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Theorizing Modernities article

Response to Wrestling with God Symposium

This photo shows Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDR) that were transported from bases in the U.S. in October 2001 to Afghanistan. U.S. Navy Photo by Tina M. Ackerman. Public Domain.

Any scholar concerned with the intersection among issues of religion, humanitarianism, ethics, and international relations would be thrilled to be in conversation about one’s work with Diane Moore, Michael Barnett, Emma Tomalin, Atalia Omer, and Joshua Lupo. I am, too—both honored and stimulated, intellectually and ethically—by the generous and insightful readings and comments brought forth by each of these interlocutors to my book. In this response, I take on issues of ethical precarity and staying with the trouble, whether Christianity (or any religious tradition) has a core, decoloniality, the problem of humanitarianism and the human, objectivist social science, and fatigue.

Staying with the Trouble

Yes (to Michael), your play on the fatigue of constant wrestling does indeed capture a fair bit of the process of writing, researching, and rewriting the book. But I submit that the notion of fatigue has also been heightened and transformed by the moral turpitude and ethical rawness laid bare by triple pandemics of the year immediately following the initial appearance of my book (in March 2020): the spread of COVID-19, authoritarianism, and the awareness of systemic racism, in the U.S. and globally. (I note that the second and third were present well before March 2020, although they have received fresh attention during the past year.) If I—and many others—were already tired before March 2020, we were almost totally depleted after it. In other words, I am convinced (unsurprisingly for anyone who has read the book) that ethical wrestling is both crucial for any kind of meaningful life, and frequently tiring. Yet neither Michael nor I can claim to know the depths of exhaustion or the sources of renewal necessitated by having to confront racism daily—that intimate, grievous, and permanently unsettling knowledge is reserved for our friends who do not enjoy our intersectional (especially white) privileges.

In this constant questioning, I am honored to be placed by Diane Moore in the company of Donna Haraway. Unsettling knowledge and ontological categories is the name of the game here, and is fundamental to Haraway’s “troubling” as well as the precarity that Moore notes is crucially important throughout my book. This unsettling simply disallows moral absolutisms, as Moore candidly puts it. I love Moore’s exposure of the “generative wonder” that results for Haraway when we acknowledge our complex interrelationships with entire “ecologies of existence.” But if the “biological and social autonomy” emanating from “bounded epistemic abstractions” are false, as Moore notes, can we speak of epistemic and religious traditions at all? This brings us, in other words, to Barnett’s important query about the core of Christianity.

The Core of Christianity?

Whether Christianity, or any religious tradition, has an ahistorically definable “core” is a question that I constantly pushed through my own wrestling throughout the book. The easy answer, perhaps, is that it is not up to me to define a core, because I am a specialist in international relations (and religion), not a theologian or religious leader. Another response is simply no, there is no core, because taking the wide range of interpretations of how to act in any of the book’s historical periods (including the present), simply precludes it. Still, I want to take up Michael’s challenge, at least partially. Writing not as a theologian but as a somewhat educated layperson with experience in the Christian tradition, I think one can identify notions of redemption through incarnational commitment, acceptance and inclusion of all humans regardless of any identity category, the negotiation of living in the world simply and rejecting material accumulation and self-glorification, and the prioritization of communal sustenance (spiritual and material) as critical, if not essential, elements of Christianity. These features singly and together also suggest a suspension of any “strong” notion of temporality, or boundaries between immanent and transcendent worlds. Having outlined these ideas, however, one immediately sees how they are contested: so many “Christians” have historically drawn lines around who is accepted and included in redemptive possibilities, and continue to do so today, and so many have played a major part in instantiating and institutionalizing a linear notion of time that separates the immanent from the transcendent.

If there is one feature in my outline above that ethically troubles me, it is whether the incarnational commitment gives too much focus to the human to the detriment of both non-human forms of being characteristic of all ecospheres and Spirit-centered traditions. Of course Christian theologians— especially those who are feminists—have for some time insisted on Christianity’s responsibility for the earth as a whole (Rosemary Radford Reuther, among others). But a potential displacement or even partial dislodging of the place of the incarnational Christ by the global (yet specifically-situated, according to different indigenous cosmologies) Spirit is another question altogether. It seems to me that indigenous spiritualities at the very least beg this kind of partial disruption of hierarchy. It is the notion of Spirit, in other words, that can lead us to a more decolonial understanding of both Christianity and religion writ large. This is because the idea of Spirit connects to numerous indigenous cosmologies in ways that acknowledge their onto-epistemological sources while allowing a kind of dynamic flowing among and through them to connect where possible with Christianity (and other “world religions”). Thus it is not a replacement for Christian universalism, but rather an acknowledgement of cosmological complexity and possibility.

Decolonial Futures

Both Atalia Omer and Emma Tomalin read Wrestling with God as a call to decoloniality. Given the points made above, I’m delighted that they do, as delving into both Christianity and modernity requires, in my view, numerous levels and forms of decolonial investigation. Here I put their related yet distinct lines of inquiry—stemming both from the book itself and, intersecting with their own work, for future research and humanitarian activism—into conversation to highlight and reinforce several of their observations and insights. Omer draws out the intersectional issues that continually arise across historical periods, and that appear to come out full force in contemporary humanitarianism. Both she and Tomalin note the apparently inescapable compromises Christian humanitarians regularly make with practices of neoliberal governmentality, even, as Omer notes, these compromises are just a genealogical step away from (and so, in her words, “rhyme with”) those made by missionaries vis-à-vis the colonizers. The negotiation of faith and neoliberal as well as colonial forms of modernity is absolutely a major point of Chapter 6 (and indeed, the book as a whole). Yet, I also appreciate Tomalin’s insight that “faith-based” (presumably “international”) humanitarian actors often sit uncomfortably with these pressures, and seek respite in finding alternative modes of interaction with like-minded interlocutors in the sites where they work. (Barnett’s work on World Vision International is also instructive here.) My own interviews with Christian and Muslim humanitarians (some of the results of which have been published elsewhere) echo these insights, as I have found that they have appreciated the opportunity to reflect on the ethical tensions brought forth by their work vis-à-vis both neoliberalism and the war on terror. Still, I note an uncomfortable range of positions vis-à-vis missionary legacies in my ongoing experiences with both western and non-western Christian humanitarian interlocutors. How many Global South as well as Global North Christians promote conversion, and if so, what reasons motivate their promotion of conversion? Is it because of a belief in its intrinsic value or because it is what the faith-based donor wants to see?

Missionary Erik Jansson in Guarany, Brazil, baptizing a person. Postcard published by Örebro Missionsförening. Public Domain. Unknown Author.

These kinds of questions need more investigation, in my view. But they also return us to the relationship between Christianity (or religion in general) and secularism in modernity. In other words, they force us to ask: To what degree does the recognition of the constitutive nature of Christian/secular development in modernity, and the harm done by attempts to ignore it (as Tomalin rightly describes) require the suspension of attempts to maintain a boundary between aid and evangelism or proselytism? I am no fan of proselytism or evangelization, but neither do I think that it is possible to pretend that religious motivations on the part of humanitarians or religious needs on the part of recipients do not exist or must not be part of the humanitarian relationship. And of course Barnett is right to bring forth the suspicion of Christian motivations by Jews (and Muslims), given the all-too-numerous historical precedents.

In short, I think the burden of Omer and Tomalin’s readings of the book accords with my own: that radical egalitarianism requires a reconfiguring of the humanitarian relationship writ large, including allowing the ontological (i.e., cosmological) reconfiguring of both Christian and secular forms of modernity. What we often think of as “modern” has never done away with what we think of as “pre-modern”—not in Christianity itself as it is practiced in many parts of the world (from Ireland to South Africa), and not in secularism, despite violent attempts at suppression. Still, we have not yet figured out how to be truly inclusive of alternate cosmologies in scholarship (certainly not in “the social sciences”) or in humanitarian activism. Doing so of necessity reconfigures the humanitarian relationship, in my view. It does so by levelling hierarchies of knowledge and possibly (hopefully?) even by prioritizing and elevating indigenous perspectives and forms of knowledge. This means that the financial, technical, and religious resources brought to the table by humanitarian aid-givers become no longer dispositive, but simply one set of resources among others that are brought to the table by recipients themselves in a way recognized by all as bearing greater weight. (Donors in this ideal/idyll would simply provide resources, enabling without directing.)

This is in many ways a very modern ideal. Returning to Barnett’s queries, while the bulk of the book does indeed focus on “others” in the Global South (for both conversion and donor proselytism), Chapter 3’s discussion of the extremely disturbing and violent way that Bartolomé de las Casas came to his distinction between “native” Americans on the one hand, and Jews and Muslims on the other—briefly, my discussion aligns very much with Michael’s—is central to the argument. The book’s analysis of the overall relationship between Christianity and secularism, as Omer states so well (as a genealogy of the “symbiosis of Christianity and secular modernity,” including “its perpetuation through other idioms and technologies” over time, while highlighting [Christian] epistemologies on the margins) also allows for, in addition to decolonial perspectives, the very kinds of openings to Jewish (or Hindu, or Buddhist, etc., etc.) rationales in favor of the secular that Barnett also notes, even though they are not the subject of this particular research tome. And Chapter 6 again addresses the othering of Muslims, no matter where they are from.

Religious Pluralism and the Ethics of Scholarship

I also want to engage briefly with several underlying objectivist social science desires that Barnett’s questions reveal. While I partially address Michael’s question about whether the recognition of ethical precarity eventually dissolves what is “Christian” about Christianity in a much earlier article, I note that theologians have long argued about the meaning of religious pluralism and its relationship to religious syncretisms. The “Alliance of Civilizations” as well as numerous other interreligious groups have brought this debate to the fore again (see Tanya Schwarz’s recent book). The most important answer to queries about this meaning has not been articulated by western theologians, in my view, but either by theologians from outside the west or indigenous thinkers. Both the theologians noted in Chapter 6, and scholars such as Silvia Cusicanqui Rivera (see, for example, Marcus Scauso), have dug into the problematic of postcolonial thought, helping us to get unstuck from debates about the contours of religious pluralism so that we can incorporate multiple ontologies and ways of being.

Similarly, Barnett would like me to outline some scope conditions under which ethical change can occur. But the very premise of wrestling in the midst of historical contingency disallows any meaningful enumeration of such conditions. For example, the Black Lives Matter movement cited by Tomalin and the intersectional analysis highlighted by Omer build on historical moments and thus require both contingency and structurally induced repetition. One could perhaps return to a notion of “tipping point” in social movement or diffusion literature to analyze the enormous impact that BLM is currently having on debates within both Christian churches and aid groups (as noted by Tomalin), but such constructions limit the impact of the long-term organizing and even longer-term wrongs that movement activists have lived through. Moreover, the usual purpose of detailing such scope conditions is to be able either to predict or shape the course of future events. While I would love to be able to do so, I submit that to provide fresh genealogical constructions that can illuminate the very real pain that has produced very real ethical challenges is more meaningful as well as likely to have a greater impact on political dynamics. Carefully analyzed, such events and their moral tensions have provided enormous food for thought, analysis, and action for the interlocutors in my book. Recognition of others’ ethical precarity begs us to acknowledge our own.

In short, we cannot eliminate the necessity of constant wrestling. As Omer notes, it is vital for avoiding depoliticization of the modes of thought and action that determine violence and peace, life, and death. It is indeed “staying with the trouble,” as Moore, via Haraway, asserts. I would contend that it is the only ethical way.

 

Cecelia Lynch
Cecelia Lynch is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. She is an expert on international relations, religion and ethics, humanitarianism, and civil society, and has researched and published extensively on topics related to peace, security, international organization, globalization, humanitarianism, and religion. She co-edits the Critical Investigations into Humanitarianism in Africa (CIHA) Blog, at www.cihablog.com.
Theorizing Modernities article

The Historian’s “Unloved Stepchild” No More: The Case for Intellectual Biography as Historical Method in Islamic Studies

Drawing of a Muslim faqih and his students during, circa 750–1258 (Abbasid Caliphate). Public Domain. Via Wikimedia Commons.

