teachers were indeed merely following a CVE approach and that it is the federal government to be blamed for their programs that treat its Muslim citizens as “usual suspects.”

As epitomized in recent remarks from some presidential hopefuls, anti-Muslim sensationalism coupled with anti-immigration sentiments seems poised to rise in the upcoming election year. Although voices from many sectors of the American socio-political spectrum have provided a strong defense of religious freedom and underlined the non-discrimination and no religious test for political office principles, American Muslims continue to be rightly concerned about a nativist reaction to Islam that frequently resorts to a vaguely defined threat of “radical Islam” and distortive anti-Shariʻa discourses in an effort to justify anti-Muslim rhetoric.

It is crucial therefore to note that while America’s politico-historical narrative on secularism and state-church relations, and its wider ethico-philosophical approaches to a public role for religion, are conducive to vitalizing pluralist coexistence, religious congregations and local policy-makers in the United States are increasingly arguing that the country may soon find itself closer to the crises that mark the debates in Western Europe and Quebec. The negotiations across and within Muslim and Catholic traditions—traditions that are dynamic rather than fixed, normatively heterogeneous rather than homogeneous, and increasingly individualistic—provide a good starting point to contemplate how we can envision pluralist co-existence as social responsibility, without transforming it into an authoritarian discourse.

Conversations across and within Faith Traditions

In Los Angeles these negotiations manifest themselves in terms of inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues—as a perpetual arbitration between the meta-narratives of religious traditions and their lived realities. During my fieldwork, the primary recurring theme that I encountered was the need for meaningful dialogue across and within ethico-religious traditions. Many of my interlocutors emphasized that pluralist coexistence requires diverse religious traditions to remain in constant dialogue, not only with other traditions, but also within their own faith. They reiterated that while many faith leaders reflected on the evolution of their own religious communities in the United States, they avidly kept an eye on the experiences of other faith traditions. The constant dynamic of inter and intra religious dialogue becomes all the more important in the context of Muslim and Catholic communities in Los Angeles and Orange County, as they make up one of the largest and most diverse communities across the U.S. The diversity within the communities themselves, including variations in socio-economic status, and variety the urban/suburban settings inhabited within each community are matched in the ethnic, theological, and sociological diversity manifested in each traditions respective historical evolutions.

In the vibrant civic landscape of the greater Los Angeles area, both American Catholics and American Muslims are still trying to carve out a dignified presence, even when they have established themselves as integral elements of the city’s civic life. The religious congregations hold considerable sway over the mayoral and sheriff elections, and, while wary of the role of religion in public sphere, the local authorities constantly seek engagement with Muslim and Catholic communities. Yet, their struggle for the acceptance of their “religious being” in the United States continues. This struggle takes on multiple colors as conversations move across generations, across immigrant and indigenous communities, socio-economic classes, ethnic communities, and across the urban and suburban landscapes.

The Los Angeles Archdiocese’s major masses in the Cathedral of the Our Lady of Angels, located across from the City Hall, invariably start with an emphasis on the multicultural nature of the Archdiocese. That the Archdiocese is the most multicultural in the nation and that the Sunday mass is offered in 42 languages across the Catholic parishes in Los Angeles is emphasized. In Orange County, the recently acquired Crystal Cathedral speaks to the needs of a flourishing Catholic community with its Vietnamese, Hispanic, and Korean communities. In the Muslim community there is an equally dramatic diversity. From the Iranian and Arab Shi’a communities to Sunni Arab and South Asian communities, to African-American, Latino and Cham Muslims originating from Cambodia, over 130 mosques and community centers organize under the umbrella of the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California since 1994, in addition to the recently formed Shi’a Muslim Council of Southern California. In the urban and suburban jungle of Los Angeles multi-million dollar mega cathedrals and mega mosques with professional staff co-exist with struggling parishes and mosques, highly trained clergy serve Muslim and Catholic Angelenos along with part-time, loosely educated individuals. And yet, neither the loosely structured Shura Council nor the formal, highly structured Archdiocese hold fundamental control over how these communities engage with the experiences and exigencies of their daily lives. Improving and instilling theological and sociological literacy, particularly customized for American public life, is a mutual challenge for clergy and community leaders in both Muslim and Catholic communities.

