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Governance, Citizenship, Rights & Obligations article

The “Mormon Menace”

Nineteenth-century America saw a nationwide campaign to tame the “Mormon menace.” Promoted by an alliance of religious and secular individuals, institutions, and ideals, it even led President Rutherford B. Hayes to recommend stripping Mormons of their citizenship. Although Contending Modernities will focus primarily on Mormonism’s fellow subjects of modern opprobrium—Islam and Catholicism—it is important to consider such other “shadow cases” as we examine the complex dynamics of religion in modernity.  The deep pluralism characteristic of the modern age has posed, and will continue to pose, a substantial challenge to the largely Euro-American-Protestant construct of secularism that dominated much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

An analysis of the “Mormon menace,” like its Catholic and Muslim counterparts, thus raises new questions and provides new insights into some of the most important issues of modern life: debates over the role of citizens, churches, and the state in regulating and defining marriage; the contest between majoritarianism and the rule of law; the nature and limits of religious freedom; and the proper place of religion in the pluralistic public square.

Mormonism and “Asiatic” Marriage

In May 1879, the United States Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Reynolds v. United States.  The issue in question was whether Mormons (or members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) could practice polygamy, which was an essential part of their religious beliefs at the time, although various federal, state, and territorial laws had rendered the practice illegal.

The Court’s unanimous decision—which was the first-ever ruling on the freedom of expression clause in the First Amendment—declared that while laws “cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”  To permit a man to act contrary to the law because of his faith “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”  The Court thus established what has become known as the “belief-action distinction,” which has governed American constitutional jurisprudence in this area ever since.

Legal scholars and historians continue to debate whether or not Reynolds is “good law.”  Regardless of the particular merits of the ruling, however, it was important in legitimating the use of state power to place limits, by coercion if necessary, on the boundaries of religious freedom.  In the ensuing decade, Congress passed a series of punitive laws tightening anti-polygamy laws and ultimately disincorporating the LDS Church and seizing its financial and physical assets until it formally abandoned its practice of “plural marriage” in 1890.

The nationwide campaign to tame the so-called “Mormon menace” was promoted by an alliance of religious and secular individuals, institutions, and ideals.  Declaring that “the sanctity of marriage and the family relation are the corner stone of our American society and civilization,” President Rutherford B. Hayes urged that Mormons be stripped of their citizenship if need be. He went so far as to send a formal missive to European governments asking that they block Mormon converts from migrating to America through their ports.  (London, for one, politely declined the request.)  The Supreme Court linked Mormon polygamy to “Asiatic” and African civilizations based on patriarchy and despotism.  A major Baptist editor and church official wrote that Mormonism “is a travesty upon the name of religion, a stench in the nostrils of decency, a constantly running sore, an immense octopus reaching out its slimy tentacles and seeking to seize hold upon our religious, social and political institutions, an ugly and misshapen monster.”

Religious Freedom for Me…. but for Thee?

Americans even debated amongst themselves (dismissively waving away any Mormon input into the conversation) whether or not Mormonism deserved the distinction of being recognized as a real religion.  While many admitted that it did make the list of false or corrupt religions, others castigated it as a lustful and criminal enterprise simply “set up under the garb of religion.”

This question was more than an academic or polemical argument.  If Mormonism was considered to be a legitimate, though false, religion—the way that most Protestants thought of Catholicism—then it and its members were guaranteed all the freedoms and benefits that other religions enjoyed under the First Amendment.  If, however, Mormonism was an illicit scheme using religious forms and rhetoric as a cover for the accomplishment of darker, more sensual and sinister aims, then it was promised none of the constitutional protections of free exercise, and instead deserved to be treated (and its followers prosecuted) as criminal and fraudulent.  As one newspaper opined, “All religions are guaranteed by the Constitution, but whenever any system goes beyond common morality, it ceases to be a religion, and should be unceremoniously stopped.”  One did not need to deal with the sticky question of how far religious freedom should go if it was determined that religious freedom should not be extended at all.

Mormonism and the Evolution of (yet) Another Modernity

Yet in the end Mormons became one of the great success stories of the twentieth century, shedding their skin as the consummate cultural outsiders to become disproportionately overrepresented in politics, business, and even popular culture. This is a far cry from a time when leading Protestant ministers could openly claim that Mormonism exceeded “the deepest debauchery, superstition and despotism known to Paganism, Mohammedanism or Medieval Papacy.”

There is perhaps, then, a lesson in the evolving story of the “Mormon Menace” about both modernity and the “outsiders” that help to define and reinforce it. Modernity and the “other” with which it has been constantly contrasted—whether Mormonism, “Mohammedanism,” or the “Medieval Papacy”—are not fixed polarities but constantly apt to shape and reshape each other in ways that it is hard for anyone at any given time to anticipate.

Patrick Mason
Patrick Q. Mason is Leonard J. Arrington Chair of Mormon History and Culture at Utah State University. From 2011-2018 He was Chair in Mormon Studies at Claremont Graduate University. Additionally, he has previously served as Research Associate Professor at the Kroc Institute at the University of Notre Dame, and as Associate Director for Research of Contending Modernities.  His first book, The Mormon Menace: Violence and Anti-Mormonism in the Postbellum South (Oxford University Press), was released in 2011.
Deadly Violence & Conflict Transformation article

Egypt’s Sad Entrance into 2011

I returned to Egypt for a visit, as I often do around this time. On New Year’s Eve my husband and I were wandering in the nearly empty streets of our Cairo neighborhood looking for a cyber café as our internet was down. When I saw two men pass by briskly carrying three huge boxes of pastries I thought of the merriment that was unfolding in houses, clubs, and restaurants and of the shouts of joy that would resound at the stroke of midnight. We hurried about our business to get home to our own quiet celebration.

Within hours, though, all hell broke out at a large Coptic church in the heart of Alexandria—ending twenty-one innocent lives and shattering peace and hope throughout the country.

There has been much written and spoken about the whys and wherefores, about possible global and local culprits with a dizzying range of motives: to ignite religious hatreds in order to divide and break Egyptian society, to strike a blow at the Egyptian state, to further polarize Muslims and non-Muslims globally. Some international media have pointed to sectarian strife they insist is a feature of Egypt. It cannot be denied that there are those who harbor ill feelings and hatred toward others outside their own religious or ethnic groups. It cannot be denied that there have been deadly sectarian attacks in the past, such as the Christmas day killing of Copts at a church in Nag Hammadi last year.  Some are prone, or goaded, to go on the offensive, stirring the pot beyond the boiling point. Others respond in angry defense. And, frustrations are exacerbated by real economic, social, and political grievances.

To put everything down to sectarian strife, however, not only misses the point but can become an ingredient in the making of such disorder and division.

On Coptic Christmas, January 7th—which incidentally is an official national holiday in Egypt—Muslims, including many prominent figures, joined Copts in their church services. Christians and Muslims lined Cairo’s Qasr al-Nil Bridge shoulder to shoulder in a show of solidarity. In the media, we have heard Muslim and Coptic political and religious leaders, such as Shaykh Ali Gomaa, Grand Mufti of Egypt, condemn the attack and reach out to their fellow citizens. In their more private lives Muslims and Copts and other Christians are reaching out to each other as human beings and as Egyptians, putting a lie to the notion of rampant sectarianism.

At the same time, they also are not putting their heads in the sand and denying the distressing and sometimes—as just witnessed—deadly realities. Some international media say that “liberal” and “moderate” Muslims were joining Copts in peaceful demonstrations (The Washington Post). Why can’t the media simply say “Muslims”? As if Muslims can only be good or not troublesome if qualified as “liberal” or “moderate”?

Egypt’s Copts (who are ten per cent of the population), other Christians (whatever their percentage), and Muslims share a country, share cities, share neighborhoods, share buildings, and not infrequently share families. Egyptians, whatever their religion, have gotten along quite well—which is not to say there have never been tensions and violence, for there clearly have. It is also true that in recent years religious tensions have been fanned into flame, sometimes to lethal effect as on New Year’s Eve. Some think it is exaggerated to suggest that sectarian strife is endemic, and that the suggestion itself is an element in enflaming passions. Others think that it irresponsible not to forthrightly acknowledge that religious tensions can and are being politicized. Violence points to rips and ruptures and the ability of some to wreak murderous vengeance.

