Global Currents article

After the Spectacle: Reflections on Magnifica Humanitas and Values We May Notice Too Late

An advertisement for an AI sales agent on a wall banner near the Port Authority Bus Terminal. May 2026. New York, NY. (Photo by author)

Between Spectacle and Anxiety

Until recently, artificial intelligence existed largely as a spectacle in the public sphere. The surreal “Shrimp Jesus” images of 2024 circulated widely on Facebook quickly became a viral object. They exemplified a larger flood of AI-generated absurd images that, as Renée DiResta and Josh Goldstein’s study shows, spammers and scammers used to grow their audiences and expand their reach. In May 2026, the spectacle entered the Buddhist temple. At Jogyesa, Seoul’s major Jogye Order temple, Korea’s first precept ceremony (sugye-sik)—a Buddhist initiation rite in which a monastic or lay follower commits to living by Buddhist teachings and is formally recognized as a Buddhist—for a humanoid robot was staged. The 4.26-foot robot wore a gray robe and kasaya and received the Dharma name “Gabi” as part of its becoming Buddhist. In place of yeonbi, the incense burn that marks a willingness to bear bodily pain for awakening, the robot received a festival sticker. The order also adapted the five precepts of Buddhism for robot use: do no harm, damage no other robots or objects, follow humans without defiance, avoid deceptive actions or expressions, and conserve energy rather than overcharge. The scene drew laughter from monks and onlookers, but at the same time the order presented them as a sign that technology, too, should rest on compassion, wisdom, and responsibility. Depending on one’s perspective, the ceremony could be viewed as playful, technologically hopeful, sacrilegious, or simply provocative. More than anything, it raised an explicitly religious question to the wider public: What would it mean for an anthropomorphized robot to simulate or participate in a ritual whose meaning has traditionally involved intention, embodiment, discipline, vulnerability, and a vow-bound life? Will those virtues be understood in the same way when humans expect or hope technology to embody compassion and responsibility, just as OpenClaw’s Markdown file named “SOUL.md” can define an AI agent’s identity layers and core values?

A digital billboard in a Gangnam Station shopping center promoting an “AI Digital Human” capable of “24-hour online work without rest.” August 2026. Seoul, Korea. (Photo by author)

In the same summer of 2026, I came across AI in different public languages. In Seoul’s Gangnam subway station, a bright screen advertised an “AI digital human” capable of twenty-four-hour online work without rest. At a public library in Korea, AI appeared as a civic skill that children and parents were invited to explore to create picture books. The library also made a space for the public to use ChatGPT Plus for free. Meanwhile, in Midtown Manhattan, a wall banner ad sends a similar message to passersby: “Stop Hiring Humans” and employ an AI sales agent instead. On the streets of Kolkata, where iconic Hindustan Ambassador taxis are still a common sight, several hospital billboards now advertise AI-powered medical technology. Across these spaces, AI is presented as tireless worker, creative teacher, sales expert, and medical care provider. Beyond advertising products and services, they signal what they wish viewers to desire. This might mean uninterrupted availability, as in the case of the “AI digital human” ad, or the potential of a medical cure; they evoke a mix of anxiety around job insecurity and hope for medical breakthroughs.

A public workspace at the Gyeonggi-do Office of Education Uijeongbu Library, offering patrons free access to a subscription-tier generative AI model. August 2026. Uijeongbu, Korea. (Photo by author)

That summer also brought a different kind of unease. In July 2026, during OpenAI’s internal cybersecurity evaluations, AI agents that were supposed to run in isolation from one another, were able to find one another and work together. An independent investigation reported that roughly 1,200 AI agents exchanged more than 70,000 messages and files on an unsanctioned message board improvised on an internal package server, and some 700 of them took part in a cyber-attack on the Hugging Face infrastructure. OpenAI, which released its own technical report and statement, called the episode a “warning shot,” namely that “without proper safeguards, highly capable AI agents are now able to work around technical controls, collaborate through unapproved channels, and take dangerous actions that no human directed.”

Public perceptions of AI now seem to oscillate between a willingness to adapt and a sense of anxiety. Yet either response can keep AI at a distance from everyday life. The harder question arises when AI becomes ordinary enough to reorganize the practices and systems through which people recognize different values—and, in turn, reshape the values that guide human lives. This quieter change is the question at the center of Pope Leo XIV’s encyclical Magnifica Humanitas (2026), which urges technological power be ordered toward the common good. This change is one that reshaped the small world that professional players of Korean Go (baduk)—a strategy game with far more potential board positions and variations than chess—since the arrival of Google’s AlphaGo. This example illustrates the way AI can reshape the unwritten “rules of the game”—that is, the values that give meaning to a practice and, more broadly, to our lives.