Keeping the youth within the fold of respective Muslim and Catholic identities and the continuity of religio-ethical perspectives as they play out in the fields of mosque/parish life, clergy/imam education, pastoral care, youth programs, and formal education are shared concerns especially in the face of moral dilemmas posed by the dominant secular ethos. From daily practice to religious garb, to sexual identities, and mixed faith marriages, the variables are plural, the solutions are often elusive and interpretive plurality is on the rise. On the other hand, a number of focal incidents that fall under the categories of education, sexual identities, interfaith relations, civic-political engagement, and institutional transformation continue to mark the dialogues within and across Muslim and Catholic communities.

Faithful Citizenship

While the national conversation on immigration reform is highly debated across the spectrum, the Catholic Church in Los Angeles has joined the debate through their faithful citizenship initiative, and have joined with Muslim communities by recently endorsing a pro-immigration stance. And, similar to the often divisive national debate, one of the major issues that stands out in my conversations across the spectrum in Los Angeles concerns how new immigrants can be enculturated into the mainstream. In the Muslim community, this issue comes across as an issue of self-reflection, especially among those who lead Muslim institutions since some of these are first-generation immigrants themselves. Speaking from inside, the leaders of organizations, including but not limited to Los Angeles Chapter of Council on American Muslim Relations (CAIR), Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), Islah LA, Umma Clinic, and Access California look at the debates within their communities, and try to streamline both new immigrants’ reflexes and challenges faced by the second and third generations into a coherent vision for the future of American Islam. The creative tension created by increasing plurality and maturation of the community requires multiple Muslim actors to engage their tradition in light of their lived reality in a pluralistic society. It is crucial that this engagement takes place against the backdrop of an increasingly rich literature and debate on jurisprudence of Muslim minorities (fiqh al-aqalliyat), diasporic jurisprudence, and legal plurality that has influenced how Muslim Americans, in Kathleen M. Moore’s words, narrate themselves into the multicultural nation and state.”

In the Catholic communities, there is a similar awareness, especially among those who compare their positions to the generation of their parents, and by those priests who engage with immigrant communities and fellow clergy. While the theological exigencies presented by Vatican II and the adaptation of Nostra Aetate continue to inform the ecumenical and interfaith approaches, there is prevalent agreement that American—as well as Asian, Hispanic and African—clergy serving the Catholic faithful are not up-to-date with Rome’s theological interpretations. It is true that Pope Francis brought a much needed fresh breath of air to the Catholic communities and Catholic faith’s relationship with other spiritual paths. Pope Francis’ 2015 visit to the United States clearly highlighted his pastoral approach and his concern for the long-term livelihood of the Catholic Church, especially in the Western Hemisphere. While Francis’ visit was limited to the East Coast, his canonization of Junipero Serra—despite concerns with his missionizing activities—was celebrated by Archbishop of Los Angeles Jose Gomez as a reminder of America’s deep religious and intercultural roots. Although much of the public attention has focused on Pope Francis’ earlier remarks about moving away from an exclusive discussion of abortion and same-sex marriage and his decision to authorize all priests to absolve the sin of abortion during the upcoming “Jubilee of Mercy” year, his tone and emphasis on crafting a Catholic message appropriate for the diversity of modern age carries crucial implications. And most American Catholics seem to approve of Francis’ message. Nevertheless, faced with questions from the more conservative congregations—echoing some members of Catholic hierarchy—religious leaders in Los Angeles persist in emphasizing that the Pope’s stance does not necessarily mean that canonical changes are in order.

Compared to the Muslim communities, questions around cultural and theological authority have become less critical among Catholic Angelenos, partly because Muslim immigration is more recent and their institutions are more nascent. Being a Catholic American is more “normal,” but living a Catholic life in the United States is just as challenging and enterprise as living a Muslim life in the U.S. And yet, both Muslim and Catholic Americans inherit similar, if not the same, problems. Clerics and community leaders struggle with many aspects of public ethics, not the least because just as in Montreal, Paris, and Amsterdam, the city they live in simultaneously gifts them with a deep, dizzying plurality.