Among historians, biography as a form of historical analysis finds little favor and is often denounced as “minutiae without meaning,” a “lesser form of history,” or “the profession’s unloved stepchild, occasionally but grudgingly let in the door, more often shut outside with the riffraff” (573). The ambivalence towards biography seems to stem from an assumption that it is nothing more than “great man” history which unadvisedly explains intellectual developments by studying the mind of an isolated genius. I first picked up on this stigma as a PhD student in a historiography colloquium at the University of Chicago. I was puzzled to hear my Europeanist and Americanist colleagues suggesting that intellectual biography was a flawed and passé method of historical analysis and that the field of history was oversaturated with studies of prominent figures. At the time I was honing in on my dissertation project, which centered the life and thought of the prominent seventh-/thirteenth-century jurist ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660/1262) as a window onto broader intellectual and social developments in the Ayyubid period. To my mind this was a worthy contribution: we knew too little, not too much about important thinkers like Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām. In other words, while I can’t speak about the entire field of historical study, the sub-field of Islamic history has too few, not too many, intellectual biographies.

As the first English language biography of Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), Sohaira Siddiqui’s Law and Politics under the Abbasids: An Intellectual Portrait of al-Juwaynī is a welcome and long overdue contribution. Siddiqui’s book is a brilliant study of the life and thought of the prominent Ashʿarī theologian and Shāfiʿī jurist who left an indelible mark on Muslim theology, law, and political thought, which, until now, had been little known or appreciated. Siddiqui’s study of al-Juwaynī makes a persuasive case for why intellectual biography as a form of historical writing can best demonstrate the interaction between political, social, and intersecting lines of intellectual inquiry at a given point in history.

While I examine the content of Siddiqui’s book in a forthcoming review for the Journal of Near Eastern Studies, in this short essay, I would like to focus on some of the methodological insights I gained from the study and how it continues to inform my work. Having spent many years contemplating intellectual biography as a mode of historical analysis, I would describe Siddiqui’s monograph as an exemplary model for how to bring to life a premodern Muslim thinker’s life and legacy.

Towards Multidisciplinarity, Coherence, and Context in Intellectual Biography

What are some of the outstanding features and key methodological insights we glean from Siddiqui’s accomplished study of al-Juwaynī?

First, Siddiqui’s study draws on three disparate subfields of Islamic intellectual history to reconstruct al-Juwaynī’s thought, namely theology, legal studies, and political theory. This multidisciplinary approach is crucial to Siddiqui’s successful search for unity in the Juwaynian corpus and for the establishment of a coherent narrative of al-Juwaynī’s intellectual vision. By showing how al-Juwaynī’s ideas in epistemology shaped his legal and political thought, for example, Siddiqui convincingly argues that interpreting the thought project of a pivotal polymath like al-Juwaynī demands expertise across subfields. In doing so, she makes a compelling case for why these disciplines should not be siloed off in the historical study of Islamic thought. The effectiveness of Siddiqui’s approach rests on mastery of the three disciplines she studies; mastery which she consistently exhibits through her careful reading and interpretation of theological, legal, and political texts and precise presentation of specialist debates.

Siddiqui’s study of al-Juwaynī makes a persuasive case for why intellectual biography as a form of historical writing can best demonstrate the interaction between political, social, and intersecting lines of intellectual inquiry at a given point in history.

Second, Siddiqui frames her intellectual portrait of al-Juwaynī by identifying a central intellectual project that connects his varied theological, legal, and political ideas. Siddiqui cogently frames the Juwaynian project as one centering on the dialectical relationship between certainty and continuity, or more specifically, the epistemically certain knowledge attained by individuals and the continuity of religion and society. Siddiqui demonstrates that the scholarly debates and the political instability of al-Juwaynī’s age created a tension between his desire to attain epistemically certain knowledge in theology and law, and his aspiration to preserve the continuity of the social and religious life of the Muslim community. Siddiqui’s simple framing that turns on the ongoing tension and negotiation between certainty and continuity is elegantly and methodically woven throughout the book’s varied topics and chapters, and serves as a powerful heuristic to explain al-Juwaynī’s socio-political concerns and his novel arguments. By framing al-Juwaynī’s project in this way, Siddiqui is able to showcase the unity that connects al-Juwaynī’s most influential writings, which may appear at first glance to be fragmented ideas or conventional treatments of standard topics in each discipline. It is Siddiqui’s multidisciplinary approach and search for coherence that enables her to present a comprehensive picture of his thought and to tie its disparate threads together.

Third, Siddiqui’s study is not merely a “history of great books” or a disembodied treatment of al-Juwaynī’s ideas in intellectual isolation. Rather, Siddiqui situates al-Juwaynī’s intervention within both anteceding intellectual currents and his immediate social and political conditions. Examples of the history of ideas which Siddiqui details include her masterful chapter-length treatment of the Ashʿarī-Muʿtazilī epistemological debates and previous Ashʿarī-Shāfiʿī thought (chapter 3) and political theory (236–43). By situating al-Juwaynī’s thought within preceding Ashʿarī and Shāfiʿī genealogies, Siddiqui brings to light his innovative contributions and the ends to which they were directed. She further situates al-Juwaynī’s interventions within their immediate socio-political circumstances. Doing so provides an explanatory context for the questions and problems that generated and shaped al-Juwaynī’s intellectual concerns. Siddiqui strikes a perfect balance in this regard: while she does not hesitate to interpret al-Juwaynī’s motives and to shed light on how his mental processes may have related to his life experience, she does so while carefully accounting for the available historical evidence and without taking excessive liberties or making speculative leaps.

These three features of Siddiqui’s monograph—employing a multidisciplinary approach, reconstructing al-Juwaynī’s central project, and situating his project within antecedent intellectual currents and contemporaneous socio-political context—are at the core of what makes Siddiqui’s study an exemplary model. Siddiqui’s impressive accomplishment has established the groundwork for future studies on al-Juwaynī and the broader scholarly traditions of Nishāpūr and Khurāsān that he represented, which were decisive for the formation of a synthesis of Sunni thought and piety that has remained paradigmatic to this day. With her contribution we are only at the beginning of understanding al-Juwaynī’s multi-faceted legacy; no single biography can be expected to provide full coverage of a polymath’s vast production.

Pieces of a Puzzle: Biographies as Scholarly Reconstruction of Intellectual History

Let me note a few avenues for future research into al-Juwaynī’s thought and legacy that are raised by Siddiqui’s groundbreaking study, some of which relate to my own research about the reception and development of al-Juwaynī’s thought in Damascus in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries. These remarks not only suggest fruitful channels for further study, but also point to important features of robust biographical studies that are best achieved through scholarly collaboration.

It is Siddiqui’s multidisciplinary approach and search for coherence that enables her to present a comprehensive picture of his thought and to tie its disparate threads together.

One question raised by Siddiqui’s study is the chronological development and evolution of al-Juwaynī’s thought. Siddiqui makes some important remarks on the dating of al-Juwaynī’s numerous theological works before settling on giving primacy to the Burhān as al-Juwaynī’s final and most exhaustive extant discussion of epistemology (110). The broader question of the chronological development in al-Juwaynī’s thought awaits exploration. Can we precisely date al-Juwaynī’s works to enable an analysis of its diachronic development? Did his thought evolve in response to pivotal experiences in his life, such as his exile, his travels to Baghdad and the Hejaz, or his tenure at the Niẓāmiyya? Exploring and finding adequate answers to these questions is a major undertaking, but one worth assuming for the payoff of uncovering otherwise undetected dimensions of the personal and historical factors shaping Islamic thought. Good examples of recent studies exploring the diachronic development of a thinker’s ideas include Ahmed El Shamsy’s analysis of al-Shāfiʿī’s legacy and Ayman Shihadeh’s study of al-Rāzī’s ethical theory.

In tandem with a chronological analysis of al-Juwaynī’s oeuvre, a fuller understanding of al-Juwaynī’s thought also requires consideration of some of his other writings that lie beyond the scope of Siddiqui’s analysis. For instance, al-Juwaynī’s magnum opus of substantive law, Nihāyat al-maṭlab fī dirāyat al-madhhab, spans some twenty-one volumes in the print edition first issued in 1428/2007. The Nihāya was considered the most important and voluminous commentary on al-Muzanī’s Mukhtaṣar, and it was received with widespread acclaim as the most significant contribution to Shāfiʿī law in the fifth/eleventh century. It has not received much attention, despite the possibilities it offers for studying developments in Islamic law, and in Shāfiʿism in particular during this period. It remains to be seen how a study of the Nihāya will further, or modify, our understanding of al-Juwaynī’s vision of law and legal theory as presented by Siddiqui.

Manuscript of al-Waraqat of Al-Juwayni. Via Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.

Another significant area of uncharted inquiry concerns the reception history of al-Juwaynī’s thought, both during his lifetime and after his death. Siddiqui explores the reception of two particular aspects of al-Juwaynī’s legal theory concerning concurrently transmitted hadith reports (mutawātir) (156–59) and scholarly consensus (ijmāʿ) (179–81). She draws our attention to several other novel interventions he makes, raising the question of the wider reception and legacy of al-Juwaynī’s thought for future research to explore. In my study of Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s and his network in Ayyubid Damascus, I demonstrate that al-Juwaynī exercised a formative influence on Damascene jurists in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries. This was the achievement of al-Juwaynī’s intellectual heirs from Khurāsān who emigrated to Damascus where they established a teaching and commentarial tradition centering al-Juwaynī’s writings in the emerging Ayyubid capital.

An exploration of the reception of al-Juwaynī’s thought should also explore the larger question of where al-Juwaynī fits within the broader scholarly landscape, particularly in the lively intellectual center of Khurāsān in this period. How did his thought compare to and interact with that of his contemporaries in Khurāsān? What about in Iraq? How did his thought contrast to that of his prominent Shāfiʿī contemporaries like Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058) and Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083)? I explore some these questions in my study, where I situate al-Juwaynī within the Khurāsānī Shāfiʿī community, characterizing his thought as an exemplary prototype of the mature Khurāsānī Shāfiʿī community’s scholarly tradition. The unique approach of this branch of the school centered analysis, synthesis, and the deployment of rational methods in the service of legal philosophy. Its unique approach comes into sharper relief when contrasted with that of the competing branch of Shāfiʿism, the Iraqi interpretive community, which upheld an emulative, issue-oriented, and transmission-based approach to law and legal theory. I show how these two streams of Shāfiʿism were transplanted into Damascus where they vied for dominance in Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s generation before gradually being fused into a single authoritative doctrine by Mamluk-era jurists, most successfully carried out by Yaḥyā b. Sharaf al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277). In recovering this history, Siddiqui’s study on al-Juwaynī challenged, deepened, and nuanced my evolving understanding of Khurāsānī Shāfiʿī history in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries. On the one hand, her detailed study of al-Juwaynī’s analytical and synthetic approach to questions of epistemology, legal theory, and political community substantiated my characterization of Khurāsānī Shāfiʿism’s scholarly culture. On the other hand, it raised further questions that challenged my suppositions about the impact of theological commitments and political anxieties on legal thought, and led me to ponder the internal fissures within the Khurāsānī community itself.

Herein lies the compounding benefit of the production of robust intellectual biographies: it is not just adding one more biography of a “great man,” but providing a vital puzzle piece indispensable for answering countless related historical questions that make it possible to develop a more coherent, layered, and rigorous longue durée vision of premodern Islamic thought. Unfortunately, many of the most influential thinkers in Islamic history remain little known. Often, only a minor facet of their lives has been adequately studied. Among the few exceptions to this rule, the gold standard is perhaps the study of Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), arguably the most influential polymath in Sunni Islam, and, incidentally, a student of al-Juwaynī. Historians have spent decades studying and debating the events of al-Ghazālī’s life and various aspects of his thought: his spiritual crisis and its aftermath, his involvement in the political intrigue of his day, and his seminal writings on theology, law, Sufism, ethics, philosophy, and politics. But we can count only a handful of other thinkers who have received a similar degree of sustained scholarly attention, like Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) and Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), and more recently, al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) and Ibn Taymīya (d. 728/1328).