Yet it seems important also to recognize that a wider culture of unity and respect remains alive, hard as it is to do so at times like these.  Many here think the time has long come when this culture must be actively preserved—before chances run out.

Margot Badran
Margot Badran, a historian and specialist in women’s studies focusing on feminism, gender, modernity, Islam, and constructions of the religious and secular, is senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and senior fellow at the Prince Alwaleed ibn Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University. Her most recent book is Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences.
Deadly Violence & Conflict Transformation article

On the New Year’s Day Church Bombing in Egypt

There is no religion worthy of the name that does not regard as one of its highest values the sanctity of human life. Islam is no exception to this rule. Indeed, God has made this unequivocal in the Quran by emphasizing the gravity of the universal prohibition against murder, saying of the one who takes even one life that “it is as if he has killed all mankind.” Islam views murder as both a crime punishable by law in this world and as major sin punishable in the Afterlife as well. Prophet Mohammad said, “The first cases to be decided among the people on the Day of Judgment will be those of blood-shed.”

The Islam that we were taught in our youth is a religion that calls for peace and mercy.  The first prophetic saying that is taught to a student of Islam is, “Those who show mercy are shown mercy by the All-Merciful. Show mercy to those who are on earth and the One in the heavens will show mercy to you.” What we have learnt about Islam has been taken from the clear, pristine, and scholarly understanding of the Quran, “O people we have created you from a single male and female and divided you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another.”

Terrorism, therefore, cannot be the outcome of any proper understanding of religion. It is rather a manifestation of the immorality of people with cruel hearts, arrogant souls, and warped logic. It is thus with great sadness and outrage that we witness the emergence of this disease in our nation with the recent bombing outside a church in Alexandria that killed tens of Egyptian citizens. There is no doubt that such barbarism needs to be denounced in the strongest of terms, and opposed at every turn.

Just as importantly, we must counter the deviant beliefs that underpin such gross transgressions. Despite their confused claims, terrorists are miscreants who have no legitimate connection to the pure Islamic way, whose history and orthodox doctrine are testaments to the Islamic commitment to tolerance, compassion and peace. The Quran is clear that “God has honored the children of Adam.” Islam therefore makes no distinction among races, ethnicities, or religions in its belief that all people are deserving of basic human dignity. Furthermore, Islam has laid down justice, peace and cooperation as the basic principles of interaction between religious communities, advising Muslims that the proper conduct towards those who do not show aggression towards us is to act with goodness and justice. Indeed, this is the way of the true Muslim, for “God loves the just.”

As in all matters, the Prophetic example is the best of all models. The Prophet considered non-Muslims and Muslims as participating in a social contract which was inviolable. The promise of a Muslim is sacrosanct, for as he said, “Whoever unjustly persecutes one with whom he has an agreement, or short-changes his rights, or burdens him beyond his capacity, or takes something from him without his blessing, I myself will be an argument against him on the Day of Judgement.” What sort of Muslim could it be that not only deprives himself of the intercession of the Prophet of God in front of his Lord, but indeed puts himself at odds with him?

This act of terrorism was an affront to all Egyptians. It must not be used to sow discord in a country where Christians and Muslims have lived together in peace for centuries. It is vital for the peace of the region and wider world that the place of all religious communities and their full participation in society should continue to be fully protected and assured. We therefore welcome the firm resolve and assurances of all those in authority to make sure this will continue to happen.

Let me be clear by reiterating that Islam is utterly against extremism and terrorism. But unless we understand the factors that provide a rationalization for terrorism and extremism, we will never be able to eradicate this scourge. This must be understood in order to build a better future that can bring an end to this grave situation that is destroying the world.

All Egyptians stand united against such behavior. Sectarian conflict is foreign to Egypt, and those who seek to use this as a pretext to stoke sectarian tensions need to be opposed in every way possible. At such a sensitive moment, we Egyptians must not participate in the spreading of rumors of such tensions. Rather, we must remain united. We must continue to treat each other with the goodness and respect that has long characterized Egyptian society.

My heart, my thoughts, and my prayers go out to the families who lost their loved ones. We offer our deepest and sincerest condolences to the families of the victims and pray for the speedy recovery of the wounded. We demand that the perpetrators be brought to justice and stand trial.

Shaykh Ali Gomaa
Shaykh Ali Gomaa was Grand Mufti of Egypt from 2003-2013. One of the most respected jurists in the Sunni Muslim world, he headed the Dar al Ifta, which issues thousands of fatwas per week.
Authority, Community & Identity article

American Identity and the Challenge of Islam

From Tree-Hugging to Tree-Bombing

In generally quiet Oregon just after Thanksgiving, a teenager espousing a radical, violent Islamist ideology allegedly tried to blow up innocent civilians—men, women, children—gathered to celebrate Portland’s annual holiday tree lighting ceremony.  How in a city more famous for tree-hugging than tree-bombing could this happen?

Violent Islamist extremism is no longer just an “over there” problem that might travel across oceans to attack here.  In case anyone doubted that this phenomenon is domestic and “home-grown,” one can do so no longer. Adding to this undeniable reality, we have by the end of 2010 seen some Americans’ fear of violent Islamist extremism morph into fear and even outright hatred of Islam and of Muslims themselves.  In just the past few months America nearly became the home to “Burn a Koran Day,” and the national conversation experienced a rapid escalation into very sharp barbs in the public discussions about the proposed Park 51 Islamic cultural center and mosque near Ground Zero in New York.

(Re)Discovering America

Anthropologist Akbar Ahmed’s latest book, Journey into America: the challenge of Islam, could hardly be more timely. “What does it mean to be American?” This is the question anthropologist Akbar Ahmed and his team of researchers posed to Americans during their visits to over seventy-five American cities in 2008.  In this book Ahmed documents and analyzes their findings.

 

In his research, Ahmed found that America continues to enjoy extraordinary potential. It has the potential to welcome a 19-year-old Somali immigrant into its fabric and opportunities, and for non-Muslims to learn about and welcome their Muslim neighbors.  However, fully realizing this potential will require that Americans, both long-timers and those newly arrived, take time to reflect on our own history, our ideals, and what these mean for our national identity today.

The American Mosaic…

Ahmed and his team trekked across America from Plymouth, to the Alamo, and to Pearl Harbor, to a Hopi reservation and to scores of American towns and cities in between.  Their research included Arlington National Cemetery, for a visit to the graves of Muslim soldiers who have died fighting—for our country, and for their country.

At the core of this work are the people he and his team encounter along the way, Americans past and present.  Ahmed tries to understand where American identity comes from, and how Americans today understand their own history.

This is a work that takes pluralism seriously because, Ahmed discovers, Americans take pluralism seriously.  The research team talked with Americans from a vast array of backgrounds.  Those interviewed range from a Jewish university dean, to a retired Catholic Archbishop, Muslim descendants of American slaves, a Zoroastrian novelist, a gay anti-Prop-8 activist, Somali refugees in Missouri, a sheriff in Los Angeles, and LDS church members.

Along the way his team documents and tries to make sense of the views of these Americans regarding what it means to be American.  He even devotes an entire chapter to encounters of between Muslims and the LDS church, highlighting not only shared experiences as religious minorities in America, but also commonalities at a social level (while recognizing differences, some significant, in theology).

…Brought to Life

A laudable feature of this project is multi-media resources accompanying the book.  Not only is the book available in a Kindle e-edition, but this team has produced a photostream, a blog, a documentary film, and a collection of short videos at a “Journey into America channel” on YouTube.  The availability of these additional resources serves as a reminder that Journey into America is not meant to be a just an academic book.  Rather the book is just one part of a broader effort by Ahmed and his team to encourage, even to prod, Americans to reflect more deeply about the meaning of American identity.  Ahmed makes clear: at this point in our history, Americans fail to do so at their own peril.

Ahmed implores: “[I]t is urgent for Americans to comprehend Islam, not only for the sake of [America’s] ideals (which include religious tolerance) but also for its geopolitical needs and strategy.”  Another aspect of this urgency is the increase in anti-Muslim sentiment in America’s public discussion today.  “Too many Americans,” writes Ahmed, “consider Islam a pestilence, and their dislike of it has become almost an obsession.”