These conversations are also in close contact with critical themes that continue to challenge the wider spectrum of religious Americans. Soon after arriving in Los Angeles I attended one of the quarterly Catholic-Buddhist dialogue meetings. Just after the meeting started, one of the senior monks in the room deferred to his dialogue companions’ advice: He had started having problems with his order that is headquartered in Seoul, because he had officiated a gay marriage in his community. He said, “this is my congregation, this is who they are, here in the West we cannot continue to deny this.” “Well,” the Catholic participants humorously countered him, “we may not be the ideal cohort to help you out with this” and the more conservative Buddhist monks chose to remain silent. What followed this initial exchange was an exciting conversation on how inter-faith marriage, changing norms of morality, and gender relations were collectively and simultaneously putting them in a difficult place as pastors and advisors in their communities.

My conversations in Los Angeles indicate that the interfaith scene is marked by an incredible dynamism, and yet both Muslims and Catholics are seeking ways to move away from a “lowest common denominator” approach to interfaith relations and create ways to further entrench their faith, not only in their respective traditions but also in religion. Again, both communities seemed to have moved away from perspectives that saw interfaith dialogues as anathema, and today have a deep belief in their importance. Nevertheless, interfaith alliances such as the South Coast Interfaith Council, despite their remarkable successes over the years, recognize the difficulties in reaching out to certain segments of faith communities, as well as, the problems with trickling down agreements and activities at the top to the local, every-day communities. Similarly, the debate on sexual identities and same-sex marriage continues to present challenges for Muslim and Catholic communities. When many Muslim organizations endorsed Proposition 8, which sought to limit same-sex marriage in 2008, some argued it was politically unwise to do so. Feeling betrayed, many faith-based allies of Muslim Americans, particularly from the Protestant congregations, who frequently came out in support against Islamophobia and securitization of Islam, protested this endorsement.

These debates on identity and religious interpretation take a significantly critical tone in educational settings. At New Horizon School Pasadena, a national blue-ribbon school, Muslim educators try to equip their students with an informed Islamic perspective on abortion and same-sex marriage, readily admitting that they are concerned with normatively inhospitable stance towards religious perspectives on these issues in the public realm. They hope, however, that their students will imbricate their American Muslim identity in the larger public environment successfully. Across town, Loyola Marymount University, a private Catholic university that takes pride in its Jesuit/Marymount identity, became the focus of a heated controversy in 2013 when the school dropped elective abortions from their health plans and instead offered TPA insurances. While the more conservative Catholics were happy with the decision, they objected to the TPA formula; others, including Catholic and non-Catholic staff, faculty and students, objected to the decision all together. The school’s non-catholic president who has since left LMU had to urge everyone to take into consideration that “We are not a parish or a seminary… But we are a Catholic university. We are not and will not be shackled by a paw of orthodoxy but neither are we USC or Pomona. Our Catholic, Jesuit, Marymount identity has meaning… Like many of you I reflected deeply about what it means to be a Catholic, Jesuit, Marymount University at these times.” When California Governor Jerry Brown’s administration put an end to the discussion, forcing Loyola Marymount and other religious colleges to provide coverage for elective abortions, the decision was not well-received among some Catholic circles. Similar debates have come to the fore following Supreme Court’s decision to legalize same-sex marriage and Angeleno Catholic and Muslim voices underlined their doctrinal position on the issue, with varying degrees of alarmism and concern. And we may see future prolonged legal battles about sexual ethics as well as non-authoritative yet influential voices critical of their own faith communities’ stances.

Living in an Unfinished America?