Conclusion

There has been resurgent interest in biography among historians in general, which is mirrored in the niche field of Islamic intellectual history. This has been a heartening development, especially in view of the depth and rigor of these studies, which espouse the analytical approaches described above of interdisciplinarity, historical contextualization, chronological development, and the study of reception among contemporaries and heirs. This approach eschews biographical studies that succumb to the pitfalls of “great men” and “great books” history. Siddiqui’s is one of the best in my opinion, and in the same series (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization), we find several other notable monographs in the field of Islamic intellectual history employing biography as a window unto broader processes and changes at pivotal historical junctures, such as Christopher Markiewicz’s study of the Ottoman historian al-Bidlīsī and İlker Evrim Binbaş’s exploration of  Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī’s intellectual networks in Timurid Iran. Each of these biographies is a fundamental puzzle piece for reconstructing the puzzle that is pre-modern Islam and its intellectual traditions, to which I hope many more will be added.

 

Mariam Sheibani
Mariam Sheibani is Assistant Professor in History at the department of Historical and Cultural Studies at The University of Toronto Scarborough. She also serves as Lead Blog Editor for the Islamic Law Blog based at Harvard Law School. Her research interests are in late antique and medieval Islamic intellectual and cultural history, with a focus on the theory and practice of Islamic law and Islamic ethical traditions. Her first book project, Islamic Legal Philosophy: Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām and the Ethical Turn in Medieval Islamic Law, examines how Muslim jurists from the eleventh to fourteenth centuries addressed salient questions of legal philosophy, leading them to develop competing legal methodologies and visions of the law. Her other ongoing research projects include judicial practice in medieval Mamluk Cairo, classical doctrines of Muslim family law, and Sufi commentaries on Arabic grammar. She holds an MA and PhD in Islamic Thought from the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago.
Theorizing Modernities article

Islamophobia and Epistemological Ignorance

A sticker from a post in Montreal taken on May 20, 2019 likely in reference to the Quebec ban on religious symbols enacted by Bill 21. Photo Credit: Flickr User Ingrid Cold. CC BY-SA 2.0.

On June 6, 2021, in London, Ontario, the Afzaal family was run down and killed by a White man, leaving an injured young boy as the sole survivor. This is the most recent and high profile Islamophobic killing in Canada, following the January 2017 mosque shooting in Quebec. In both cases, the victims were targeted because they were Muslims.

In a similar manner to the reactions after the Quebec mosque shooting in 2017, many politicians and ordinary citizens have claimed that the attack in Ontario is exceptional. They claim that such things do not normally happen in Canada. To treat it as an exceptionally tragic event makes it possible to condemn the violence and to offer sympathy and support to Muslim communities without having to address the conditions which make the Islamophobia that motivates such attacks possible. The connection between individual actions and the systemic context is erased from view when violence against Muslims is treated as an isolated incident rather than as part of a longstanding political context.

Bill 21 is a flashpoint in this context. Bill 21, which became law in 2019 in Quebec, prohibits people who wear religious symbols from giving and receiving public services in the name of upholding Quebec’s commitment to secularism. In practice, the law disproportionately excludes Muslim women who wear hijabs from working in the public sector, as well as other religious minorities who wear visible religious symbols. A few days after the London attack, Prime Minister Trudeau was asked during a press conference about his views on this provincial law in light of his stated commitment to fighting Islamophobia. Trudeau responded that he had already expressed his disagreement with the law before, but that it was up to Quebecers to take it up as an issue.

The connection between individual actions and the systemic context is erased from view when violence against Muslims is treated as an isolated incident rather than as part of a longstanding political context.

Quebec’s Premier Legault, along with other Quebec politicians and party leaders, were quick to reject the idea that there was any relationship between Bill 21, Islamophobia, and the London attacks. As Bloc Quebecois leader, Yves-François Blanchet, stated, “…there is no relationship, no link between Bill 21 and that kind of gestures of hatred because Bill 21 has no meaning in London, Ontario.” Blanchet’s statement, along with those of the other Quebec party leaders, can be read, superficially, as commenting on the fact that a law that is passed in one province has no applicability in another. Technically, that is correct. More significantly, however, it reflects a refusal to see the discursive meaning that Muslims give to these two events.

I want to consider this alleged lack of connection and meaning in more depth, as I contend that it is indicative of a refusal both to know and to see Islamophobia. What does this refusal show us about the underlying relationship between Islamophobia and Whiteness, between Muslims and the nation in Quebec and in Canada? I suggest that there is an underlying relationship between the epistemological (what Edward Said describes as the production of knowledge about Islam and Muslims through reference to the west) and the political that can help illuminate the logic behind this refusal. How Muslims are known is connected to their political subjectivity. The refusal to know and to see Islamophobia, I claim, is ultimately a refusal to accept the political claim by Muslims to be treated as equal citizens. It is a refusal to see how Islamophobia is sustained through its connection to Whiteness in Quebec.

A Secular Nation

As Saba Mahmood has shown, hijabs and niqabs mark a fault line between the secularity of the western democratic nation on one hand, and the religiosity of Muslims on the other. Muslim women who wear them are defined entirely by their religious identity, and perceived as lacking individual agency. This defining makes it possible for the state to intervene via the law to “save Muslim women” in the name of western democracy that is based on secularism and gender equality. For the past decade in Quebec, various provincial governments have made efforts to legislate a ban on hijabs and niqabs. The current Coalition Avenir Quebec (CAQ) government has been the most successful thus far.

The refusal to know and to see Islamophobia, I claim, is ultimately a refusal to accept the political claim by Muslims to be treated as equal citizens. It is a refusal to see how Islamophobia is sustained through its connection to Whiteness in Quebec.

Legault’s government defends Bill 21 by claiming that it reflects Quebec’s “values,” namely, the importance of secularism. Secularism is closely tied to Quebec’s national imaginary following the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, religion and the Catholic Church were removed from the operations of the state and public sphere. At the same time, a Quebecois national identity based on French as its official language, gender equality, and secularism were cast as the defining characteristics of “modern” Quebec society.

Most Muslims in Quebec are francophones and have been settled in the province for several decades, since the Quiet Revolution. However, despite the fact that many Muslims are linguistically well-integrated in a society that centers French as both a language and national identity, their presence as racialized and religious minorities has come to be politicized in recent years within debates about “reasonable accommodation” and Quebec nationalism. The perceived hypervisibility of Muslim women who wear hijabs and niqabs in public spaces has been central to these debates, because it challenges the self-professed ideals of secularism and gender equality as part of a “modern” and nationalist view of Quebec.

The consolidation of secularism in Quebec is dependent in part upon the erasure of Muslim religiosity from public space, where public space is imagined as constitutive of the nation. This legislated erasure of Muslims from everyday public space normalizes and legitimizes Islamophobic violence, as it seeks to make their visibility and acceptance as Muslims exceptional. It creates the conditions that make it possible for someone to set out to kill Muslims in order to literally remove some of them from the nation. This is the meaning that connects Bill 21 in Quebec to what happened in London, Ontario. It is also invisible to Quebec’s government and Quebecois politicians.

Epistemology of Ignorance

The refusal to see Islamophobia in Quebec is rooted not only in Quebec’s idea of “modern” secularism, but also in the history of its relationship to the Rest of Canada (ROC). Quebec politicians also rejected the idea that Bill 21 could have had an impact on the hate crime in London because of Quebec’s relationship to the ROC. They emphasized Quebec’s power and ability to pass laws applicable to its own population without interference from the ROC. Their response, asserting a version of Quebec nationalism, is a well-established frame through which many Quebecois view relations with the (English) ROC. Many see the ROC as having engaged in historical “oppression” that is now being turned into a kind of bullying and convenient scapegoating.

This response ignores the complexity of Quebec’s own position as a francophone White settler society located within Canada, which is an anglophone White settler society. These are two intersecting political projects. While the standard criticism often claims that English Canada dominates over the linguistic minority of French Quebec, this narrow focus ignores how White francophone Quebecois majorities themselves constitute a dominant group in relation to the racialized (non-White) minorities in the province. In other words, the tension that shapes Quebec national identity is its position both as a White francophone minority in relation to Canada and a White francophone majority in relation to racialized minorities in Quebec. Thus, the refusal to see Islamophobia is also a refusal to see themselves as a “White nation” where White majorities who consider themselves to be the “owners” of the nation hold the power to set the terms of belonging for non-whites.

 

Memorial to the victims of the January 2017 attack on Muslims praying at Quebec City Central Mosque. CC BY-SA 4.0.

Charles Mills describes this refusal to see as an “epistemology of ignorance” in the context of his theorization about the racial contract. This contract lays out the terms in which White supremacy and its colonial projects structure society. The epistemology of ignorance refers to the non-knowledge of White groups who neither know, nor see, how Whiteness structures the world around them and maintains their position within it. They live in a world that is invented using “white mythologies, invented Orients, invented Africas, invented Americas” (18). These are anchored in the White imagination. This is neither accidental, nor incidental, but a necessary requirement for the structure of White supremacy to exist and to endure. It is constitutive of the racial contract itself, “which requires a certain schedule of structured blindnesses and opacities in order to establish and maintain the white polity” (19).

The comments by Premier Legault towards other racialized minorities, in addition to Muslims, demonstrate the ongoing investment in this epistemology of ignorance. In 2019, close to the two-year anniversary of the mosque shooting and in response to a proposal to mark a day dedicated to fighting against Islamophobia, Legault stated there was no need for it because there’s no Islamophobia in Quebec. More recently, in June 2020, after the murder of George Floyd in the US and protests against police killings of Black people, he said that while there was discrimination in Quebec, there was no systemic racism. A few months later, after the death due to negligence of Joyce Echaquan, an Indigenous woman who filmed two nurses insulting her before she died in a Quebec hospital, he reiterated his position against the existence of systemic racism.

Muslim Political Agency

Since 2017, there has been more public discussion about Islamophobia and advocating for Muslims. This change highlights the emergence of a national conversation shaped by Muslim political consciousness and agency. In the aftermath of this latest attack, many Muslims are not only naming their experiences of Islamophobia and laying out the connections between its various manifestations, but more significantly, seeking accountability and action from political parties and their elected representatives. In response to the initial call from the London Muslim Mosque and later from the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM), the federal government held a national summit on Islamophobia on July 22, 2021. It remains to be seen what kind of impact or long-term changes will come out of it.

Earlier, I noted a connection between the epistemological and the political, which sheds light on how Islamophobia and Whiteness are connected. Sayyid describes Islamophobia as “the systematic regulation and disciplining of Muslimness” and a denial of Muslim agency “through reference to a westernizing horizon” (423). Muslimness, as “a process of identification by which a Muslim subjectivity is articulated” (423), can only be imagined through reference to the west, which means that it is defined as antagonistic to it. In the case of Quebec, this “westernizing horizon” includes a future in which its Whiteness is secured as part of its “modern,” western, secular, democratic society. Muslim subjectivity, articulated through expressions of political agency, is seen as a threat to this imagined future and met with attempts to discipline it, and ultimately to erase its visibility.

Thus, the refusal to know Islamophobia is an act of Islamophobia itself because it is a refusal of Muslim political claims. However, it is sustained, not through personal prejudice, but through a systemic refusal to see Quebec’s own Whiteness as integral to its national identity. This commitment to the epistemology of ignorance as constitutive of a racialized hierarchy in society is the only way for a government to pass a law that devalues and discriminates against Muslims as racialized and religious minorities who have equal rights as citizens in the polity—and to deny that it does so at the same time.

Uzma Jamil
Uzma Jamil’s research expertise is in Critical Muslim Studies and examines how Muslims are constructed as racialized and religious minorities in the west, using a decolonial/postcolonial approach. Her research and publications focus on Muslims in Quebec and Canada, Islamophobia and racialization, the construction of knowledge about Muslims, and the securitization of Muslims in the “war on terror.” She has previously published in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Ethnicities and the Islamophobia Studies Journal, among other academic publications. Dr. Jamil is a founding member of the Editorial Board of ReOrient: The Journal of Critical Muslim Studies and a contributor to the podcast Network ReOrient.
Theorizing Modernities article

Religion, Humanitarianism, and Decolonization

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) distributes food in Madagascar. Source: Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.