Ahmed makes clear that the challenge Islam presents to America is a challenge not only for non-Muslim Americans but also for Muslim Americans.  During his 2008 trek across the country Ahmed encountered intra-Muslim tensions in some mosques, Muslims leery of his Journey into America Project, and imams “trained in Egypt or Pakistan” who “seem out of tune with their congregation and its cultural context.”  There is work to be done.  Ahmed urges, “Muslims also need to invest time, effort, and resources to a serious study of both their own community and larger American society.”  And he calls on Muslim leaders in America “to face the crisis in their own community rather than recoil in the customary defensive manner.”

This study is not without some levity too, though even Ahmed’s levity has its own gravitas.  Ahmed expresses his concern that public representatives of Islam, even years after 9/11, are mostly from “men of the older generation of immigrants” whose commentaries “do little more than intone ‘Islam is a religion of peace’ and ‘We love America.’” Ahmed knows this is unsatisfactory.  He also expresses his alarm at the cloaking of anti-Muslim sentiment in concerns about “national security.” Neither is the type of rigorous engagement needed to help Americans, Muslim and non-Muslim, begin to understand and encounter each other.  Ahmed concludes, “It is time to encourage [such commentators] to take up American pastimes like sailing and long mountain treks so that they are kept busy and out of public sight….[and] it may help them to become more self-reflective and develop much needed humility.”

The American heartland and the heart of Islam: closer than we think?

In America today, I find myself at times perplexed by the strange situation we face in which politically and theologically liberal groups that differ dramatically from most Muslims in social values have embraced Muslims. At the same time, their conservative counterparts who share many of the moral and social concerns present in the Islamic faith are among the most vocal, and at times vitriolic, anti-Muslim voices in the public square today.

One of the contributions of Journey into America seldom found elsewhere is the attention Ahmed devotes to social values in Muslim communities in the U.S., and the opportunities these values offer to build common ground on issues such as family, marriage, children, and respect for sexual integrity.

In writing about Muslim convert/former fashion model Nicole Queen in Texas, Ahmed notes the striking contrast between the highly sexualized popular online videos of Girls Gone Wild, on the one hand, and Queen’s “self-respect for mind and body” on the other.  Ahmed writes about the concern he and other Muslims have for “unchecked self-indulgence” in American society.  In the video of Ahmed’s Journey into America interview with Hamza Yusuf, Yusuf talks about Girls Gone Wild as a “degraded expression” of the desire “to get out of the madness of the world.”  Yusuf observes that it is “quite hard for me to witness a real degradation of culture.”  Many Americans who are not Muslim share these concerns about “unchecked self-indulgence” and “degradation” in our society, but alliances to address these shared concerns are, at present, rare. (Rare, but not non-existent: The recent volume, The Social Costs of Pornography: A Collection of Papers, includes an essay by Hamza Yusuf, alongside essays by Americans of various other religious backgrounds, about the threat pornography poses to human well-being and cultural integrity, not least of all in our country.)

Spreading the Word

I hope Journey into America will be made available in an audio version.  Since it is full of stories, it lends itself to audio.  Moreover, it is on the long side; an audio version may make this work more accessible to those daunted by its length but otherwise interested in this timely subject.

At a time when we see European social cohesion appear to tear at the seams, Journey into America calls on Americans to reflect on a very different identity rooted in our history, and importantly, in the core ideas of our Founders.  Ahmed’s book is not a call to tolerate just anything and everything in the name of tolerance—including tolerating those who seek to destroy tolerance.  Instead he presses into American history and Americans’ minds to find out what Americans themselves understand to be at the heart of being American.  His findings include that “it is important to remember and celebrate the American tradition of religious pluralism, which presupposes the right to choose one’s faith.”

These days more than a few Americans seem to think Islam itself is a threat to America’s identity, even to our very existence.  And yet in Journey into America, we encounter the authentic voice of a Muslim who is not trying to destroy America—holiday trees and all—but rather trying mightily to get Americans to wake up and realize they’ve got something very good going. That “something” may sometimes seem hard to define. Akbar Ahmed’s Journey into America is a timely reminder that America’s identity is worth articulating, preserving, and invigorating.

Jennifer Bryson
Jennifer S. Bryson is a Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC. from 2009-2014 she served as Director of the Islam and Civil Society Project at The Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, New Jersey. She studied Political Science as an undergraduate at Stanford, medieval European intellectual history for an M.A. in History at Yale, and Greco-Arabic and Islamic studies for a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, also at Yale.
Gender, State & Society article

Catholicism and Feminism

About twelve years ago, I gave a paper at a conference on “Women’s Health and Human Rights” at the Vatican. A highlight of the event was a special audience for the conference participants with Pope John Paul II. To the surprise and delight of his listeners, he benignly proclaimed “Io sono il Papa feminista”— “I am the feminist pope.” And Pope John Paul II meant it. In 1988, he had issued an apostolic letter, Mulieris Dignitatem, with the English title On the Dignity and Vocation of Women. He repeatedly called for the development of a “new feminism” which would honor and celebrate the “feminine genius” in all walks of life, public as well as private, in the work world as well as the domestic world.

A Feminist Church?

More broadly, if feminism is ultimately about affirming the dignity and well-being of women, we must applaud the many crucial ways in which the Roman Catholic Church as a whole is a feminist Church. It has done an enormous amount of good for women in precarious circumstances throughout the world, Catholic and non-Catholic alike. For example, the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, Gender & Women runs programs around the world that help women organize into cooperatives for the production and marketing of goods; provides shelters for basic needs; educational programs in literacy; and training in business knowledge and empowerment. The Mother Teresa School for Girls in Ghana educates over 550 girls from preschool through high school. At the same time, it is safe to say that many people don’t share the late Pope’s easy association of feminism and the papacy. In fact, there are some—both feminists and Catholics—who would bristle at the association.

Secular feminists have frequently decried Catholicism as opposed to the flourishing of women, in particular its opposition of contraception and abortion. For their part, officials in the Vatican have regularly published broad denunciations of feminism, castigating its destructive effects on society and the family, particularly children, both born and unborn. Sometimes, Catholic women find themselves caught in the middle, loving their Church and their faith, but dispirited by occasional statements that suggest that the Vatican views them as disordered or defiled, simply by virtue of their being women. I am thinking here, of course, of the public relations firestorm raised by the Vatican’s recent announcement of two sacramental crimes: clergy sexual abuse and the attempt to ordain a woman. Even women who support the Church’s restriction of the priesthood to males winced at the grouping of these two acts in the same document.

So how do we sort out the convergences and divergences between Catholicism and feminism? There will, of course, be the need for nuanced historical, cultural, and geographic studies. Neither Catholicism nor feminism can be encapsulated in a bullet point on an outline. The tensions between the two are not the same in the United States as they are in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, nuanced rigorous comparative analysis of the normative frameworks of Catholicism and feminism sorely needs to be undertaken. Facilitating this sort of analysis, of course, is a central purpose of the “Contending Modernities” project, which will unfold over a period of several years.

Here and now, however, I can only briefly suggest that we give some consideration to three normative polarities within the Roman Catholic framework itself, polarities which help illuminate how John Paul II could honestly and truly say that he is a feminist pope, on the one hand, and there could also be significant points of strain between Catholicism and feminism, on the other. These three polarities are: 1) Equality and Difference; 2) Nature and Nurture; and 3) Complementarity and Collaboration. Many Catholics see these tensions as creative, and affirm the importance of holding onto both poles in each polarity. Catholics want to affirm, after all, that men and women are equal—and that are not the identical in every significant respect. So, for that matter, do many feminists. What, then, is the root of the antagonism? In my view, a significant part of it is attributable to fear. Each party fears that the other is in danger of letting go of one pole, to the detriment of women and indeed, to the detriment of all of society. So in order to help feminists and Catholics to come to a better understanding of each other, we need to examine the fears of each group.

Equality and Difference

On the one hand, the Catholic tradition has long held that all human beings are made in the image and likeness of God, equal in dignity, possessing the same human nature, no matter their sex, race, ethnicity, or social status (Gal. 3:28). On the other hand, the Church does not see human persons as purely spiritual bundles of reason and will. We don’t merely have bodies, we are embodied, and that embodiment s part of the goodness of God’s creation. In particular, our different embodiment as either male or female is a divinely ordained aspect of the created order, which needs to be honored and respected if humanity is to flourish. In a nutshell, the Vatican worries that some strands of secular Western feminism are emphasizing the first point—equality—to the detriment of the second point—difference. It worries that this obscures the ontological difference between men and women, and the goodness of that difference for both individuals and society. In particular, it fears that an insufficient appreciation of difference will denigrate women’s unique power as mothers, who shape and nurture the next generation.