These vignettes from some of the more critical incidents and conversations that took place during my research point out that Los Angeles is marked by the plurality of ethico-religious interpretations and a multiplicity of actors. As the cultural and intellectual authority and the role of religion in both private and public space are constantly challenged by the secular ethos of modern American society, cross-generational religious literacy, the survivability of the religious paradigm, and cultivating a dignified existence for religious citizens all continue to be a shared concern across the Abrahamic and other ethico-religious traditions. Similarly, those American citizens who approach religion skeptically and promote various forms of non-religion are curious to know how the public role of religion can signify the diversity of the society while, at the same time, co-exist with laws that restrain its role in public life. While they frequently disagree on how best to address these challenges, public figures and private individuals realize that this diversity needs to be re-articulated in the 21st century landscape of Los Angeles, necessitating novel socio-political imaginaries.

A recent photovoice project that the San Francisco Human Rights Commission put together in cooperation with Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities in 2015 to highlight stories of discrimination and resilience was reflective of the continuously changing ethical, legal, and religious landscape of the country was aptly titled: “Living in an Unfinished America, implying that there might be a more perfect end to the American story. However critical one may be of such a utopian end, as the most recent Pew Religious Landscape Survey points out, the religious ecology of United States continues to change greatly, influencing future trajectory of religious pluralism. By comparison with the 2007 survey, Catholics and Protestants have witnessed a dramatic loss of membership, the “nones” are attracting individuals from other altars at a remarkably high rate, and Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu populations are on the rise.

Importantly, American Muslim and Catholic communities engage with the new plurality at different stages of their respective historical evolutions in the ever-changing American religious and legal-ethical landscape. It is exactly because of their historical situatedness that my American Muslim interlocutors place a high stake in the successful evolution of a truly multicultural citizenship imagination and equate the development of a sustainable American Muslim community as truly embedded in the successful development of the multicultural futures of the American religio-political landscape. It is clear, however, that merely pitting the American experience with public religion against an avowedly secular/laicist European tradition will not produce meaningful answers to the multiple challenges that face the ever-growing American religious plurality. A more productive approach would be to move towards contextualized interpretations of novel moral imaginaries, towards those shared conceptual maps that inhabit American religious and non-religious communities.

Ahmet Tekelioglu
Ahmet Selim Tekelioglu is the content editor for Mayadan, the academic blog for the Ali Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from Boston University. His research is located at the intersection of religion and secularism, politics of ethno-religious identities, Muslim minorities in the West, and international relations theories. Ahmet Selim's dissertation examines six American Muslim communities in Boston and the San Francisco Bay Area with a focus on contemporary debates about American Muslim identity and transnational belonging. From 2013-2015, Ahmet Selim lead the Los Angeles leg of the Public Ethics and Citizenship in Plural Societies Project, as part of a team of researchers at Boston University's Institute on Religion Culture and World Affairs (CURA), working with Contending Modernities.
Global Migration & the New Cosmopolitanism article

The New Western Plurality and Citizen Co-Existence

Two developments over the past generation have presented serious challenges to the ideals and practice of Western citizenship. The first has been an unprecedented expansion of migration to Western countries, including that from Muslim societies and the broader global south. It goes without saying that the migratory vectors of our age pass not just from south to north, but across countries of the developing world. But the late-modern march of humanity to Western lands is of such a scale and complexity that it has raised questions about existing models of pluralist citizenship—a challenge which has been exacerbated by its cultural timing. In the aftermath of the great secularist surges of the 1960s and 1970s, most Western European and North American countries had reached a new consensus on the place of religion in public life. But many new immigrants brought with them, or discovered in their new homelands, different ideas as to how and where to be religiously observant.

Resurgence of Religion

The second development that moved questions of religion, ethics, and citizenship to the center of public discussion in the West has been the global revitalization in religion since the 1970s. In phenomena as diverse as Hindu nationalism, Islamic resurgence, Pentecostal conversion, and America’s culture wars, these developments showed that contemporary religions have not merely weathered the secularizing challenges of the age, but, as Jose Casanova and others have long argued, reasserted themselves as public religions. In presenting their faith as of public relevance, religious adherents have come squarely into conflict with assertively secularist models of citizenship and civility ascendant in many parts of Western Europe (but much less decisively in North America) since the 1960s.