Reading Lynch’s compelling and wide-ranging study of the role of Christian actors at different historical periods and how they manage the ethical precarity that faces them in dealing with the social, political, and economic problems they encounter, introduced me to areas of scholarship and geo-political contexts not directly engaged with in my own research to-date. The strongest impact on my thinking, however, was with respect to the careful unpacking of the ways in which Christian actors have been involved in both driving and resisting colonial processes. Connecting with these histories is both timely and potentially transformative given the radical impact of Black Lives Matter (BLM) in 2020, which has extended far beyond “Black Lives” in catapulting critical race theory and intersectionality into the mainstream. It has never been more crucial for academics to engage with the ethical precarity arising from the unequal and colonial underpinnings of our disciplines as well as the activities of the communities of practice about which many of us in the social and political sciences write.

In my primary field of the study of religion, there has been a tradition of scholarly critique over the past few decades of colonialist and Protestant Christian influenced understandings of what a “religion” should look like, the damage that has been done through the normalization of the separation of the religious from the secular, and the problems that arise from viewing religions through the lens of the “world religions paradigm.” My secondary field of study, that of “humanitarianism”—defined by Lynch as including “both emergency relief and longer, development efforts” (190)—has for several decades sought to influence policy and practice within the international aid sector to move away from Global North-led solutions to local humanitarian/development “problems,” and instead to work from the “bottom up” through equal partnerships that value local knowledge and expertise. However, it is only more recently that serious attention is being paid to the institutional racism in the aid sector. Given that these attempts to decolonize scholarship and practice within the field of religion and of humanitarianism are not new, how can we learn from this decolonial moment? And how does Lynch’s book offer some ways forward in pursuit of this aim?

Christian Humanitarians—The ‘Little Platoons’ of Neoliberalism?

Like Lynch does in chapter 6, “Wresting with Violence and Injustice Abroad and at Home,” my research combines the study of religion with humanitarianism/development. However, I do so from a sociology of religion perspective, rather than from Lynch’s theologically inflected international relations approach. As Lynch points out, contemporary Christian humanitarianism has its roots in the colonial missionary enterprise, providing a “strong foundation . . . for ongoing denominational relief and development efforts” (189). Nonetheless, this Christian genealogy became obscured with the rise of the contemporary global aid business, which took off immediately following the Second World War, and saw the establishment of key aid instruments, including the World Bank and the IMF, as well as the UN. Religion had no place in this official picture, which assumed that religion (at least in its public manifestation) would eventually lose its hold over people’s lives as they reaped the benefits of “modernization.” Lynch picks up this story at a crucial intersection, in the post-Cold War period in the 1990s. This era saw the spread of “neoliberal economic ideology and policies on a global scale” (188). It saw the rise of the non-governmental organization (NGO) and its religious counterpart the so-called faith-based organization (FBO). NGOs and FBOs attracted rising levels of donor funding throughout the 1990s, with the faith element particularly taking off towards the end of the decade and into the 2000s. This coincided with the global “war on terror,” which turned the attention of Global North governments towards religion (or more properly Islam) as a public force that needed to be better understood and managed.

It has never been more crucial for academics to engage with the ethical precarity arising from the unequal and colonial underpinnings of our disciplines as well as the activities of the communities of practice about which many of us in the social and political sciences write.

For faith actors who had been pushing for greater inclusion in humanitarianism/development, as well as for scholars in the incipient field of religion and humanitarian/development studies, this “turn to religion” has been interpreted differently. For some, this was evidence of the emergence of the “desecularization of development” or of a “post-secular development praxis” where faith actors were now being invited to the table to design development policy and deliver development programs (Tomalin 2019). Others have been more critical and see this as a cynical attempt to co-opt religions to meet neoliberal development goals. On this account, faith is nothing more than a vehicle for generating social and other kinds of “capital” for instrumentalist ends. Like Lynch, I am interested in the extent to which FBOs, including Christian humanitarians, are little more than what Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell have called the “little platoons” of neoliberalism (390), or, as in Lynch’s words, “quasi-agents of the state, their focus on metrics of accountability to funders over aid recipients” (199). As with the earlier decolonial shift towards “bottom up” development in the 1980s, where equal partnerships with local communities in the Global South were emphasized, the “turn to religion” can be seen as not going beyond “trendy terminology” (202). Here its radical and decolonial potential is diluted and pacified.

Looking Again at the “Turn to Religion” by Humanitarianism: Shifting Register to Manage Ethical Precarity

Despite this colonialist deployment of religion in the name of humanitarianism/development, Lynch notes that it is also the case that Christian humanitarians are “participating yet sometimes reformulating . . . a ‘transnational apparatus of governmentality’’’ (199). This suggests that (some) faith actors occupy a more fluid and multi-vocal space within the aid nexus rather than simply performing the role of the little platoons of neoliberalism.  Building on this, I argue that if we take an “actor-oriented approach” and look at the religion-development connection from the point of view of these faith-based humanitarians themselves, we can see how they strategically shift in register between secular modes of communication with neoliberal global development actors to religious modes with local faith actors and their religious support base, while acting as, in David Mosse and David Lewis’s description, “brokers operating at the ‘interfaces’ of different world-views and knowledge systems” (10). I suggest that (some) faith-based humanitarians manage the ethical precarity that comes with involvement in the formal aid business with parallel activities where they instead resist their instrumentalization to serve secular neoliberal goals by cultivating strong networks with other faith actors, including at the local level in the Global South. Their positionality within the aid nexus as brokers and translators, comfortable with both secular and religious registers, places them in a unique position to connect with local faith actors in the Global South, who are mostly precluded from directly participating in the formal aid business due to their expression of religiosity and development outside a neoliberal framing.

Decolonizing Religion and Humanitarianism Scholarship and Practice

Lynch notes how Christian humanitarianism cannot be reduced to the (neoliberal) Global North version, and instead that “relationships between Christians in the Global North and Global South” add to its intricacies and complexities (220). Many Global South Christian actors are involved in humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding activities, yet they may not label them as such or be recognized by the global aid system as doing this work. Studies have shown that they are often overlooked as humanitarian partners due to a secularist bias and the perception that they will not adhere to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief. Moreover, we know much less about this informal humanitarian work of local faith actors than we do about that of the neoliberal, faith-based humanitarian, where academic research has followed a donor trend of focussing on that contribution (see Spies and Schrode 2020). In order to push forward the decolonizing of religion and humanitarianism scholarship and practice, I am in agreement with Lynch’s assertion that we need to look to the Global South for “insights that are critical for understanding the ethical precarity of Christianity and secular humanitarianism” (192). Indeed, as she points out, Global South theologians offer “other strategies” to “cope with such tensions” arising from the ethical precarity of engaging in neoliberal humanitarian work (225) since they engage in an “autocritique of Christianity’s symbiotic role in colonialisms, racisms, and paternalisms of various kinds, including the neocolonialism and paternalism at the heart of humanitarianism” (225). This critique involves drawing attention to the ways in which neoliberal, faith-based humanitarianism reinscribes boundaries between religious traditions, as well as between the religious and the secular, and promotes a model of engagement that reinforces the views of select religious leaders and organizations. Instead, there is a need to broaden approaches to the religion-development nexus and to develop a new conceptual perspective that moves beyond prioritizing the agenda of secular global development institutions and instead critically examines their rhetoric and practices. In looking to Global South theologians and faith communities to highlight the neoliberal and colonial framework that dominates scholarship, policy, and practice around religion and humanitarianism, Lynch’s approach offers some solutions to this. These solutions support the need for the development of a research agenda which recognizes that in order to achieve widespread commitment in the aid community to the localization of humanitarian action, engagement with faith actors is critical. Unfortunately, they continue to remain overlooked and marginalized.

Emma Tomalin
Emma Tomalin is Professor of Religion and Public Life at the University of Leeds. She has published widely on the topic of religion and development, including the following books - Religions and Development (2013) and The Handbook of Religions and Global Development (2015). She co-edits the Routledge Research in Religion and Development book series, which now has 19 volumes. She is the co-chair of the Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Community (JLI) learning hub on Anti-Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery.  
Theorizing Modernities article

The Sexual Politics of Ethno-Religious Nationalism

Rainbow colors on the White House celebrate the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2015 5-4 decision allowing same-sex marriages in every state of the Union. White House photo. Photo Credit: GPA Photo Archive. Via Flickr.

The 2013 Supreme Court Decision, United States vs. Windsor, declared unconstitutional the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996—an earlier law that had defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman in federal law, thereby granting states the right to deny the marriage of same-sex couples. Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) further required the federal government, and all states, to recognize and respect same-sex marriage equality, and confer all the rights and protections attendant to such recognition.

On the night that the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Obergefell, then President Barack Obama illuminated the White House in rainbow colored lights—the colors symbolizing Gay Pride since the inception of the Gay Rights movement. For many evangelical Christian Americans, this action taken by the first African-American U.S. President was nothing less than a culture war broadside against evangelical Christian identity. For them, it marked the rapid dissolution of Christian culture in the United States. As evangelical historian John Fea recounts, “When LGBT activists claimed that Obama was on ‘the right side of history’ in his support of gay marriage, the message to evangelicals was clear: they were on the wrong side” (27–28).

Fea suggests that White evangelicals embraced Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential election as part of a backlash to a societal shift toward marriage equality that occurred “too quickly for many Americans.” And yet, this backlash narrative neglects the deep history and subterranean—yet episodically resurgent—dynamics that made evangelicals’ path to Trumpism predictable, if not inevitable. For, when viewed through the lenses of ethno-religious nationalism, it becomes evident that White evangelicals have been at such a juncture of obstinate opposition before in their sexual politics concerning the “sanctity of marriage.”

The “sincerely held belief” among White evangelicals in 2016 is that same-sex marriage (and all homosexual relations) contradicts the true meaning of “marriage.” This true meaning is premised on a putatively ontological, or natural, difference between men and women. Further, those who hold this belief appeal to a “civilizational normativity,”  which is frequently based on the alleged dictates of natural law. Here, the claim is that marriage is a union between a man and a woman that has served as a societal bedrock of Western civilization for millennia. Such claims resurrect and reanimate the same logics, patterns of refusal, and sexual politics of earlier evangelical opposition to inter-racial sex and marriage. Both cases spurred, and were further fueled by, upsurges in evangelical Christian ethno-religious nationalism. This points to the animating and reanimating impulse, pattern, and logic that has surged and resurged for more than a half-century in White, Christian America. I have termed this phenomenon “zombie nationalism.”   

Long before abortion was recruited as a wedge controversy, the “moral abomination”  of “inter-racial mixing,” “inter-racial marriage,” and “inter-racial procreation” led White evangelical Christians to engineer protective legal and political formations to defend against the putative onslaught against their religion and culture. Inter-racial sexual relations were rejected by conservative Christians as a taboo of “miscegenation” because they transgressed ontological racial differences. Countless documented lynchings were related to inter-racial intimacy, sexual relations, or “flirting” (alleged or real).

Long before abortion was recruited as a wedge controversy, the ‘moral abomination’  of ‘inter-racial mixing,’ ‘inter-racial marriage,’ and ‘inter-racial procreation’ led White evangelical Christians to engineer protective legal and political formations to defend against the putative onslaught against their religion and culture.

Many evangelicals argue that the parallel is not valid. Most claim to have long since renounced explicit racism. They argue that “race mixing” and “miscegenation”—while clearly taboo and sincerely believed to be moral abominations long ago—are fundamentally different concerns because the arguments against gay marriage stand upon the more (allegedly) stable grounds of the “biological complementarity” of specific sexual reproductive organs. Transgressing this conception of sexual complementarity, as they claim same-sex coupling does, violates “natural” (putatively ontological) forms of differentiation in ways that the “miscegenation” and “amalgamism” of inter-racial sex and relationships never did.

This objection, however, is based on revision of justifications treated as self-evident, and theologically justified, at the time. The claims that inter-racial sex, marriage, and procreation were biological, moral, and spiritual abominations, and thus ought to be legally prohibited, were justified by White evangelical Christians in similar ways to how they currently justify their opposition to same-sex marriage. They deemed the differences in personhood and status that existed between Whites and Blacks to be just as ontological and grounded in natural law. Protestants devised “Bible-based” theological justifications for separate races. Similarly, appeals to the logic of putative “ontological differences” between races, and claims that sexual separation of the races was a “civilizational norm,” served as bases for excluding certain people from legal marriage. For example, in prohibiting marriage between any “person of African descent,” and “any person not of African descent,” the terms of Oklahoma’s 1908 anti-miscegenation law made the ontological and civilizational nature of such statutes clear. Like the alleged abomination of same sex marriage (or any same-sex sexual relations) is for most White evangelicals and White Catholics today, inter-racial sex and marriage was claimed to be a violation of God’s law, as well as a betrayal of the essential natures of White and Black manhood and womanhood. The fact that instances of miscegenation could result in procreation spurred expansive legal innovation—laws which would cover the distinct class of cases in which inter-racial sex resulted in so-called “mixed-race” offspring.[1]

The claims that inter-racial sex, marriage, and procreation were biological, moral, and spiritual abominations, and thus ought to be legally prohibited, were justified by White evangelical Christians in similar ways to how they currently justify their opposition to same-sex marriage.