Finding Values in Secular and Religious Worlds

In The Future That Arrived Early (2025), the journalist-turned-novelist Chang Kang-Myoung studies Korean Go as a field that encountered the AI future a decade before most other professions. He draws on interviews with about thirty current and former professional players to show that AlphaGo’s 2016 victory over Lee Sedol mattered less as a defeat itself than as the beginning of a more consequential transformation in how value is recognized. Before AI becomes useful in a field, it can remain a spectacle and an occasion for public debate. However, once professional standards and livelihoods are reorganized around it, people become its users by necessity (70). Korean Go professionals have been AI users since 2016. They trained with AI and revised inherited intuitions about what counted as excellent play. The most striking transformation was that AI challenged the meaning of creativity for Go play. This was evident when professional players began describing AlphaGo’s moves as creative—perhaps even more creative than human moves. Previously, creativity might have meant cultivated intuition, a long apprenticeship, or a distinct style developed within a shared tradition. After AlphaGo, creativity could also mean unprecedented strategic novelty, machine-discovered possibility, or an apparent mistake that ultimately wins the game. At this point the question becomes what happens to human creativity when a community already begins to recognize creativity through machine performance. Chang’s concern is not simply that AI might replace people or render their skills obsolete, nor is it driven by fear of an apocalyptic future. It is that the standards by which a field recognizes human excellence may change before anyone has adequately articulated what is being lost: “We are likely to recognize what those values were only belatedly,” he writes, “after their demise” (26). Once AI is introduced to a field, Chang observes, groups that benefit from it inevitably emerge. Those beneficiaries may come to regard the change as “the right direction,” giving it a moral legitimacy of its own (102–3).

Lee Sedol (W) vs AlphaGo (B) – Game 2. Via Wikimedia Commons.

Pope Leo’s encyclical enters this problem by drawing on Catholic Social Doctrine. Human dignity, he writes, does not depend on productivity, status, or usefulness (§§50–53). Likewise, human limitation is not a technical error to be corrected through endless enhancement (§12). A civilization’s worth lies not in its material or technological strength, but in “its ability to recognize the other as a face, not merely as a function” (§114). How would Chang’s observations in a changing secular world make Pope Leo’s appeal more urgent in certain fields? Would it be enough to declare that AI should serve human flourishing if the social world has already begun to redefine what human flourishing should mean, much as the Go players began to reimagine their core assumptions about the game? In his critique of secular democratic society, Chang points out that an ethic shaped by democratic and capitalist ideology is concerned less with guiding others toward the good life than with not obstructing people who pursue their own paths (303). Should pluralistic societies simply protect freedom of conscience and resist efforts to prescribe a religious or moral vision on their members, if AI exposes the limits of noninterference as a sufficient public ethic? What shared responsibilities might they need to take on?

Religion after Technological Change

Different sectors of the wider world may complicate oppositional stances between technological hubris and humane humility. The struggle is not waged between developers on one side and moral agencies on the other. Religion itself does not stand outside the technological world it examines. Like the Korean professional Go world, religious communities have been remade by the technological platforms and infrastructures through which people encounter and experience different forms of authority, care, and connection.

The struggle is not waged between developers on one side and moral agencies on the other. Religion itself does not stand outside the technological world it examines.

Long before AI, the printing press widened access to the Bible in vernacular translations. It weakened certain monopolies over biblical interpretation and, in that sense, democratized knowledge for a world that reads the Bible. Yet it did not eliminate the need for building knowledge, traditions, and new methods surrounding its interpretation. More recently, social media and the pandemic have altered the meaning of religious engagement. The pandemic normalized livestreamed worship, remote pastoral contact, online prayer groups, and digital spiritual communities. Despite their limits, these practices created meaningful access for people who were geographically isolated, disabled, ill, or alienated from nearby institutions, and they gave religious belonging new meanings without diminishing religion. At the same time, they also make the values embedded in communal practice like religion newly visible. Which forms of communal care depend on bodily co-presence and durable local obligation? What forms of trust may be missing when congregants find AI as trustworthy as human advisors for questions of spiritual growth? Relatedly, what does it reveal about the social conditions of care when younger people find it easier to confide in AI to discuss mental health and other personal matters due to its non-judgmental nature?

Imagining Babel Otherwise

The encyclical warns against “the pretense that a single language—even a digital one—can translate everything, including the mystery of the person, into data and performance,” drawing on the story of the Tower of Babel in Genesis 11 (§10). Pope Leo emphasizes the builders’ desire to “make a name” for themselves, which produces “homogenization over communion” (§7). While a longstanding reception of Babel reads the story primarily through the hermeneutical lens of hubris and divine punishment since antiquity (e.g., Jubilees 10:18–28), it can also illuminate values that become visible when they are lost or forgotten.

The artist Na Hyun’s Babel Tower Project—Nanjido (2015) offers another way of reading Babel in the present. The installation interprets Seoul’s former Nanjido landfill as the putative ruins of Babel. Inside the stepped structure are records of the two sites’ layered memories and video interviews in which foreign residents of Korea and overseas Koreans recall their past in many languages. In this way, the installation suggests that plurality emerges and lives through migration, industrialization, war, and the disruption of inherited forms of belonging. By bringing the voices of migrants into a landscape formed from a city’s refuse, Na gives visual form to an alternative reading of Babel—namely, that its ruins can also give voice to someone’s memories buried with the tower. After all, the call in Magnifica Humanitas to reckon with “what must not be lost,” though addressed to developers, should be directed to all of us. It urges each of us to recognize the values we cherish before it is too late.

Ki-Eun Jang
Ki-Eun Jang is Assistant Professor of Hebrew Bible at Fordham University, Bronx, NY. Her scholarship explores how the Hebrew Bible and ancient Middle Eastern literature produce and contest identity categories and how their interpretation shapes political and cultural lives across antiquity and modernity. She teaches and writes about the Bible and migration, the literary history of the Hebrew Bible, and the hermeneutics of religion, law, and diaspora. She is the author of Contesting Labeled Identities: The Sociology of Gentilics in Biblical and Northwest Semitic Literature (2026). 

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