Together these two developments have raised deep questions about received values and practices of pluralist co-existence in Western societies. At times the resulting controversies have led to non-violent but heated “culture wars” over questions of public values and co-existence. At other times, as in London in July 2005, in Oslo in June 2011, in January’s Charlie Hebdo attacks, and most recently with the attacks on Paris in November, the culture wars have spilled into acts of real physical violence. Whatever the precise sequence of events, as the British political philosopher Tariq Modood observed in Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea, these developments have put in question received Western models of liberal citizenship. The fact that the pace of immigration and the growing plurality of Western societies show no sign of diminishing soon suggests that the question of just what is required, public-ethically speaking, for pluralist co-existence is likely to remain at the heart of debates in Western societies for some years to come.

Paris, Amsterdam, Montreal, Los Angeles

It is against this backdrop that the Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs (CURA) at Boston University undertook 16 months of field research on migration, the new plurality, and pluralist co-existence in metropolitan Paris, Amsterdam, Montreal, and Los Angeles, as part of the University of Notre Dame’s Contending Modernities initiative. These four cities were selected for three reasons. The first is that the nations of which they are part are heirs to quite different regimes of secular-liberal governance, vividly demonstrating that the “liberal” West is heir to, not one, but as Alfred Stepan put it a few years back, “multiple secularisms.” The variation across cities also reminds us that, to borrow a Stepan phrase once again, patterns of state-religion-society relations in these settings “are best seen as conjunctural, socially constructed, political arrangements, rather than as fixed normative models” (p.114).

The second reason for choosing these cities is that the main religious traditions to which each of the surrounding societies is heir are today undergoing great changes, not least as a result of the precipitous decline and repositioning of once-dominant faith-traditions (with the notable exception of the United States). The third reason for our choice is related to this second: all four cities happen to be sites of innovation by actors aiming to rework received traditions in such a way as to respond to the deep plurality of the age.

Catholic, Muslim, Secular

Although the challenge of pluralist coexistence is today being felt by all ethico-religious communities in Western societies, our project focused on three: Muslims, Catholics, and a loose assortment of groupings that we have referred to (while recognizing the polymorphous diversity the phrase hides) ethical “secularists.” The focus is directly inspired by the tri-civilizational comparison highlighted by the Contending Modernities research and education initiative. In the case of our New Western Plurality project, however, the focus was also intended to make comparisons across countries manageable by limiting the range of ethical groupings and traditions studied.

Our research on these three ethical traditions was never meant to imply that they are or will be the most decisive for the future of pluralist co-existence in these lands. Indeed, over the course of the research we were regularly reminded of the scale of the ethical and epistemological challenges all three traditions face. Many Muslims, indeed probably the majority in Amsterdam and Paris, rarely if ever go to mosque, and many have an at best cultural rather than explicit normative identification with Islamic traditions. The much-discussed fragmentation of authority in late-modern Muslim communities has also diminished any confidence some might have that Muslim intellectuals and leaders ideas on pluralism will be easily embraced by a broader Muslim public.

In both its scale and varieties of affiliation, the Catholic community is even more complicated than the Muslim. In the Netherlands and Quebec, if not in the United States (where Church membership in cities like Los Angeles has been buoyed by Hispanic immigration and the continuing resilience of religion in public life generally), the Church over the past forty years has been so severely shaken by dwindling parish membership as to force the hierarchy into crisis-management mode. As one advisor to the Netherlands bishops told me in September 2014, “the bishops are so busy with school closures, dwindling finances, and membership disaffiliation that most have little time to devote to the debates about pluralist citizenship raging in the society around them.” Notwithstanding these challenges, the Catholic hierarchy in all four societies has devoted special staff and resources to inter-faith initiatives. Indeed, some of the most thoughtful Christian spokespersons we encountered over the course of our research were people like Father Christophe Roucou, director of the French Church’s Service nationale pour les relations avec l’Islam. While the voice of figures like Pere Roucou commands respect in inter-faith circles, however, there is no certain transference of that influence out into the broader population of “cultural” Catholics. Some of the latter maintain what British sociologist Grace Davie has called (speaking of many varieties of European Christians) a “vicarious” identification with Christianity, “believing without belonging.”  Others belong without much believing – taking their cues from popular pundits and politicians as much or even more than Church spokespersons.