This logic of ontology, civilizational foundations, and natural law leads most White, evangelical Christians, to be unable to recognize the legalization of same-sex marriage as the acknowledgement of a long occluded, marginalized, and persecuted group which has finally achieved recognition and equality before the law. They cannot see it as an instance of the arc of the moral universe bending toward justice. Any such claim is transvalued into the secular state’s, and secular culture’s, legal vindication of a putative “sexual orthodoxy” that appeared roughly two minutes ago on the clock of history, and is now being imposed upon them. Of course, by this logic, civil rights for African Americans and suffrage and rights for women fall roughly 2.5 and 3 minutes prior on the clock of civilizational history, respectively.

They protest that they are the victims of an anti-religious, militantly secular state and nihilistic culture that, in effect, marginalizes them by requiring that they legally recognize, and provide services in businesses (or in government, universities, or other organizations that serve the public and/or have tax-exempt status). Such recognition of same-sex marriage gets portrayed as a compelled endorsement of sin, transgression of natural law, and, as such, an infringement on a persons’ religious freedom to believe and treat same-sex marriage as an abomination in God’s eyes. So it was also in the eyes of Christians who were forced to recognize, first, laws overturning Jim Crow segregation, and gradually, inter-racial marriage, inter-racial sex and procreation, adoption, and child-rearing (Griffith, Moral Combat, 118–19).

Again, this illuminates sexual politics as a spirit that breathes life into zombie nationalism. What appears to be an isolated episode in sexual politics (i.e. rear-guard defense against newly legalized same-sex marriage) is, when placed in historical context, one surgent moment in a long contest over the identity and character of U.S. society. The “oppression” of White evangelicals occurs in the secular state’s putative infringement upon allegedly sincerely held commitments to a religious worldview. This is the secular state’s supposed violation of one’s basic right to religious freedom. This position construes religious freedom both as a so-called “first freedom,” as inscribed in the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights, but simultaneously, also a civilizational value that is intrinsic to the supposedly Judeo-Christian ethos of the U.S. founding. Accordingly, the fight for the “soul” (identity and character) of American society is infused by Christian nationalism.

What appears to be an isolated episode in sexual politics (i.e. rear-guard defense against newly legalized same-sex marriage) is, when placed in historical context, one surgent moment in a long contest over the identity and character of U.S. society.

This reactionary response reflects an attempt by evangelicals to contest the effects of modernization in U.S. society by using modern moral and legal terms. They deploy these tactics to preserve beliefs they consider to be non-negotiable, but which have become recognized as dehumanizing and damaging to others (for example, protecting their right to practice and promote “conversion therapy”). This creativity with modern legal and moral norms and concepts also leads to innovation and creativity with the religious dimensions of national identity, and the societal and legal implications that flow therefrom. This creativity is not the innovation of working within the normative constraints of a living tradition. It is the kind of creativity that Nietzsche described as emerging from the nihilism that underpins ressentiment. It exemplifies the resourcefulness and self-vindication of the transvaluation of values (see my discussion in Part 2).

The patterns of ethno-religious nationalism inscribed in White Christian resistance to interracial sex and marriage, and later, resistance to same-sex sex and marriage, evince markedly similar logic and dynamics of ressentiment. A key insight this connection illuminates is that, to identify and unlearn these patterns of ethno-religious nationalism—to escape the cycles of zombie nationalism—White evangelicals (along with White Americans more generally) will have to learn (and, then, unlearn) what it is to be, and to have been all along, White, cis-hetero-normative, and patriarchal in a context that bears the stamp of the distinctive racial history, recurring history of sexual politics, and hegemony of White, evangelical Christianity, as does the United States.

[1]  See Martha Hodes, White Women, Black Men: Illicit Sex in the Nineteenth-Century South, 1, and Fay Botham, Almighty God Created the Races: Christianity, Interracial Marriage, and American Law, 145, 156. See also, Marie Griffith, Moral Combat: How Sex Divides American Christians and Fractured American Politics, 86–90; and Byron C. Martin, Racism in the United States: A History of the Anti-Miscegenation Legislation and Litigation.

 

Jason Springs
Jason A. Springs is professor of religion, ethics, and peace studies at the University of Notre Dame. Springs is particularly interested in ethical, philosophical, and religious dimensions of restorative justice, attending specifically to its potential to intervene in racialized and class dimensions of the U.S. prison-industrial complex. He works on questions of structural and cultural violence, conceptions of religious toleration and the challenges posed by religious pluralism for transforming conflict, Islamophobia in Europe and North America, and democratic theories and practices. These concerns are oriented by his broader research interests in American Pragmatist thought. Springs’s most recent book, Resurrection in Back of the Yards: Restorative Justice and Lived Religion on Chicago’s South and West Sides (2024), examines the effectiveness of restorative justice initiatives in responding to structural forms of racism and injustice (e.g., the New Jim Crow). He is the author of Healthy Conflict in Contemporary American Society: From Enemy to Adversary (2018), Toward a Generous Orthodoxy: Prospects for Hans Frei’s Postliberal Theology (2010), and coauthor (with Atalia Omer) of Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook (2013). His articles appear in Journal of Religious EthicsJournal of the American Academy of ReligionThe Journal of ReligionModern Theology, and Contemporary Pragmatism, among others. 
Theorizing Modernities article

Decolonizing the Practices of Religion in International Relations

Map from Cholula, in the present-day state of Puebla, Mexico. Dating from between 1578 and 1586, the Relaciones Geográficas are responses to a questionnaire initiated by the Spanish crown in 1577, requesting information about Spanish-held territories in the Americas.  The Relaciones contain important historical, cultural, and geographical information about New Spain during the 16th century. Many of the questionnaires are accompanied by maps and pictures. These both convey information about such topics as the colonial economy and the spread of European religion in New Spain. This map dates from 1581 and has glosses in Nahuatl, the language of the Aztecs, and in Spanish. University of Texas Libraries. Public Domain.

As a student of religion and modernity, one important upshot I derive from Wrestling with God: Ethical Precarity in Christianity and International Relations is that contemporary humanitarianism, still dominated by Christian organizations, continues with, but also diverges in important ways from, the long legacy of Euro- and Christian-centric colonial extraction and epistemic (and material!) violence. Lynch’s nuanced account of intra-Christian ethical debates regarding conversion, displacement, elimination, and now humanitarianism and “soft power,” is important because, first, it problematizes an overly simplistic critique of modernity and Christianity’s complicity with empire and, second, it demands an intersectional approach to religion and politics. These are the two issues I highlight here. The first is very much present in Lynch’s text and relates to the shocking reverberation of colonial discourse in contemporary technocratic humanitarianism and other facets of religion and international relations. The second point is likewise present, though only implicitly so, in the book’s accounts of prophetic and liberationist Christian actors as well as in non-White theologians’ effort to imagine decolonial and polydoxic horizons. Their inclusion in the book offers an encouraging avenue for future research trajectories that seek to decolonize “religion” and the practices of religion in international, global, and local relations.

Lynch examines the symbiosis between “western Christianity” and secularism through her analysis of internal ethical contestations. The upshot is a more capacious, historically attuned, and theologically pluralistic account of Christianity and secularity as discursive traditions. This is important if only to challenge overly simplistic, unhelpful, and reductive accounts of Christianity’s role as midwife in the consolidation of western colonialism and neocolonialism. Such accounts now constitute a foil for decolonial epistemologies and emancipatory (reactionary) narratives that end up flirting with reifying the “west” and Christianity as mechanisms of empire.  Walter Mignolo, for example, writes: “The decolonial—in contradistinction to Christianity, liberalism, Marxism, and neoliberalism—is not another option for global design . . . but it is an option to delink from all global designs promoting local resurgences and reemergences confronting and rejecting, unmasking their fundamentalism and pretense of ‘chosen’ people to arrogate themselves the right to run the world” (147).

While today the language of mission framing humanitarianism is no longer explicitly one of violent conversion, power dynamics are entrenched nonetheless in multiple registers of proselytizing, through both “secular” and “religious” forms. In particular, I found the concept of “donor proselytism” (which Lynch develops together with Tanya Schwarz in an earlier work) effective in illuminating the way neoliberalism shapes humanitarianism in its secular and religious registers. Lynch’s work brilliantly demolishes the pretenses and proclaimed benevolence of contemporary Christian or “faith-inspired” humanitarianisms for their persistent complicity and symbiotic relations with neoliberal developmentalism and anti-Muslim orientalist securitizing discourse. Indeed, they cannot be analyzed as one nefarious constant, moving like a “one eyed giant” through the centuries, but instead should be understood as historical epochs and universalizing cosmologies/ideologies that rhyme with one another. Conquest in one and neoliberal structural adjustment in another are undeniable, as are the internal efforts to make such violence more ethically palatable. To such a degree we do identify casuistry, it is carried out by Christian actors who, on a case-by-case basis, apply theoretical and moral frames to concrete realities within the confines of unrelenting power differentials. I refer to this kind of variation as the “priestly” variety of humanitarian practitioner. This person was initially an actual priest, but now more often is a person who can be identified with a class of practitioners best described by what I refer to as a “religiocrat.” These are the actors (though she does not use my labeling) who populate the humanitarian spaces Lynch examines.

Lynch’s work brilliantly demolishes the pretenses and proclaimed benevolence of contemporary Christian or “faith-inspired” humanitarianisms for their persistent complicity and symbiotic relations with neoliberal developmentalism and anti-Muslim orientalist securitizing discourse. 

Lynch’s book, which she describes as “a genealogy of wrestling” (235), or intra-Christian casuistry (turned eventually into variations on enduring civilizational discourses within the contemporary framing of humanitarianism) therefore clearly shows the troubling continuities between the landmark debate between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda at Valladolid, Spain (1550–1551) and contemporary ethical grappling with tensions between the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) and the Code of Conduct for Humanitarian Assistance. If the popular casuistry of missionaries in the one context of sixteenth century Spain “soften[s] the edges of colonialism” (236), as Lynch writes, the contemporary relinking of “religious freedoms” with military and strategic articulations that occurs with the IRFA and subsequent articulations of contemporary policies rhymes with this legacy in troubling ways. It is interesting to locate variations within the “priestly” discourse of empire, but the overall outcome is hegemonic, paternalistic, and leads the actors involved to seek out justifications for violence in its multiple forms.

The cooptation of contemporary Christian humanitarianism into neoliberal developmentalist discourse results in the depoliticization of communities who are taught to link their “dignity” to being economically self-sustaining. Indeed, there is nothing new about such paternalism. Neoliberal technology and its patterns of “donor proselytism” simply constitute a reconfiguration of earlier varieties of a civilizational discourse. Regardless of this foil for decolonial demystification, Lynch wants us to know about internal debates and that our analysis of Christianity, imperialism, and neo-imperialism, i.e. the story of modernity, is in effect not a “one-eyed giant” simply reconfiguring its oppressive script through different currencies, be they conversion, democracy, or development/humanitarianism. The debates that Lynch conveys, tracing casuistry and “wrestling with God,” are important, but they also reveal the endurance of the modernist construction of religion as an instrument of colonial control and taxonomy as noted by scholars such as David Chidester, Charles Long, and Tomoko Masuzawa. Indeed, the neoliberalization of “faith-inspired” or “faith-based” humanitarianism consolidated a new class of “priestly” operatives facilitating devolutionary technologies and otherwise entrenching systemic structural forms of violence. Lynch does not end there. She illuminates prophetic registers in the discourse of those working in the humanitarian field as well. These are not only associated with religious and spiritual exemplars but also with a prism that highlights systemic and structural violence by focusing on epistemologies from the margins. Such epistemologies must be embodied in the experiences of marginality, and hence they also must immediately constitute an intersectional analytic intervention.