But the Vatican isn’t the only one who has worries. Feminists are worried too. The way in which some Vatican documents—and some supporters of papal feminism—try to specify these differences between men and women concerns feminists, because it can seem as as if certain character traits are being defined and imposed as either “male” or “female” without any regard for empirical study or individual difference. And that definition and imposition, they believe, contributes to inequality. Consider, for example, the position of papal feminist Gloria Conde: Quoting Judith M. Bardwick, she writes: “The ‘masculine’ is equivalent to the objective, analytical, active, inclined to thought, rational, indomitable, interfering, one who obstructs, independent, self-sufficient, emotionally controlled, and self-assured. With his mind, the man distinguishes, analyzes, separates, and perfects. The ‘feminine’ corresponds to the subjective, intuitive, passive, tender, sensitive, easily influenced, docile, receptive, empathetic, dependent, emotional, and conservative. Her mind picks up relations, she possesses intuitive perception of sentiments, and she tends to unite rather than divide.”

The trouble with this sort of sharply dichotomous understanding of the difference between men and women is that it undermines women who are doing jobs that don’t correspond in every respect to the traditional “feminine” virtues. In the beginning of my teaching career, for example, a young man came to me about a grade; he was upset that he got a B+ in my class. Couldn’t I see how he was really an A student; how the low grade I gave him marred the perfection of his transcript, how important it was to him to get an A for his future career? I told him I could see—but I still couldn’t change the grade. It wouldn’t be just. As he left the office in frustration, he offered a final reproach: “But you’re a woman. You’re supposed to be nice!”

Nature and Nurture

Where do these differences between men and women come from, anyway? This question brings us to a second flash point between Catholicism and feminism: the polarity between nature and nurture. On the one hand, the Catholic tradition recognizes that human beings are essentially social—our understandings of who we are, of our place in the world, are shaped and transmitted by the languages, cultures, and societies in which we live. On the other hand, that tradition also proclaims that there is some irreducible core of “human nature” that remains constant across time, place, and culture. Let me emphasize the importance of the Church’s commitment to the notion of a common human nature. It forms the basis not only for the proclamation of equal human dignity, but also for the tradition’s confidence in the possibility of articulating some basis for a universal morality that transcends particular religious and cultural traditions.

In our cosmopolitan and fractious world, I believe that commitment to human nature will be increasingly indispensable. The Vatican believes that the secular West has gone too far in endorsing the first pole—nurture—to the detriment of the second pole—nature. It worries that the idea that human nature, including sex and gender, are completely malleable does not give enough weight to the created order, whose intricate pattern is embedded in the physical and psychic structure of human beings. The Vatican is making an important point. Nature matters. Some differences between males and females seem ingrained, not imposed. That point is brought home immediately and intuitively to anyone who has ever beheld an eighteen-month-old boy cheerfully repurposing a Barbie doll as a hammer.

More scientifically, we know that endocrinologists are making great strides in understanding the way in which male and female hormones, such as testosterone and estrogen, affect our brains, and therefore influence our ability to reason and to choose. The mind and the body are not separate entities. It is a serious anthropological mistake to think of human beings as androgynous minds encased in male or female bodies. For their part, however, feminists worry that what some people view as the designs of nature are in fact not natural at all, but are in fact the deceptive mask worn by ingrained patterns of sexism. Consider, for example, the article on “Woman” in the 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia, in which one of the authors maintains that the education of women should be directed toward their roles as wives and mothers. The author hastens to observe that “the Catholic Church places here no barriers that have not already been established by nature.” While a few women might go on to earn higher degrees, he asserts that “the sexes can never be on an equality as regards studies pursued at a university.” Ironically, that assertion may be turning out to be correct—just not in the author supposed. A recent study showed that women outnumber men at every degree level in higher education in the United States—even, since last year, with respect to Ph.Ds. Men still outnumber women in some fields, such as engineering, but overall the educational gap between men and woman has closed, and even begun to reverse itself.

Complementarity and Collaboration

With all these women flooding the educational system, men find themselves competing for advancement and academic honor not only with other men, but also with women. Is that worrisome? Pope Benedict XVI has expressed concern about the increasing relationship of competition between men and women, and calls instead for a collaborative relationship between the sexes. (See, e.g., Joseph Ratzinger, “On the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World.”) In his view, the basis of a collaborative relationship is the recognition of the complementary gifts and skills of men and women. Men and women should view themselves and their roles as complementary, not as competitive; women in particular should not aim to emulate the strengths of men, but should instead nurture their own distinct gifts. Complementarity, in his view, is most clearly visible in the roles that men and women play in marriage and family life, but it is also should be visible in other contexts as well. One of the hallmarks of papal feminism, in fact, is an effort to define the “feminine genius” in all spheres of women’s existence in terms of the virtues of motherhood.

For their part, feminists are worried about the call to complementarity, not necessarily because they are opposed to the idea that both men and women bring some distinct and important gifts to human society, but because of the way that idea tends to work out in practice. In fact, they fear it undermines collaboration, which in Latin means “working together, ” because it tends to promote both separation and practical inequality. The great Protestant theologian Karl Barth explicated male-female complementarity in terms of A and B; one need not be a psychic accurately to guess which sex is assigned to the B position. The way the concept of complementarity works in geometry also reveal the potential problem: Two angles are complementary if they add up to 90 degrees. If we begin with a 68 degree angle, then the complementary angle must be 22 degrees. The complementary angle is all and only that which the primary angle is not.

Analogously, if we begin with a man, then a woman must be all and only that which a man is not—her role is to fill in the gaps. If complementarity is taken too far, then, it does not facilitate collaboration, but rather fosters entirely separate spheres of interest and specialization. The concept of complementarity notion rightly affirms the importance—and unique demands—of motherhood on women. But how does it account for the gifts, ambitions, and concerns that men and women share in common? How does it account for the fact that men and women have many of the same talents, as well as different talents? It ought not, in my view, to be considered a destructive form of competition for men and women to strive for excellence—together—in the many areas and interests which they share. The common pursuit of excellence—or virtue—is also a type of collaboration. In fact, it is a key element of the classical definition of friendship.

My larger goal for Notre Dame’s Contending Modernities Project is that it will broadly exemplify the collaboration spoken of so movingly by Pope Benedict XVI. I look forward to collaboration among Catholics, Muslims, and secular thinkers, collaboration between men and women, and collaboration between papal feminists and secular feminists. I anticipate collaboration in the pursuit of excellence and in furtherance of the common good. Most importantly, I hope for collaboration as we address our fears, build our trust, and cultivate our friendship.

 This post is the text of the remarks Prof. Kaveny delivered at the public launch of Contending Modernities on November 19, 2010.

Cathleen Kaveny
Professor Cathleen Kaveny, a scholar who focuses on the relationship of law, religion, and morality, joined the Boston College faculty in 2014 as the Darald and Juliet Libby Professor, a position that includes appointments in both the department of theology and the law school.  Her research interests include the relationship of law, religion, and morality in pluralistic societies, health care ethics, rhetoric and ethics, the relationship of mercy and justice, and complicity with wrongdoing.
Gender, State & Society article

Grandfather Knows Best

I wish I could have had the privilege of meeting Shahla Haeri’s late grandfather. He sounds like he was a wonderful man. In a way, he reminds me of my own grandfather.

On the surface, of course, these two men would have very little in common. Her grandfather was a Shi’i ayatollah who lived in Iran; my grandfather was a Roman Catholic layman who lived in New England.

But both men loved their granddaughters. And both were willing to rethink conventional restrictions on the roles of women that would prevent their granddaughters from flourishing. Professor Haeri’s grandfather supported the value of educating women, thereby enabling her to become a scholar in the field of Islamic Studies, honoring and carrying forward his own erudition and love of his religious tradition.