So our focus on Catholics, Muslims, and ethical secularists was not premised on the assumption that intellectuals and leaders in the organized wings of these communities exert a determinant influence on popular ethical opinion. Our premise was simpler: we felt, and research confirmed, that looking at leaders and initiatives in and around these groups could provide a useful perch from which to observe ongoing ethical debates over how to live together in the new Western plurality, at a time when many citizens regard received models of liberal and/or multicultural citizenship with unease, uncertainty, or outright skepticism.

From Normative Work to Public Reasoning

Armed with this research imperative, during the early months of our project we trained our attention on the normative work being done by community leaders and public intellectuals engaging the new plurality in creative and hopeful ways. We were also interested in the obstacles and opposition that the proponents of ethical pluralism encountered, both from within and outside their respective communities. We were particularly curious to see how these actors might be drawing on elements in their own ethical traditions to devise new ideas and practices for pluralist co-existence.

In this phase of our project, our approach drew on that developed by the anthropologist John Bowen, in his pioneering Can Islam be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State. Several years back Bowen set out to explore the “public reasoning” of Muslim teachers and intellectuals in France, looking to their own Islamic heritage for ethical guides to living in new European homelands. Like Bowen, we were convinced that, even in an era of irreverent postmodernism, some among the citizenry look to received ethical traditions to grapple with contemporary moral problems.

The complexity of this research ambition quickly became apparent, however. One problem was that so much of the sound and fury of public ethical turbulence in the cities we were studying emanated from actors outside of and little concerned with these ethical traditions. Drawing as our project did on prior research on the politics of public spheres, we had expected as much. What we hadn’t fully anticipated was just how effective populist actors and media could be in sidelining thoughtful public discussion and, in so doing, changing the terms of public debate on topics as varied as Muslim women’s headscarves, core values courses, or, most generally, what it means to be French, Dutch, Quebecois, or American.

Focal Events

Rather then limiting our research focus to public figures with polished discursive skills, then, we extended it to examine what we called “focal events” which brought a broad variety of actors and voices into public ethical contention. In the public controversies surrounding “Black Pete” in the Netherlands, the laicist and broadly anti-Islamic “Charter of Values” in Quebec in 2013-2014, and the rise of the National Front in French national and EU elections—each of which are discussed in the essays that will follow—we looked not just at the admirable efforts of high-minded pluralists, but statements and actions of protagonists more interested in “winning” than developing a coherent or faithful ethical discourse. Although often overlooked in discussions of ethics and modern public spheres, this “un-Habermasian” politics of positioning and media caricature is a key influence on late-modern ethical life.

At the beginning of our project we had not intended to make Islam or Muslims a pivotal point of research reference more central than any other. However, during the middle months of our research in late 2013 and 2014, questions related to Muslims and Western citizenship surged to the fore. International events were of course part of this: the dark terrorist attacks of the early 2000s had given way in 2011 to the bright hopes of the Arab spring, only to be clouded again by developments in Syria and Iraq, not least the gruesome post-modern mediatrics of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and the Levant.

But other events closer to our four cities also drove ostensibly Muslim issues to the fore, even if, as our research recognized, the issues always had as much or more to do with a some imagined national subjectivity than it did Muslims or Islam as such. The proposal for a starkly laicist “Charter of Values in Quebec,” put forth by leaders of the Parti Quebecois in late 2013 caught Canadian Muslims and Quebec pluralists by surprise, and set off a half-year debate on the place of religion in general and Islam in particular in Quebec society. Opposition to gay marriage and the “Marriage for All” legislation in France created an implicit if uneasy alliance between some segments of the Catholic and Muslim communities. For some non-Muslim French, the apparent alliance of conservative Catholics and Muslims only confirmed their conviction that Muslims did not share properly modern republican values. (In actual fact the Muslim community was divided on the gay marriage issue, some feeling that the issue risked alienating longstanding allies). In the Netherlands, too, the rise of overtly anti-Islamic parties on the right and requirements that immigrants master Dutch language and “core values and norms” have kept Muslims and Islam at the center of citizenship debates. Each of these case studies is explored in the following blog posts from Azeddine Hmimssa, Carol Ferara and Ahmet Yukleyen.