This is precisely where Lynch’s discussion of Christian liberation theologians exposes an important disjuncture between the ironic depoliticizing effects of religious humanitarianism (and cooptation of the so-called “religious actors” into peacebuilding and development policy designs and practices) and religion’s apparent new-found visibility in the “postsecular” moment. What Lynch does is show through a careful study of primary sources that this postsecular discovery of religion does not constitute a departure from the symbiosis of Christianity and secular modernity, but rather represents its perpetuation through other idioms and technologies. Hence, it is important to do what Lynch does and highlight epistemologies of those on the Christian margins. Such epistemologies by default are deeply political and intersectional and thus resist depoliticization. Lynch examines the case of the Harlem Renaissance in Chapter 4, for example. This example forces us to think of “religion” and “race” together through an analysis of coloniality. Such an analysis brings to the fore the long and enduring patterns of gendered racialization and exploitative economic configurations. This intersectional mode already takes me to the second point I wanted to underscore.

What Lynch does is show through a careful study of primary sources that this postsecular discovery of religion does not constitute a departure from the symbiosis of Christianity and secular modernity, but rather represents its perpetuation through other idioms and technologies.

The religion and development/peacebuilding/humanitarianism industry which Lynch challenges powerfully deploys religion in its modernist abstract form as a set of principles, ritual practices, networks, institutions, and leaders/actors that supposedly have the keys to unlocking elusive “local” communities and mobilizing them as forms of “capital” (in the neoliberal devolutionary spirit). Disentangling “religion” from race and racialization by focusing on utilitarian engagement with religion as a positive force to alleviate suffering reinforces modernist epistemic moves that retain colonial difference. The deployment of religion as a tool of humanitarianism/development/peacebuilding, therefore, is decidedly non-intersectional, by design. Lynch is alluding to this point when she writes in her conclusion about the cynical use of the concept of “human dignity” as a way to erase socioeconomic and systemic violence, or structural sin. She writes: “The concept of dignity connects liberationist and humanitarian ethics, but its meaning has changed. Instead of the poor and marginalized taking the lead in structural transformation according to liberationist ethics, humanitarianism depends upon the paternalism of actors employing largely western epistemologies and modes of action to help others who suffer” (239). Dignity is only one of the “nice” concepts deployed within a neoliberal and technocratic landscape of the global engagement with religion. Such an engagement contributes to the ironic depoliticization of religion through its very politicization (a “soft power”) in the discourse of empire. This is indeed a familiar history that Lynch’s account exposes while gesturing toward the possibility of its transformation through what Mignolo calls “epistemic disobedience.” Indeed, I think that the concept of wrestling is more fitting to the prophetic mode of disruption and resistance than to the missionary and/or contemporary humanitarian priestly adjudication of competing ethical grammars. Still, I wonder if Lynch’s historical and ethical work can help us think about how to reimagine human rights and the concept of dignity through decolonial theological and political prisms. This would amount to a worthy undertaking.

Atalia Omer
 Atalia Omer is Professor of Religion, Conflict, and Peace Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and at the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame in the United States. She earned her Ph.D. in Religion, Ethics, and Politics (2008) from the Committee on the Study of Religion at Harvard University. Her research focuses on Israel/Palestine; religion, violence, and peacebuilding; as well as theories and methods in the study of religion. Omer was awarded an Andrew Carnegie Fellowship in 2017, resulting in Decolonizing Religion and Peacebuilding (Oxford University Press, 2023). Among other publications, Omer is the author of When Peace is Not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp Thinks about Religion, Nationalism, and Justice (University of Chicago Press, 2015) and Days of Awe: Reimagining Jewishness in Solidarity with Palestinians (University of Chicago Press, 2019). She is also a co-editor of the Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
Theorizing Modernities article

Christian Ethics and the Purposes of Modernity

Detail of marble base of a funerary kouros with relief scenes, found in Athens 510-500 BC. National Archeological Museum of Athens. Photo Credit: Darren Puttock, March 2012.

 

I can only imagine how exhausted Cecelia Lynch must be after Wrestling with God. It is breathtaking in its ambition and at times its audacity. She is constantly circling the subject matter, at times tossing it to the ground, only to find that the subject has thighs of steel and is able to jump to its feet and put Lynch on her heels. I am impressed by her resilience, but also impressed that she never has a moment’s rest, and that is partly because she wrestling from “outside the ring” with others who are “inside the ring.” In other words, who is doing the wrestling is (intentionally) ambiguous. There are the theologians, Christian ethicists, papal authorities, missionaries, Christian-inspired socialists and Marxists, as well as ecumenical intellectuals and activists. All of them are wrestling with God as they also wrestle with secularism and other intellectual currents that challenge their existing worldviews. But standing over this wrestling match is Cecelia Lynch, who herself is wrestling with the very same issues as she watches their contortions, hand-jabs, and leg spins. We learn not only through Lynch’s assured interpretations, but also her own reflexivity. I have considerable admiration for both the book and its author.

Yet a book should be judged not only by how well the author does in answering her own questions, but also by the questions it leaves on the table and subsequently generates. Lynch should be credited for acknowledging that many of the questions cannot be answered precisely because they are subject to heated contestation by this uninterrupted wrestling match, a point I will follow up on below. In that spirit, I want to raise two questions not only for Lynch but for all those who follow in her footsteps.

What Is Christian about Christian Ethics?

I have to start with a fairly remedial question: What is the Christian in Christian ethics? This might seem like a simple question, but as Lynch knows quite well, it is far from simple and is the retaining wall that provides the boundaries for claims to be made about Christian ethics in theory and practice. Christianity is a social and not a natural kind, and all social kinds are heterogenous. Wrestling with God embraces the presumption that Christianity is a social kind and attempts to capture how Christians are wrestling with ethics from differing branches of the faith. We don’t have to worry too much about subgroups within these different branches because presumably they all are part of Christianity, but occasionally there are some branches and some subgroups within these branches that cross the line from Christianity into something else (such as secular humanism). All this is a long-winded way of saying that all social kinds are subject to considerable contestation. Wrestling is the name of the game. Lynch’s neo-Weberian analysis takes much, but not all, of this into account. This leads me to the second question.

Everybody Wrestle?

Only Christians are allowed to enter this match, which presupposes that there are criteria for membership, and these criteria must include beliefs and practices. In other words, there is a screening process. But what questions are included in this screening process? And who referees, deciding which questions are welcome, which answers are heretical, and even who is sanctioned to wrestle? My sense is that Lynch’s analysis begins after all this is settled, but it would be worth saying more about the terms of the settlement. After all, Eastern Christianity does not seem to have made an appearance at the match, and its absence is worth some explanation, especially if it signifies something about its quite different approach to the “other” and the “common good.” In any event, as I read Lynch’s book, I kept wondering what is the core of Christianity and what are the outer boundaries, that is, how far can a Christian venture away from the core without risking being disqualified from participation? Lynch seems to suggest that secular humanism represents the outer limits of the acceptable and constantly risks being transgressive.

As I read Lynch’s book, I kept wondering what is the core of Christianity and what are the outer boundaries, that is, how far can a Christian venture away from the core without risking being disqualified from participation?

A further complication is that Christianity wrestles over different core issues at different times. Lynch is not interested in all features of Christianity but rather its ethics, or rather the ethical purposes of a modernity shaped by Christianity. In other words, Lynch is not addressing pre-modern ethics but rather the Christian attempt to bridge two divides: first, between Christians and less powerful or non-Christian others, and second, between violent and non-violent legitimations of intervention with the goal of bringing peace and social justice. This is a terrific way of approaching the matter because they have not only been at the core of contemporary Christian ethics but also the ethics of many other religious communities as they also confront the challenge of modernity and humanism; in this regard, it provides the basis for important transcultural and transhistorical comparisons.

Orientalist statue of Fr. Eusebio Kino in his native village of Segno, Italy. Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons, 2016.

Nonetheless, I do have some questions, including some that Lynch partially, but does not fully, address. Who are the “others” that have been the most common source of concern for western Christians? My sense is that most of them are non-westerners, mainly those who Christians encountered through exploration, colonialism, imperialism, and missionary work. But this leaves aside the “others” that were nearer and arguably more of a perceived threat to Christians, namely Muslims and Jews. Lynch suggests that western Christians have wrestled with many differentiated others, and it would be worth pursuing how the debate over one other did or did not shape the debate over other others. This would be helpful because Christians have typically ranked others in terms of their proximity to a highly Christian-inflected conception of standards of civilization. Standards of civilization, though, are also subject to change in emphasis and debate. Consider, for instance, Christianity’s entanglement with race; for some Christians, conversion was (almost) enough to warrant admission to civilization, while for others skin color would always hold them back.

Christianity and Modernity

Relatedly, one of the interesting conundrums is how Christian ethics relates to the ethical purposes of modernity. In her introduction to the argument, Lynch proceeds as if they are ontologically distinct. But she later has a long discussion of the complicated relationship between the two, particularly concerning how Christian ethics shaped the very purposes of modernity. And there is also a recognition of how secular humanism has shaped Christian ethics. If both of these are true, is there not a substantial overlap between the two? And does this not mean that it becomes difficult to understand where one ends and the other begins? One way to break this circularity is to consider who, besides Christians, contributed to secular humanism and the separation of the Church and state. Who in Christian societies would have an interest in doing so? There is a case to be made that one “other,” namely European Jews, made important contributions on this matter, and were motivated to do so because of their own theological debates as they increasingly integrated with Christian societies and saw secularism as integral to their physical and ontological survival. In other words, notions of secularism and humanism emerge not only because of internal Christian debates and Christianity’s encounter with non-western peoples, but also because of the active role played by other non-Christian communities in the west.

The Thin Line between Precarity and Collapse

The question of Christianity’s core—and the nonnegotiable elements and boundaries between self and other—also possibly figure into Lynch’s conclusion regarding the permissibility of interventions, coercive and otherwise, to defend and spread Christianity. Said otherwise, how far can Christians go in meeting the other before they lose their faith? Lynch wants her fellow Christians to embrace ethical precarity. As she writes, the radical egalitarianism that she seeks must be based on a “deeply reflexive acknowledgment of ethical precarity.” But at what point does precarity collapse on itself? At what point does radical egalitarianism challenge the Christian self and beliefs? Lynch has a rich discussion of Christian humanitarianism, and one of its interesting developments is the interpretation and place of missionary work and conversion. My research on World Vision International (WVI) suggests that there were various factors that caused the evangelical organization to moderate its tendency to give a bowl of rice alongside a heap of the gospel. Part of this was not just a recognition and respect for the other, but also the sheer fact that WVI grew and became more inclusive of non-western forms of evangelism—and there was not necessarily agreement on which beliefs would become the basis for conversion. But many evangelical Christian humanitarian agencies believe that some people are going to heaven and others to hell depending on whether they have been saved. This is not just a prediction but also a reflection of a belief in the fundamental distinction between self and others. This is not just about saving lives but also saving souls. And if someone believes that I, a Jew, has a damaged soul, then I am going to question their ability to be truly engaged in radical egalitarianism. So, how far can Christians go in their radical engagement before they cease to be Christian in the eyes of other Christians?

Silver Linings?

Lastly, I want to raise the role of theodicy in Lynch’s argument about wrestling. Lynch rightly argues that the problem of theodicy is the reconciliation of the existence of evil in the world alongside the existence of an omnipresent, loving, God. How could a God that cares about his children allow evil to exist? Different religions can be defined by how they answer this problem. Different Christian sects also have a range of views. Theodicy is not necessarily an everyday problem, but rather emerges during times of personal and societal crisis: Why do the good die young? Why would God permit a pandemic? Why would a loving God permit the Holocaust? As Lynch notes, those who experience the problem of theodicy are in need of meaning; if they cannot find meaning, then the suffering is meaningless, and this can be almost too much to bear.

Notions of secularism and humanism emerge not only because of internal Christian debates and Christianity’s encounter with non-western peoples, but also because of the active role played by other non-Christian communities in the west.