In my own case, the issue had to do with reading scripture publicly in church. As a certified public accountant, my grandfather was conservative by temperament. He did not think, for example, that it was a good idea to allow women to serve as lectors during Mass. But his view changed when I was a sophomore in high school, preparing for confirmation. For my confirmation project, I wanted to be a lector. And . . . since I wanted to be a lector, in his view, I should be a lector.

From the Particular to the General

At first, the change in my grandfather’s view was very particularized: Cathy was a good reader, with good enunciation. . . . Cathy should be able to be a lector for her confirmation project. As he soon realized, however, Cathy was also a member of a class, the class of young Catholic women who wanted to participate more broadly in the life of the church. It was only fair, then, that women in general be allowed to read publicly during Mass. And so a particularized exception to an old rule became a new, generalizable rule.

In our panel discussion at the Contending Modernities launch, Professor Haeri made the very insightful point that the advancement of women’s flourishing in religious communities depends to a large degree upon the commitment of men of good will. I have no scientific evidence, but my hunch is that grandfathers are the place to start. Mothers, wives, and daughters all must somehow fit into a man’s plans, ambitions, and responsibilities. But granddaughters are something else entirely. Granddaughters, in my view, are the often first females whom men love with pure delight—in part because grandfathers are not responsible for them in the same way that fathers are for their daughters.

I’ve seen this from the other side as well. My own father used to be a junior high school principal, known across the region for his strict discipline. He raised his children kindly but firmly. But he has different rules for his granddaughter. He once took the four-year-old out for a last treat before she was about to get on a transcontinental flight to go home. When her mother, his daughter, shot him a dirty look as she struggled to strap the sugar-addled little girl into the car seat, he responded “What? She told me she wanted ice cream and candy.”

An ice cream is not, of course, the same thing as an education. Mere wants aren’t the same thing as legitimate components of human flourishing.  But some people live in religious or cultural contexts where the components of women’s flourishing have been defined without any input on the part of women themselves.  In such contexts, the fact that grandfathers are paying appreciative attention to what their granddaughters say they want is a sign of hope, and perhaps a harbinger of positive change.

Cathleen Kaveny
Professor Cathleen Kaveny, a scholar who focuses on the relationship of law, religion, and morality, joined the Boston College faculty in 2014 as the Darald and Juliet Libby Professor, a position that includes appointments in both the department of theology and the law school.  Her research interests include the relationship of law, religion, and morality in pluralistic societies, health care ethics, rhetoric and ethics, the relationship of mercy and justice, and complicity with wrongdoing.
Gender, State & Society article

Challenging Marriage Laws in Contemporary Shi’i Iran

On Being an Ayatollah’s Granddaughter in Modern Iran

 

The contradictions of growing up the unveiled granddaughter of an Iranian ayatollah had not occurred to me until I was confronted in 1988 by Dr. Christian Troll, a scholar of Islam and a Jesuit priest living in India at the time. “How is it possible,” he asked, “that your grandfather did not ask you to veil?” Indeed! “Why hadn’t he?,” I wondered. What was specific to him or to Iran at that time in history that made it seem perfectly normal for him to let his daughters and granddaughters go unveiled?
Continue reading “Challenging Marriage Laws in Contemporary Shi’i Iran”

Shahla Haeri
Shahla Haeri is Associate Professor of Cultural Anthropology and former director of Women's Studies at Boston University. She has conducted research in Iran, Pakistan, and India and has written extensively on religion, law, and gender dynamics in the Muslim world. She is the author of No Shame for the Sun: Lives of Professional Pakistani Women.
Authority, Community & Identity article

The Jesuit Role in the Emergence of a Catholic Modernity

Priest on the run

Near midnight, on Saturday evening, October 14, 1854, a mob of one hundred men in the small shipbuilding town of Ellsworth, Maine, attacked Fr. John Bapst, a Jesuit priest. Bapst had stopped in Ellsworth, hearing confessions for much of the day, en route to a sick call in a nearby town. Carrying lanterns and torches, the members of the mob surrounded the modest home of a Mr. Kent, an Irish immigrant, where Bapst was known to be staying.  Kent at first denied that Bapst was inside. “We know he is, and we must have him,” yelled the mob. Bapst crept into the cellar of the home, closing a trap door behind him. Kent invited the mob to look in the windows. The  mob would not relent. “If you don’t produce him we will burn down your house and roast him alive.”

Bapst emerged from the cellar to spare an attack on Kent’s home.  According to one witness, he still hoped that the “instincts of humanity” would prevail, but the mob rushed upon him, dragged him one mile down the hill toward the Union River and tied him to a rail. Some in the mob advocated burning Bapst alive. The consensus was to tar and feather him, which the mob did, after stripping him naked, taking his watch and emptying his wallet. One eyewitness recalled plucking feathers from Bapst’s body after a search party had found him, then shaving off the priest’s hair and eyebrows to remove remaining bits of tar.

The next day Bapst said Mass in Ellsworth. Fearful that “the mob would gather again,” he took refuge in the home of one of the town’s leading citizens. This man hustled Bapst out of Ellsworth and rode with him on the stagecoach to Bangor, as accounts of the attack began filtering out from Maine into the far corners of the United States and the world.

The Jesuits and the Forging of a Catholic Modernity

How can we explain such an odd, disturbing event? What might it mean for us, gathered in this room in New York City in the year 2010? This afternoon I’ll argue that the tarring and feathering of Fr. Bapst tells us much about the building of a Catholic modernity in the nineteenth century, and that it allows us to reflect on the meaning of modernity for Catholicism and Islam. To persuade you of this, I’ll speak briefly about the role of the Jesuits in the Catholic expansion across the world in the nineteenth century. Then I’ll talk about John Bapst and his role in the Catholic revival. Then I’ll talk about his opponents.  Finally, I’ll tie these events to our topic  for today.

This material comes from a book I’m finishing, tentatively entitled Martyrs and miracles: The Jesuits and the American Catholic world they made. I say “finishing,” but of course my service as dean has made me fearful that its publication will be posthumous.  In this book I claim that the Jesuits are central to any understanding of the nineteenth-century Catholic revival and diaspora, a movement of people, institutions and ideas altering modern history on both sides of the Atlantic. The  revival included a surge in vocations to the priesthood and women’s religious orders, the reconstruction of the institutional church after the chaos and persecution unleashed by the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars, the construction of an intellectual milieu suspicious of modernity and the cultivation of a devotional life centered on acts of personal piety, alert to God’s miraculous intervention in the world.

The history of the Jesuits does not substitute for a history of this nineteenth-century Catholic whole. But it comes close. Growing from six-hundred aged members in 1814 to almost seventeen thousand a century later, the Society moved from the margins of Catholic life to its center. No group is as crucial to understanding modern Catholicism, and no group will help us better reflect on the similarities and differences between modern Catholicism and modern Islam.

The Jesuits: Think Globally, Act Globally

The most important observation to make about these Jesuits was their global orientation. The most influential nineteenth century Jesuit, the Flemish-born Jan Roothaan, the Father General or leader of the Society from 1829 to 1853, viewed evangelization as the Society’s highest priority, and he worked carefully with like-minded bishops to send Jesuits to the far-flung corners of the world. In 1831,  Roothaan pleaded with the world’s Jesuits to volunteer for missionary work, specifically noting the “repeated appeals” made by American bishops for Jesuit assistance. Over half of the world’s two thousand Jesuits immediately volunteered for missionary service, and in the 1830s and 1840s alone the order established new missions in Syria (1831), Calcutta (1834), Argentina (1836), Madurai (1837),  Nankin (1841), Albania (1841), Canada (1842), Madagascar (1844), Algeria (1848) and Australia (1848).

More of these missionary Jesuits—close to one thousand between 1814 and 1900—moved to the United States than any other place. In the United States, by the 1870s, Jesuits from Turin worked in San Francisco and among the Blackfeet Indians in Montana; Jesuits from Naples in New Mexico and as professors at the Jesuit seminary in Woodstock, Maryland; Jesuits from Paris in New York City; Jesuits from Belgium in central Missouri and in the Pacific Northwest; Jesuits from Lyon in New Orleans, Tampa and El Paso; Jesuits from Germany on Indian reservations in Dakota territory and in St. Louis, Milwaukee, Chicago and Buffalo, and Jesuits from Switzerland up and down the East coast, on Indian reservations in Kansas and Dakota Territory and in St. Louis, Cincinnati and Boston.