A New Spirit of Cooperation and Solidarity

Although some might have expected Islamic issues to loom even larger in the still- “post-9/11” United States, Ahmet Selim Tekelioglu and I were regularly reminded that the situation is not quite so simple. Ahmet spent a year in Los Angeles, and an additional six months research in San Francisco and Boston. As I followed him to some of his research sites, meeting with Muslim, Catholic, and other public intellectuals and community leaders, both of us were struck by the quiet purposiveness and optimism of intellectuals and leaders in the Muslim community. Certainly, many people, both Muslim and non-Muslims, spoke of the pain and anxiety experienced by many American Muslims in the months the followed the 9/11 attacks. But many too spoke of a new spirit of cooperation and solidarity. Indeed, Ahmet encountered many Muslim Americans who spoke of a veritable civic renaissance among American Muslims since the middle 2000s, particularly in cities like Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Boston, where Muslim demographics and institutions are of such a scale to allow for a synergy across Muslim worship, educational, and civil-rights organizations.

There are other conjunctural peculiarities to the American scene that make the situation of American Muslims hopeful and dynamic. One is a perception that personal religiosity in the public sphere finds easier acceptance than in some parts of Europe – a perception that, interestingly enough, was also voiced by young hijabi women we met in Amsterdam and Paris, some of whom expressed interest in emigrating to the U.S. for just that reason. But there is another historical circumstance that makes the American Muslim situation distinctive. As African-American Muslim scholars like Sherman A. Jackson points out (see his moving Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking toward the Third Resurrection), thirty percent of American Muslims are African-American, and, although their interactions with Middle Eastern and South Asian immigrants have not always gone smoothly, they have nonetheless created rich moral synergies. Immigrant Muslims learned civil-rights skills from their African American brothers and sisters. They also learned of the importance of building broad social alliances and new educational institutions for community betterment. Perhaps no institution embodies this history more profoundly than the recently established Zaytuna College in Berkeley, California, the first Muslim-based liberal arts college in the U.S. Zaytuna was founded by an alliance that included African American Muslim preachers, Euro-American converts to Islam (including the gifted Shaykh Hamza Yusuf), and Muslim intellectuals from the South Asian and Middle Eastern-descended Muslim community. Combining an appreciation for classical Islamic jurisprudence with Islamic spirituality and civil-rights idealism, Zaytuna is a striking example of what makes the American Muslim experience of deep cultural interest for the global Muslim ummat.

Living Together in Ethical Difference

By way of conclusion, and to respond to questions that the other researchers and I have regularly been asked, I offer a few preliminary reflections on what our project might say about living together in the deep ethical different that marks the new Western plurality.

Our study began against the backdrop of a broad body of research that had dispelled the confidence once widespread in policy circles that formal democratic institutions alone are sufficient to “make democracy work” (to borrow Robert Putnam’s much-used phrase) under conditions of growing religious and ethical pluralism. Contrary to the hopes of policy makers in the 1980s and 1990s, even a vibrant “civil society” or network of civic associations cannot guarantee a tolerant and inclusive citizenry.

In speaking of Muslim integration in the contemporary West, Jonathan Laurence’s panoramic book, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration suggests (referring in particular to Europe) that the cultural integration of Muslims can be managed easily enough, if it is carried out on the model of corporatist accommodations devised a century ago between governing elites and representatives of the Jewish community. Laurence is right to emphasize the state’s crucial role in any sustainable civic integration. However, our research suggests that corporate deals by themselves will never be enough to make a new pluralism work; it’s also important to bring society back in (a point with which Laurence, a consultant to the project in its early stages, would no doubt agree).