The problem of theodicy that arises from soul-shaking experiences, therefore, can create a crisis of faith that requires an answer that restores faith; and this crisis will itself produce an unsettled period during which lay and clergy produce a variety of responses that draw on tradition, but also produce novel interpretations of it. These debates do not happen in abstract but rather in concrete historical contexts that shape which answers are appropriate and practical and which are not. It would have been helpful to her argument and the subsequent chapters, however, if Lynch had even a loose framework for understanding when such change is and is not likely to occur. And it is not always a response to theodicy that drives this change. Consider her discussions of Christian humanitarianism. There were lots of debates among faith-based organizations about how to respond to the post-Cold War challenges and how to do so in ways that were largely consistent with existing practices. But debates did not seem to be triggered or guided by the problem of theodicy. Sometimes the sacred mattered, but faith-based organizations were also moved by profane concerns, such as market shares. In any event, I think that there is more to be said on the subject and I hope that in subsequent work Lynch more clearly connects the specific theodic challenge to the nature of doctrinal and practical change.

Michael Barnett
Michael Barnett is University Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at the George Washington University. His research interests span the Middle East, humanitarianism, global governance, global ethics, and the United Nations. His most recent books include The Star and the Stripes: A History of the Foreign Policies of the American Jews; Paternalism Beyond Borders; and, most recently, the edited collection Humanitarianism and Human Rights: Worlds of Differences.
Theorizing Modernities article

Race, Ressentiment, and Nihilism in White Evangelical Christian Nationalism

American Progress (1872). John Gast. Via Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.

Why focus on Whiteness in the surging and resurging evangelical Christian political activism that occurs as zombie nationalism? How does race relate to the recurrent waves of religious nationalism currently driving Trump-era populism among White evangelicals? Race is inextricably interwoven with Christian nationalism in the U.S. And racialized privilege—and various dynamics of racial animus—is an essential driver of the recurring waves of White evangelical Christian ethno-religious nationalism, or what I have termed “zombie nationalism.”

Christian nationalism is a cultural frame that has been profoundly influential in recent U.S. politics, culture, and society more broadly. Andrew Whitehead and Samuel Perry suggest that being “White,” or a “White evangelical”—even the nature and character of one’s “religiousness,” per se— is not at the heart of the deeper, motivating interests of what presents itself as the phenomenon of Christian nationalism. On the one hand, they argue, Christian nationalism frequently underwrites and fuels political support and organizing for specific issues associated with, for example, pro- “law and order” policies, anti-gun control policies, anti-“big government” policies, anti-abortion legislation, and anti-same-sex marriage policies, among others. Yet, these conventional explanations also suggest that what mainly motivates and fuels this activism is the desire for conservative policies and laws. On this account, “Christian nationalism” is the means by which conservative Americans of whatever race, ethnicity, or socio-economic class desire to “institutionalize conservative Christian cultural preferences in America’s policies and self-identity” (153). This account, however, risks reducing Christian nationalism to a multipurpose tool by which conservative-minded Americans pursue power and political and cultural influence. Race is not entirely irrelevant here, of course. Not, for example, when being White and approving of Christian nationalism happen to intersect. At bottom, however, Christian nationalism is motivated more by the pursuit of political influence and cultural protectionism—to “defend against shifts in the culture toward equality for groups that have historically lacked the access to levers of power—women, sexual, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities” (152–54).

Of course, pundits are quick to charge that scholars, academics, and social commentators of all sorts are eager to uncover and impute charges of racism to conservative and religious members of U.S. society where (they claim) racism does not really exist. Such objections deploy highly specific concepts of “race” and “racism.” “Racism” easily becomes a sanitized term that obscures more than it illuminates, especially in so far as it is limited to intentional beliefs and explicit attitudes associated with discrimination and bigotry. This, however, obscures the ways that cultural practices, conceptions, and implicit and un-recognized biases camouflage participation in structural forms of racism, reinforce them, or make them feel and appear “not wrong.”

Racism’ easily becomes a sanitized term that obscures more than it illuminates, especially in so far as it is limited to intentional beliefs and explicit attitudes associated with discrimination and bigotry.

By treating race as secondary, dependent, and/or incidental in significance, such accounts detach the power and long-time ethno-religiousness that has shaped Christian nationalism throughout U.S. history. In effect, through this lens it is impossible to see the specific changes that White evangelical and Catholic Christians resist in their embrace of Trumpism. Similarly, it downplays the structural and cultural character of “race” and “racism.” Interestingly, this dynamic coheres with White American Christians’ broad refusal to acknowledge racism as a structural and cultural phenomenon in the first place (rather, to conceive it solely as a matter of personal attitude and explicit belief, from which most White people quickly excuse themselves [178]).

Whitehead and Perry, for example, identify “racism” with explicit, identifiable attitudes, in abstraction from structural and cultural forms of racism (18-19). And yet, as a group, White U.S. Christians who think the U.S. is a “Christian nation,” and are self-avowedly “not racist” (indeed, who report “warm attitudes” toward Black Americans), simultaneously broadly fail, or refuse, to acknowledge the impact and persistence of structural and cultural forms of racism throughout U.S. society (Chapter 5).

Contra what Whitehead and Perry claim, Christian nationalism in the U.S. is, at its root and in its constituent features, an intrinsically White supremacist phenomenon. When viewed as a socio-contextually embedded, historically extended, discursive formation and set of practices that inhabit institutions, Christian nationalism is only minimally a set of personal beliefs and preferences (the hackneyed “tip of the iceberg”). It is, rather, a set of disposition- and behavior-shaping embedded mythical (would-be historical) narratives, embodied rituals, and (putatively) legitimating conceptions of collective self-identity that were Euro-centric and White supremacist at their core, and continue to be laced with racialized dimensions in the present.

To consider but one example, the conception of U.S. peoplehood as a “New Israel” espoused by New England Puritans, as well as founders like Thomas Jefferson, among others—chosen and charged by God to seek religious freedom and establish “a [shining] city upon a hill”—underwrote conceptions (and formal articulations) of “Manifest Destiny.” Manifest Destiny—the belief that the providential guidance of the Christian God (or some sense of divine providence) guided European colonial-settlers into the “new world” and sanctioned and blessed their conquest of it—was (and is) an intrinsically White supremacist conception (intentionally conceived as such or not).  It underwrote settler-colonial removal and the extermination of indigenous populations in the “new world.” It fueled the expansion of the slave trade in so far as it expanded the demand for forced labor, and it opened new territories and states which invigorated the quest to add slave states. It invited and legitimated conquest and annexation of neighboring countries such as Mexico.

The Manifest Destiny interwoven with the “New Israel” self-conception is at the heart of “American exceptionalism” and the “chosen and/or special status in the eyes of God” motif. In various forms—including its “shining city on a hill” trope—it remains a constituent feature of the history and character of U.S. Christian nationalism, interweaving with numerous elements of nationalism of the last sixty years, and into the present—including, as of 2012, the formal platform of the Republican Party. Recognized for its structural and cultural features, it is an intrinsically White supremacist-inflected, and racialized, discursive formation, regardless of the skin color of the person espousing such views. Fully recognizing this illuminates how and why contemporary versions of U.S. Christian nationalism spur the behaviors and voting patterns that it does.

The withering away and loss of phenomena like racialized advantage, and protection of what Max Weber identifies as a central driver of ethno-nationalism, i.e., “cultural prestige” and significance, currently mobilizes White evangelical Christians in mass patterns of behavior and voting trends. These behaviors and trends reveal a degree of uniformity (and amplification of previous logics and behaviors) not seen heretofore. At the same time, these also reflect patterns and logics of in-group protection, survival, and political reassertion that do have antecedents in the history of this group. Ethnicity, religion, and nationalism interact synergistically and symbiotically with all the religious and ethnic/racialized features that constitute U.S. nationalism (Christian myths, symbols, origin stories, and exceptionalist claims for the nation’s special favor, duties, and world-historical significance in relation to the Judeo-Christian God). Re-described philosophically, the animating process—and the innovative forms of protectionism to which it gives rise—bears a striking resemblance to the nihilistic “transvaluation of values” that occurs by way of spiritual defensiveness and retaliation which Friedrich Nietzsche describes in The Genealogy of Morals.     

White Evangelical Ressentiment as Ethno-Religious Nationalism

US President Calvin Coolidge signs the Immigration Act of 1924 on the White House South Lawn along with appropriation bills for the Veterans Bureau. John J. Pershing is on the right. Via Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.

Diversification by non-European immigrant people groups has been occurring at an increasingly rapid pace in the U.S. over the past sixty years. This has happened especially in the wake of Asian and Latin-American immigration since the passage of the Hart-Celler Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Hart-Celler reversed hardline nativist immigration restrictions established in the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act. Historian John Higham describes the distinctively White supremacist orientation of the xenophobia and nativism that underwrote Johnson-Reed. “Nativists during this period argued that the so-called new immigration from southern and eastern Europe was racially inferior to the ‘old immigration’ from northern and western Europe. It was therefore polluting the nation’s bloodstream” (50).

Numerous studies indicate that increasingly rapid societal diversification—accompanied by experience and/or fear that one’s majority status is diminishing, and that such reorientation is a necessary part of the increasing justness of a society— triggers identity defensiveness. Consistent with these studies, White people in the U.S. now widely report that they perceive discrimination against White people to be as significant a problem as discrimination against Blacks and other minorities.  Such surveys correlate with the upsurge of White entitlement, White fragility, and increasingly reactionary and virulent forms of White supremacy in recent decades, and especially in the 2016 and 2020 elections. These are circumstances ripe for exploitation by appeals to putatively endangered White identities, and grievance politics, which characterize much of the conflict and divisiveness in contemporary U.S. society.

White evangelical Christian perceptions of discrimination track closely with the reported grievance trends of White Americans generally. Eighty percent of White evangelicals report perceiving “in-group embattlement.” They allege that “discrimination against Christians is as big a problem as discrimination against other groups in America.”  As Janelle Wong notes, a majority of White evangelical Christians claim that “American culture and way of life” has worsened since the 1950s (53). This may account for White evangelicals’ wide-spread attunement to the invitation to “make America great again.” White evangelical Christians demonstrate marked uniformity in their political affiliations. They are vastly Republican.

Wong’s work indicates a difference in minority and immigrant evangelicals in virtue of what they lack. Namely, they do not harbor a similar sense of “grievance” and perception that they have “lost” a culture and society that once was (putatively) rightfully theirs (cultural protectionism) (Wong, 21-24). In sum, evangelicals who are members of minority groups frequently hold self-identified conservative views on numerous issues without doing so in a way (or for reasons) that are predictably uniform in the way they are among White evangelicals, and in a way that does not bear the same degree of grievance toward a perceived lost (or putatively diminishing) status. The temptation is for White evangelical politics to become—in so far as they are not already—inspirited and driven by a perception of their own endangerment, and a spirit of victimhood turned inward upon itself, and then outward, exemplifying what Nietzsche called ressentiment.

As Nietzsche had it, ressentiment is a process by which a group takes its own perceived endangerment, alleged victimhood, and/or suffering, and projects its angst outward as a means by which to assert itself. It wields its alleged victimization as a covert means of conjuring and asserting power—even dominance—in the form of retribution against what it perceives (and claims) to be the source of its precarity. Ressentiment is self-deceiving in that the source of the group’s power—its amplification of its own alleged victimization and putative embattled status—produces an inability to accurately perceive the true cause of its perception of self-suffering. Ressentiment trans-values (revalues) values in order to locate meaningfulness in the group’s perception of its marginalization and suffering. It then repurposes that putative suffering and alleged endangerment as a weapon. The trans-valuation of values becomes a form of spiritualized self-protection and reprisal.[1]

The temptation is for White evangelical politics to become—in so far as they are not already—inspirited and driven by a perception of their own endangerment, and a spirit of victimhood turned inward upon itself, and then outward, exemplifying what Nietzsche called ressentiment.

In its general contours, ressentiment becomes a source of power because it is creative. It invents by transposing the meaning of values, and the orientation of actions that ensue therefrom, in virtue of the group’s conviction that its members are the people who are truly victimized and endangered. In this way, even “the highest values devalue themselves,” despite the stated intentions of those who might promulgate those values as absolute or nonnegotiable.[2]  This transvaluation—and thereby, group self-invention and reassertion— reveals how the treasured beliefs and alleged inviolable truths of the group are, in fact, symptomatic of a Western mythos (a dynamic Nietzsche described as indicative of nihilism).[3] In the present case, the mythos in question manifests in the outworking and reworking of a particular form of ethno-religious nationalism—zombie nationalism. This process of transvaluation and self-invention fits Nietzsche’s description of nihilism (even if tacitly so and/or unintended by the group in question).