In part these Jesuits followed the Catholic tide. The Catholic portion of the  nineteenth-century migration outward from Europe was immense, probably over half of the 55 million immigrants who left all corners of Europe, from Greece to Ireland. These immigrants landed in Britain, Australia, Argentina, and beyond, but the biggest group made their way to the United States. In the 1840s and 1850s alone, close to two million Irish (over ninety-percent Catholic) reached American shores, as did an equal number of Germans (perhaps fifty-percent Catholic). Just three percent of the American population in 1830, Catholics numbered eighteen percent of the population by 1900. And this migration catapulted the American Catholic church from marginalization into an uneasy status as the nation’s single largest religious grouping.

Stories about the nineteenth-century Jesuits who worked with these Catholic immigrants were once told and retold in Jesuit rectories and periodicals, then preserved in Jesuit archives. Now they are largely forgotten. But these Jesuits  carried the books, journals, devotional pamphlets, architectural drawings, chalices, rosaries and holy water from a European Catholic world in crisis, and translated them into an American idiom. They founded dozens of schools and colleges. They preached parish missions as they attacked the Republican party—remember that this is the nineteenth century, not the twenty-first century—for its anti-Catholicism. They promoted devotions such as the Sacred Heart. They defended papal infallibility while promoting miraculous healings. They became loyal allies and admirers of the nineteenth century Popes, some of whose closest aides included Italian Jesuit exiles fresh from stints teaching at a seminary in rural Maryland.

The Modern Odyssey of a Jesuit Priest

But back to Fr. Bapst.  Bapst  was born in 1815 in a small Swiss village. He joined the Jesuits at the age of 20. He spent the next decade studying and teaching at the Jesuit boarding school and college in Fribourg, Switzerland, an important center of nineteenth-century Jesuit life. Once enrolled in the college in Fribourg, Bapst absorbed the central intellectual messages of the Catholic revival, including the conviction that the destruction wrought by modern philosophy and the French revolution had placed Catholics and modern liberals on opposite sides of an unbridgeable chasm.

Bapst’s time in Fribourg was ended by a civil war in Switzerland—actually a war between Protestant and Catholic cantons, a war that stemmed from the uneasiness of Swiss nationalists with the Jesuit role in the Swiss educational system. As the armies of the Catholic cantons surrendered, Bapst fled Fribourg with his fellow seminarians and priests, all in disguise and divided into groups of four or five men. For Bapst and his Jesuit contemporaries, this forced exile—the first of many as Jesuits were expelled from Italy, Germany, France, Spain, Guatemala, and other countries in the nineteenth century—made an enduring impression. As Swiss nationalists denounced the Jesuits in speeches, novels and verse, and as mobs looted Jesuit residences, defaced church walls and destroyed Jesuit libraries, Jesuits found their suspicions of modernity confirmed. As one Jesuit explained to a friend “In the name of freedom [the Swiss liberals have] driven them out of their country looted their house disgraced their churches, desecrated the graves of their brothers.”

Bapst eventually made his way from Switzerland to a Jesuit residence in France. He was then sent, along with sixty other Jesuits, to the United States. Soon he was working in Ellsworth Maine. His work in Maine exemplifies the nineteenth century Catholic revival in four ways.

The Catechetical Imperative

The first is his effort, like that of other nineteenth-century Jesuits across the world, to instill basic doctrinal knowledge into populations loosely connected to the institutional church. Repeatedly, Bapst worried about the “pathetic state” of catechesis among Maine’s Catholics, the bulk of whom were famine-era Irish immigrants or French-speaking Quebecois. He lamented  the “shameful ignorance in which the burgeoning generation stagnates.” He “announced publicly that not one child will receive his first communion” without knowledge of their catechism, and “we will refuse the future absolution to the parents who neglect the religious instruction of their children.” Immediately upon arriving in Ellsworth, Bapst also gave a set of lectures on Catholic doctrine that attracted significant crowds, leading one group of young women to convert to Catholicism and upsetting their families.

Bapst then set about forming Catholic associations and building up the parish. The first step in this strategy was the parish mission, pioneered by Jesuits in the eighteenth century. After arriving in a town, Bapst typically organized a mission or  “jubilee” often lasting a full week and including a well-publicized series of exhortations, Masses and long hours (for Bapst) in the confessional.

Mission psychology pivoted between a doctrinal severity centered on the horror of sin and everlasting damnation, and a practical, even generous, piety aimed at persuading Catholics to view the sacraments (especially confession) and the Church as their best shield in a bewildering world.  The severity is evident in Bapst’s correspondence. He viewed missions as “spiritual weapons” for “reclaiming  a very large number of bad Catholics” and converting the occasional “Protestant or heretic.” “Hardened sinners” must understand that eternal life depended upon reconciliation with the church.  The generosity is evident, too, in Bapst’s insistence that all could be saved, that any sin could be remedied in the confessional. The Catholic Jesus of the nineteenth century was more the empathetic  sufferer than the judge, more the Jesus of the beating Sacred heart than the wise rabbi or teacher.

Bapst also focused on other markers of Catholic solidarity and identity. This  seemed especially important since Maine’s Catholics lived in what Bapst accurately described as a “nearly exclusively Protestant” milieu. Bapst conceded that many Protestants seemed “generally well disposed toward the Catholic religion” but this superficial acceptance made self-conscious markers of Catholic identity the more vital. While traveling in Maine, Bapst made a conspicuous point of not eating meat on Fridays; when a group of parish trustees in Waterville, Maine, proposed putting the title to the land for their Catholic chapel in their own name instead of the bishop’s,  Bapst rejected them out of hand.

The cumulative effect of  Bapst’s efforts, like that of fellow missionaries across North America, Australia and Europe, was considerable. After a year in Ellsworth he informed his provincial that only a handful of Catholics in the Maine towns he visited avoided the parish mission or did not attend Mass and receive communion at Easter. “The triumph of grace,” he concluded, “ is miraculous.” Once a handful of Catholics in a particular town became enthusiastic about the mission, Bapst reported, “they went from door to door to recruit other great sinners that had not yet repented.” Later, a group of “female members of the Catholic Congregation” pleaded with Jesuit leaders to keep Bapst in Maine. Prior to the arrival of Bapst, these women explained, “Our youth grew up without a proper knowledge of their Faith and consequently many of them were Catholics only in name, though sufficiently identified with the Church to furnish her enemies with a pretext to attribute to her teaching the vices learned of themselves.”

A School of Our Own

The second way in which Bapst exemplified the nineteenth-century Catholic revival was in his focus on Catholic education. Bapst had two strategies. First, Bapst criticized the use of the King James Bible in Ellsworth’s tiny public school. He noted the differing wording of the Ten Commandments for Protestants in the King James version and for Catholics in the Catholic translation and the general inadequacy, in the Catholic view, of the Bible without a church-supplied interpretive apparatus. As one observer of events in Ellsworth put it, “ Fr. Bapst conceived it his duty or right, to prohibit among [his] people the reading of the Protestant Bible (the version in common use); he instructed the Catholic youth in our schools to decline reading the Bible when asked by their teachers to do so.”

Even as Catholic students began to refuse to read the King James Bible in school, Bapst then organized a petition to protest use of the King James Bible. The school authorities, in turn,  refused to listen to Bapst. He then arranged for the one Catholic attorney in Ellsworth to sue the town for requiring use of the King James Bible in the public school.  The case went all the way to the Maine Supreme Court, where Bapst lost because, as the Court explained, only common texts such as the King James Bible could civilize and create “republican citizens” out of immigrant populations.

As this dispute accelerated Bapst’s second strategy became evident. He founded a Catholic school for local children, convinced that no public school could be religiously neutral.  The teachers in the public school, Bapst explained privately, “think that our children will become Protestants. We MUST have our own school, despite the endless difficulties this will present. “

Against the Nations

The third way Bapst exemplifies the ethos of the revival is in his suspicion of the modern nationstate. The nineteenth century—in Italy, Germany, France and the United States—was a period of intense, often romantic nationalism, an almost mystical belief in national character and destiny, for figures as diverse as Otto von Bismarck, Guiseppe Garibaldi and Abraham Lincoln. Nineteenth-century Jesuits, including Bapst, thought such nationalist sentiments dangerous, even in Catholic countries such as Poland and Ireland. They worried about a substitution of national loyalties for the priorities of church and family, what to them seemed the more organic building blocs of any good society. That liberal nationalists in Europe were willing to eject Jesuits from allegedly tolerant nation-states only proved their point. In Switzerland the fact that the student body and faculty at Fribourg came from over a dozen countries occasioned a series of attacks on the Jesuits by Swiss nationalists in the 1830s and 1840s. Because the Jesuits declared their primary loyalty to the Pope, these nationalists charged, they could not inculcate national loyalty. Or as one British commentator put it, the “Jesuits are a body of conspirators who overspread the roman Catholic world; men who have no national ties.”