Changing Aspirations: From citizenship to Social Recognition

Several things make the new Western plurality a more daunting ethical challenge than that of a century ago. Some of the new, religiously observant citizens are today less willing to make the life-style and religious concessions that Catholic and Jewish minorities may have been willing to make three or four generations earlier.   As Tariq Modood has pointed out, drawing on Charles Taylor’s early work, most of the new citizens aspire not merely to formal citizenship, but to a publicly expansive social recognition. Yet, as we all know, in some Western countries a significant portion of the long-resident population is reconsidering just how much of the new multicultural plurality they are willing to put up with, not least with regards to Muslims. Headscarved teachers in some lander in Germany, minarets in Switzerland, hijabs, niqabs, and any variety of “ostensible” religiosity in public institutions in France – these are, it seems, a multicultural bridge too far for some Europeans.  However offensive some populist players in the anti-accommodative camp may sound, the disagreement over what common values and cultural practices are needed for sustainable pluralism is a serious one, and practicable answers will not be simple.

Inevitably, however, we circle back to the same questions: Who is to say what values will figure among those to be shared? And who has the right and capacity to nurture them? Recognizing the limitations of his 1994 model for “making democracy work,” the Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam has said that one key lies in nurturing “bridging” as well as “bonding” civic associations. That sounds sociologically appealing, and it resonates with the proposals made by scholars in the field of peace studies who say that the key to making plurality work is for people from diverse ethnic, religious, and social backgrounds to put aside their intellectual reservations and join with people of diverse backgrounds in local campaigns of community organizing and betterment.   Our research confirms that interfaith collaborations are helpful, and may well be transformative of some individuals. But a nagging question remains: What is to be done with the overwhelming majority people who have neither the opportunity nor the inclination to participate in what David Barclay has aptly called “political friendships?”

Building the New Western Pluralism

In the end, I believe, the evidence suggests that there is no single key to pluralist civility. What is needed instead is a virtuous circle of serious normative work, high-minded civic associations, and state agencies collaborating in the creation and public performance of a new pluralist consensus. Fine words, but what might that mean? First of all, rather than a single pluralist pathway in all cities or countries, there will and must be many. To put the matter differently, the proponents of pluralist co-existence have no choice but to begin with the resources at hand, and hope that the moral message and practices they promote can slowly be extended to other social fields. In some instances, it makes sense to begin locally, with small groups of inter-religious/ethical dialogue and organization. But if these local groups are not to be swept aside by populist bullies, they must also look more widely. In particular, they must devise ways to scale up collaborations across the state-society divide, promoting pluralism-friendly messages in schools, the media, and the marketplace. Where the social imaginaries of local communities are religious, the promotion of pluralist practices will also require the participation of religious leaders and intellectuals, able to legitimate general models of pluralist co-existence in tradition-specific terms.

The idea that there is no single institutional key to achieving pluralist civility may strike some readers as a spare or pessimistic conclusion indeed. The conclusion is modest but it offers not a counsel of pessimism but a message of practical hope. Modern societies are made up of diverse social fields and history shows that pluralist progress in one field can be easily reversed by uncivil bigotry in another. The challenge for the proponents of pluralist civility, then, is to devise ways to slowly extend inclusive practices and ethics from one sphere into others, both in society and across the state-society divide. Along the way there will be obstacles and set backs, as well as whirlpools and eddies of anti-pluralist froth. But that too is the new plurality: there is and never will be any blissfully multicultural end to history. But to recognize this fact is not to succumb to pessimism but to find a practical path toward hope. Building the new Western pluralism work is not a distant dream. The work begins in the here and now, and in as many fields as pluralist-minded actors are able. This, our research would suggest, is the only way forward, and the march has long since begun.

Robert Hefner
Robert W. Hefner is Professor of Anthropology and Director of the Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs at Boston University.  He has done research on religion and plurality in Southeast Asia since the late 1970s, and has been involved in projects on the comparative study of Christians, Muslims, and civic-pluralist co-existence in Western and Asian societies since the 1990s.  His books include Pentecostalism in the 21st Century (2012) and Sharia Politics: Law and Society in the Modern Muslim World (2011).