Held up to the recent history of White evangelical Christians, ressentiment describes an animating dynamic for the ways that ethno-religious nationalist logics exemplify recurrent patterns of self-preservation through transformation, re-animation, and resurgence that constitute the zombie nationalism at the heart of White evangelical, culture war Christianity. As I demonstrate in the third and final installment of this blog series, the recurring effects of this pattern of ressentiment is nowhere more dramatized than in White evangelical and White Catholic Christians’ present-day, and previous, discourses and organizing regarding sexual politics.

[1] Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 162–63. Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought, 27-30. As Nietzsche has it, it is possible for ressentiment to “consummate and exhaust itself in an immediate reaction,” and thus not become “poisonous.”  This is indicative, he says, of a “noble’s” response to the experience of ressentiment (36–39).

[2] Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 9.

[3] For a helpful exposition of Nietzsche’s nihilism along these lines, see Tsarina Doyle, Nietzsche’s Metaphysics of the Will to Power, pp. 2–4.

Jason Springs
Jason A. Springs is professor of religion, ethics, and peace studies at the University of Notre Dame. Springs is particularly interested in ethical, philosophical, and religious dimensions of restorative justice, attending specifically to its potential to intervene in racialized and class dimensions of the U.S. prison-industrial complex. He works on questions of structural and cultural violence, conceptions of religious toleration and the challenges posed by religious pluralism for transforming conflict, Islamophobia in Europe and North America, and democratic theories and practices. These concerns are oriented by his broader research interests in American Pragmatist thought. Springs’s most recent book, Resurrection in Back of the Yards: Restorative Justice and Lived Religion on Chicago’s South and West Sides (2024), examines the effectiveness of restorative justice initiatives in responding to structural forms of racism and injustice (e.g., the New Jim Crow). He is the author of Healthy Conflict in Contemporary American Society: From Enemy to Adversary (2018), Toward a Generous Orthodoxy: Prospects for Hans Frei’s Postliberal Theology (2010), and coauthor (with Atalia Omer) of Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook (2013). His articles appear in Journal of Religious EthicsJournal of the American Academy of ReligionThe Journal of ReligionModern Theology, and Contemporary Pragmatism, among others. 
Theorizing Modernities article

Ethical Precarity and Staying with the Trouble

Dew on web. Author photo.

Historian of science and ecofeminist Donna Haraway’s focus in her latest book, Staying With the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, is to understand and represent dynamic interdependence in the radical present. She challenges readers to abandon (1) the fiction of autonomous entities, and (2) the distracting obsession with imagined futures. In their stead, she urges all to embrace the reality of profound interdependence with human and other “earth critters” (what cellular biologist and radical evolutionary theorist Lynn Margulis called “the intimacy of strangers”) and to stay with, rather than attempt to ameliorate, the “trouble” in the ever-changing present.

Echoes of Haraway permeated my consciousness as I read Cecelia Lynch’s evocative volume Wrestling with God. Lynch’s development of what she calls “ethical precarity” aligns beautifully with Haraway’s notion of “staying with the trouble,” and both provide a refreshing and generative challenge to expressions of moral absolutism that are prominent in normative western “religious” and “secular” discourses. In fact, as Lynch ably argues, the persistent representation of each of these epistemic arenas (secular and religious) as bounded and discrete forms the foundation for moral absolutisms to flourish in explicit and implicit ways. Both are commonly evoked as totalizing worldviews (often defended as such over and against the other) that are commonly defined by moral and epistemic absolute truths. Lynch elegantly challenges this secular-religious binary and joins other scholars in asserting the symbiotic relationship of the religious to the secular while eschewing interpretations that conflate them. Her robust genealogy of Christian ethical thought at selected critical moments in history provides a strong illustration of the twin fallacies of the religious-secular binary and the ethical credibility of both religiously and secularly inspired universal moral truths. Through her meticulously argued narrative, Lynch lays bare what turns out to be the de facto reality of ethical precarity, namely that all moral agents always function in a radical and complex “present” that is situated in time and place and constructed by a dynamic confluence of forces. By the end of her eloquent exposition, one can’t help but wonder how any of us could have ever thought otherwise. Ethical precarity is a “precondition for a radically egalitarian (and thus ethical) international politics that can diminish the salience of justifications for inequality and violence” in service of the “common good” (19).

While Lynch dismantles the religion-secular binary and challenges the credibility of moral absolutism, Haraway’s focus is to decenter humans and to radically expand who and what is included when the “common good” is invoked and promoted. Haraway asserts that it is essential for us to be intentional about “making kin” that includes “godkin” with other humans and “oddkin” comprised of “multispecies connections” as a way to acknowledge our true state of radical interdependence. “Neither One nor Other, that is who we all are and always have been” (Haraway, 98). Like Lynch, Haraway exposes fundamental truths of our existence. The fiction of autonomous selves is as unmoored from reality as is the fiction of bounded abstract concepts and their attendant universalisms, including moral absolutes.

Our ethical precarity as humans is especially pronounced when we decenter ourselves and acknowledge our place in the ecologies of existence itself. The complexities of our interdependencies are legion and dynamic and impossible to fully comprehend. This decentering can be terrifying, but in Haraway’s hands we are invited into its generative wonder. Staying with the trouble in the radical present requires creating “stories [and theories and worldings] that are just big enough to gather up the complexities and keep the edges open and greedy for surprising new and old connections” (Haraway, 101). She offers epistemic tools for the construction of stories, theories, and worldings that she calls “SF” that are comprised of science fiction, speculative fabulation, string figures, speculative feminism, and science fact, “so far” (Haraway, 2).

Together, Haraway and Lynch invite us into the generative power of confronting and embracing the interdependent dynamism of our existence as biological and social beings. By exposing how claims of biological and social autonomy as well as bounded epistemic abstractions are fallacious, both authors thrust readers into confrontation with our physical and moral precarity without reverting to another binary of relativistic limbo. Instead, they assert that the complexity of our existence can itself inspire the radical moral and ethical imagination required to tackle our most urgent contemporary challenges.

As the climate crisis looms and the consequences of multiple forms of inequity are exposed and exacerbated by the global pandemic, we are in what Arundhati Roy calls a “portal” moment where we have the opportunity to confront the reality of our interdependence and stay with the trouble of the always radical present. Acknowledging ethical precarity in the service of multispecies flourishing seems the only responsible option. And doing so with humility, curiosity, and imagination will guide us well.

Diane L. Moore
Diane L. Moore is the faculty director of Religion and Public Life at Harvard Divinity School, a senior fellow at the Center for the Study of World Religions, and a faculty affiliate of the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation and the Middle East Initiative. She focuses her research on enhancing the public understanding of religion through education from the lens of critical theory.
Theorizing Modernities article

Introduction to Symposium on Wrestling with God

In Wrestling with God: Ethical Precarity in Christianity and International Relations, Cecelia Lynch provides a genealogical account of Christianity’s role in shaping the field of international relations. Throughout the book, Lynch creatively puts a geographically diverse set of thinkers from different moments in history into conversation with one another. She does this so that we might not only understand the past better, but also think with it more constructively in the present. By looking at how Christian theologians confronted the political and social contingencies of their day, Lynch shows how the logic of Christian missionizing and humanitarian activity arose during the colonial era of conquest and continues into the present, albeit now more often in the work of NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and FBOs (faith-based organizations). Drawing on Judith Bultler, Lynch contends that we should see these actors in history, and ourselves, as precarious creatures—that is, as persons vulnerable to violence and injustice—perched within traditions not of our own making, but to which we can draw on to further the common good (66). This is what Lynch aims to do in her examination of the Christian tradition in this context.

In her examination, Lynch prioritizes practice over doctrine, i.e. what people do rather than what they profess to believe. In doing so, what comes to the forefront is the process of ethical reasoning rather than its doctrinal precedence or results. Ethical reasoning, on this account, is a form of casuistry, where “religious actors constantly interpret and reinterpret teachings in order to meet their needs for living and acting in specific places and times” (57). In other words, it is a bottom-up process, one where the practical realities of the world shape how we respond to challenges and eventually shape what we call doctrine. It is decidedly not a top-down process, one where we apply previously established principles to new matters without considering the restraint of contingencies. It is these contingencies which make our actions, and our sense of self, precarious.

Lynch treats each of the subjects with whom she engages throughout the book as ethically precarious, practically reasoning actors. It would be impossible to provide a complete overview of the thinkers and arguments that Lynch weaves together throughout this book. Indeed, in each historical era, she makes clear that there is no single interpretive line amongst Christian thinkers, and gives ample attention to a variety of influential philosophers, theologians, and political thinkers. She begins in the colonial era, focusing on the arguments made by theologians like Bartolomé de las Casas and Eusebio Kino concerning the treatment of indigenous peoples in the newly “discovered” Americas. She shows how the terms of these debates concerning, for example whether it was necessary to convert, kill, or peaceably live alongside indigenous peoples were shaped by the contingencies of exploration and the restraints of doctrine. But in responding to these contingencies, she explains, doctrine itself was changed. Her story continues in her discussion of debates about war amongst Protestant and Catholic theologians in the modern world. Lynch dives deep into the 1932 debate between H. Richard Niebuhr and his brother, Reinhold, on the ethics of intervention in the Sino-Japanese conflict. She does so, however, while situating it within its wider theological and political context. She demonstrates, for example, that H. Richard Niebuhr’s account of non-violence was not the only possible interpretation at the time. She shows how a Catholic thinker like Dorothy Day interpreted the Christian tradition in an even more radically pacifist way than H. Richard Niebuhr as an active mode of non-violent resistance. Before ending the book by exploring the current constellation of neoliberal NGOs and FBOs, Lynch explores how liberation theology took up the same Christian teachings as their elder brethren, and yet saw in them a message more concerned with standing with the poor and marginalized. What one is left with after reading this book is a genealogy of Christianity’s role in international relations that balances a wide-ranging scope with historical depth. This approach makes it possible for the actors that appear in each of her chapters to speak to one another and to readers.

In the responses to the book collected in this symposium, the contributors engage with the theoretical as well as ethical questions that Lynch’s book raises. Diane L. Moore puts Lynch’s account of precarity into conversation with Donna Harraway’s notion of “staying with the trouble” to further reveal what an expansive notion of the common good might entail. Michael Barnett wrestles with the boundaries of how we classify Christianity. Atalia Omer extends Lynch’s discussion of technocratic humanitarianism in our present moment and thinks with her about what it means to center those at the margins of religious traditions so that we can imagine new horizons of ethical possibility. Relatedly, Emma Tomalin reflects on the importance of prioritizing local faith actors in overcoming current neoliberal approaches to humanitarian aid.

In thinking both critically and constructively with Christian thinkers from both the past and present, Lynch’s book shows how we might employ critical genealogical methods without succumbing to a cynical and/or fatalistic view of the world. This creative engagement is key to navigating the challenges of modernity and grappling with contested notions of the secular and the sacred. In significant ways, this forum builds upon themes of our previous symposium on Giuliana Chamedes’s A Twentieth-Century Crusade: The Vatican’s Battle to Remake Christian Europe, which also gathered scholars together to think both historically and constructively about religion’s role in shaping geopolitical realities in modernity.

Joshua S. Lupo
Joshua S. Lupo is the Assistant Director of the Contending Modernities research initiative. In this role, he serves as the editor and writer for the Contending Modernities Blog and the classroom coordinator for the Madrasa Discourses program. He has published articles and reviews in Sophia, Soundings, Critical Muslim, Reading Religion, and Religious Studies Review. With CM Co-Director Atalia Omer, he is the co-editor of Broken Solidarities: Feminism, Race, and Transnationalism (Notre Dame Press, 2022) and Religion, Populism, and Modernity: Confronting White Christian Nationalism and Racism  (Notre Dame Press, 2023). His current book project is titled After Essentialism: A Critical Phenomenology for the Study of Religion.