Bapst  did become a United States citizen in 1856, two years after his tarring and feathering, but he worried that America might become as intolerant of a global Catholicism as the Italian nation-state that had isolated pope Pius IX or the German state that had declared a virtual war on German Catholicism. Many of his fellow Jesuits made a point of not celebrating the Fourth of July; others quietly refused to vote. Bapst and his colleagues sometimes wrote to Rome complaining of overly nationalistic Catholic clergy. Or as one Italian exile complained, “By thus praising the American founding fathers they think they will win popular respect which they love too much and are too much influenced by.” Many of Bapst’s colleagues subscribed to and carefully read, even contributed to, the Jesuit-edited Roman journal Civilta Cattolica, the most influential such journal in the Catholic world, and a journal that kept up a steady drumbeat emphasizing the importance of religious, not national, ties. The Pope met every other week with the editors of Civilta Cattolica to show his support, and all of Bapst’s Jesuit colleagues stressed, far more than in the eighteenth century, the importance of loyalty to the pope, and the pope as a symbol of Catholic unity.

Against modern individualism

This suspicion of the nation-state fed into the fourth way Bapst and his colleagues exemplified  the Jesuit ethos—a broad suspicion of the modern world and the anti-Catholic or even anti-religious ethos it seemed to imply.  Each of the nineteenth-century Fathers General composed sad letters to the world’s Jesuits, a Jesuit jeremiad read out loud during mealtimes on “the current calamities” (1845), the “evils of our times” (1856),  the “bitter harassing by evil-minded men,” (1884) and “On some Dangers of our Times” (1896).

One Father General, Anthony Anderledy—originally from Germany, expelled from Switzerland in 1848 and sent to Green Bay, Wisconsin, then returned to Germany in the 1850s, later sent to Italy and expelled from Rome—complained of the “injustice of the times, and the bitter harassing of evil-minded men whom we see raging against the Church of God, and raging against the Society of Jesus.”

The most disturbing feature of modernity seemed its exaltation of the individual; for example, the individual vulnerable before the forces of the market and industrial capitalism, a concern that led to Jesuit leadership in the drafting of the key documents of modern Catholic social thought such as the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum. The exact same Jesuits who drafted these papal encyclicals also worried about individuals permitted the freedom to choose their own religious affiliation without any guidance or encouragement from the state, a view which led to Jesuits defending the ideal of a union of church and state.

The very term “modern”  became an epithet, with Pope Pius IX famously declaring himself, in an 1864 papal text deeply influenced by German Jesuits, opposed to conventional notions of “progress, liberalism, and modern civilization.”Battling this modernity—even through the use of modern technologies such as the printing press, or the speedy travel afforded by steamship and railroad—became a central Jesuit task, an effort to define the meaning of civilization and improvement upon favorable terms.

The Deep Roots of American Anti-Catholicism

Now one must ask: Why did Ellsworth residents react so violently to Bapst? The passions that provoked the attack on Bapst were not unique to Maine, or even to the United States. Instead, religious and ideological currents from across the Atlantic collided in the unlikely locale of Ellsworth. To be fair, suspicion of Catholics and of Jesuits had deep roots in American history.  John Winthrop famously justified his decision to found the Massachusetts bay colony with the need to “raise a bulwark against the Kingdom of AntiChrist which the Jesuits  labor to rear up in these parts.”  In 1815 Thomas Jefferson described the return of the Jesuits as a move from light to darkness, and another ex-president, John Adams, thought that the Jesuits had been “a greater Calamity to Mankind than the French Revolution or Napoleon’s Despotism or Ideology. They have obstructed the Progress of Reformation and the Improvement of the human mind in society much longer and more fatally.”

These fears became heightened in the 1840s and 1850s in the context of the Catholic migration, even in little towns like Ellsworth. With the exception of slavery, nineteenth-century American ministers wrote more on Catholicism than any single topic, and anti-Catholic tracts were among the century’s bestselling texts.  At its most intense, in the early 1850s, discussion of the threat posed by Catholicism to American society saturated the pages of both the religious and the secular press, occupied theologians in the learned journals and provoked fiery exchanges in Congress. Mobs destroyed a dozen Catholic churches across the North in the early 1850s, and anti-Catholic preachers and orators toured the country to large audiences. The anti-Catholic Know Nothing order claimed 10,000 lodges and over one million members by January 1855, and its political wing, the American Party, elected mayors in Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago, eight governors, over one hundred congressmen and thousands of local officials.

A Nineteenth-Century Glenn Beck (Or Keith Olbermann)

The crucial figure in Ellsworth was William Chaney, the editor of the Ellsworth Herald, and one of the anti-Catholic agitators who emerged in both America and Europe in the 1840s. Chaney filled his newspaper with anti-Catholic attacks, short stories and even the occasional painstakingly wrought cartoon. Think of a small-town, nineteenth-century version of Glenn Beck or, if you like, Keith Olberman. Chaney  used his position as town clerk to call numerous meetings to discuss the Catholic threat and encouraged the formation of Know-Nothing militias or street gangs. As Bapst wearily noted, “The Bigots of Ellsworth and among others the editor of the Ellsworth Herald indulge in all kind of abuses, outrages, slanders & abominations against the church, the priest, the Catholics & chiefly the converts.”

Chaney’s slashing, crude style did not endear him to Ellsworth’s leading citizens.  But even these men sympathized with his basic message. J.P. French, the town’s Methodist minister, preached that “Catholicism is an old worn-out institution, it is behind the age,” and complained that “For fifty years the various Catholic countries of Europe have been annually disgorging upon our shores, her tens and hundreds of thousands of paupers and criminals….” Charles Lowell, local attorney and essayist, worried that Catholicism remained  incompatible with the “freedom of thought, and personal responsibility, necessary to the support of republican institutions.”

A Crescendo of Anti-Catholic animus

A wave of street orators, European exiles and prominent ministers traveling through New England and Maine also preached a surprisingly consistent message:  that Roman Catholicism threatened American liberties. Alessandro Gavazzi, an ex-Italian priest who had played a leading role in the 1848 Roman revolution came to North America in 1852 where he created a sensation, lecturing across the United States and in Canada. Gavazzi devoted considerable attention in his lectures to the school issue, concluding, “With the Bible, and Bible alone, the American people will flourish; and I will say to them, remember it was the Bible, and the Bible alone, which made your freedom.” Jesuit exiles in the United States, from Italy, Germany and the “Jesuitical college at Fribourg” seemed to Gavazzi an obvious threat to American liberty, and he advised Americans that they too should consider expelling the Jesuits from their country. Gavazzi’s lectures were reprinted in the Ellsworth paper and widely discussed locally.

Also joining this conversation was Boston’s Theodore Parker, the most prominent liberal Protestant minister in the United States. Parker lectured to Bangor and Ellsworth residents for two consecutive evenings in the spring of 1854, just a few months before the attack on Bapst. By the time he spoke in Bangor,  Parker had come to dwell in his public addresses on the incompatibility of  “a priest [standing] betwixt the nation and its God” and to worry that Catholicism threatened the nation’s continued economic and political progress. (He frequently contrasted public education in cities such as Boston with the “small and mean buildings” devoted to public education in Rome, “where the priesthood is mighty and the people are subjects of the Church.”)  “Jesuits” he warned, “come in abundance, some are known, others stealthily prowl about the land, all the more dangerous in their disguise.” He added: “The Catholic Church opposes everything which favors democracy and the natural rights of man. It hates our free churches, free press and, above all, our free schools.”

What  Bapst’s story allows us to see, then, is the formation of two distinct milieus: one largely Protestant and in the North increasingly concerned about individual liberty. From this Protestant and secular vantage point Catholics seemed incapable of appreciating the virtues of democratic government because of their attachment to a hierarchical church; Catholics failed to appreciate the importance of religious liberty and indeed argued against it because they thought theirs the only true church; Catholics did not recognize the importance of a common public education in producing American citizens out of immigrant populations.  Catholic religious leaders—its priests and nuns—dressed in odd garb.

Catholics, on the other hand, especially Jesuits, became more convinced than ever that they needed to foster communal solidarity to protect themselves against a hostile milieu. They mobilized around mission campaigns, which carried a vision of the Church as distinct from all Protestant denominations and a determination to bind Catholics closer, through sacraments, parish associations and schools, to a shared sense of global Catholicism.  They worried that nation-states such as the United States might substitute national for religious loyalties, and they emphasized  the Pope as a symbol of Catholic unity to link Catholics in the United States to other Catholics around the world.  Some of the Jesuits Bapst knew as European exiles in the United States played an important role in drafting the promulgation of papal infallibility in 1870, an event that starkly contrasted liberal understandings of national loyalty and autonomy with a Catholic focus on communal solidarity and an independent religious authority.

From Mutual Contention to Rapprochement

Over time though, this stark contrast between Catholics and their opponents softened.  The tarring and feathering of John Bapst clearly demonstrated an American intolerance of Catholicism with echoes in Europe and Latin America.  But even in tiny Ellsworth many citizens protested the violence and admired Bapst’s calm behavior during the crisis.  In nearby Bangor, Bapst was presented with a gold watch—which his Jesuit superior after some internal debate extending to Rome allowed him to keep—as partial recompense for what he endured. He moved from Ellsworth to become pastor of Bangor’s largest Catholic church, where a visitor can still pore over his diary, listing, in French, baptisms and weddings performed. By the twentieth century Catholicism had become an important part of Maine’s social fabric, the largest single religious  group in the State, even the single largest church in Ellsworth, and John Bapst’s name was chosen for Bangor’s Catholic high school.  Catholic nations in Europe and Latin America were, as Protestants feared, slower to become democratic nations over the course of the twentieth century, but become democratic they did, and now Catholicism is frequently viewed by political scientists as a welcome pre-condition for the adoption of democratic political structures.

Some Jesuits, too, while decrying the violence against Bapst, also noted that in the United States, as opposed to most of Europe, there was a never a serious effort to ban Jesuits or even inhibit the growth of Catholicism.  Instead the church flourished. The very religious freedom that nineteenth-century Jesuits theoretically opposed, the idea that religious identity was at base an individual choice, allowed them to build schools, colleges and parishes. This religious freedom came to seem to most twentieth-century Jesuits as a good thing in and of itself, not simply something to be tolerated in the absence of a more uniform religious alternative.  Jesuits, including Jesuit John Courtney Murray of the United States, played a decisive role in shifting Catholic doctrine on this issue at the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s.

In both instances, then, for Jesuits such as John Bapst and for his opponents, abstract convictions about the nature of the world were modified by experience and in turn this experience prompted new ideas.

Global Patterns, Global Lessons

These stories point us toward a more global history of religion. Historians of American religion, even historians of American Catholicism, once viewed the nineteenth-century Jesuits, if at all, with their loyalty to the papacy, anti-national inclinations and condemnations of liberalism, as a regrettable detour from the theological road leading to the Second Vatican Council. But viewed comparatively, the nineteenth-century Jesuits and the Catholicism they favored seem less an anti-modern exception and more a global rule. The world’s great religious traditions—including Protestant and Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Hinduism, Buddhism and Roman Catholicism—all  became more self-conscious about doctrine and uniformity of practice during the nineteenth century, as new modes of  travel (including the railroad and the steamship) and communication (including the telegraph) brought people into unprecedented proximity.

Comparisons between Catholicism and Islam—both diasporic faiths, both intensely communal, both committed to distinct visions of gender roles,  both concerned with the sustenance of religious authority in religiously diverse  settings—now seem useful as a means for understanding how global religions navigate the modern world.  Complaints made about nineteenth-century Catholics—that they obeyed foreign religious rulers, that they could not be good citizens, that they segregated themselves from American society, that they wore unusual clothes—are eerily similar  to complaints about contemporary Muslims.  Muslims, too, engaged modernity in the nineteenth century,  as outlined by the Grand Mufti in his address. Indeed one could argue that many Muslim intellectuals  and political leaders in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century were even more eager than Jesuits like Fr. Bapst to reach out to what they understood as the modern world, certainly in modern Egypt, perhaps most dramatically in modern Turkey and modern  Iran. A religious reaction against this Islamic modernism or moderate Islam is one of the great dramas of the late twentieth and twenty-first century, on display in Iran since the Iranian revolution of 1979 and evident  throughout the Muslim world.

This current religious reaction coincides with a Muslim migration to Europe and to a lesser extent North America, a migration as important to our time as the migration of Catholics was to the nineteenth century. These Muslim migrants—like nineteenth-century Catholics—may become more self-consciously Muslim in exile, through easy access to digitized speeches,  texts over the internet, and cheap flights enabling pilgrimages to Mecca. They may become more aware of Muslim leaders in Egypt, the Sudan and Indonesia just as Catholics became more loyal to the papacy in the nineteenth century. But the Muslim experience will also, inevitably,  mean assimilation. It means the making of Muslim Americans, Muslim Belgians and Muslim Germans too, and the building of Muslim institutions, mosques, schools and associations that will look different from those built by nineteenth-century Catholics but which will serve some of the same communal purposes.

After the Ellsworth outrage, Bapst continued to work as an administrator and parish priest in cities on the Eastern seaboard. His name entered Catholic histories and textbooks as a suffering victim of intolerance, with the most prominent early Catholic historian asking him for a first hand account of his ordeal. In his old age he grew a long white beard fit for “a holy old patriarch” and accounts circulated of his ability to heal the sick through his prayers, or even predict the future.  During his last years, he struggled to distinguish “between dream and reality,” occasionally waking up in horror as he replayed that night in Ellsworth so long ago.

We honor those nightmares this afternoon. But we also remember Bapst’s successes in the United States—successes that included starting several parishes and serving as the first president of Boston College, one of the world’s great Catholic universities (although not, I hesitate to stress, in the view of those of us at Notre Dame, the world’s greatest Catholic university).

Like today’s Muslim leaders, Bapst responded to tugs from across the Atlantic even as he worked in the United States, building churches and schools. We live in a moment when we can see the global dimensions of these religious traditions more vividly than ever, no longer blinded by the patriotic nationalism of the cold war, and alert to the ways in which religious loyalties seem more enduring than citizenship ties in much of the world. We see global religion in the South Asian Catholic priests serving as pastors in rural Michigan parishes, we see it  in a  gathering of 150,000 Filipino Catholics in Los Angeles, we see it in our presence here this evening, in a New York City hotel ballroom, a few blocks from St. Patrick’s cathedral, the Catholic church most associated with the pride and determination of those nineteenth-century Catholics.  Precisely because of this more global religious landscape, precisely because we are here, I hope you agree with me that Fr. Bapst’s story has more than a touch of contemporary resonance.

These remarks were given by John McGreevey at the 2010 launch of Contending Modernities in New York City.

John McGreevey
John T. McGreevy is professor of History at the University of Notre Dame and author of American Jesuits and the World: How an Embattled Religious Order Made Modern Catholicism Global (2016) and of the prize-winning Catholicism and American Freedom: A History (2003). He previously served as Chair of the Notre Dame Department of History (2002-2008) and Dean of the College of Arts and Letters (2008-2018).
Contending Modernities article

Orsi Contra Ecclesiam

In Citizens, Simon Schama’s narration of the French Revolution, he describes the revolutionary government’s suppression of the popular rebellion in the Vendée. Far more than a military maneuver, he recounts, the operation sought “the wholesale destruction of an entire region of France.”  In a “sinister anticipation of the technological killings of the twentieth century,” the revolution’s armies exterminated women, children, entire villages, and ultimately some one third of the inhabitants of the region.  Among the massacres’ chief targets was the Catholic Church, which the revolution sought wholly to destroy and to replace with its own parallel hierarchy, priesthood, rituals, and theology: the Cult of Reason and the Cult of the Supreme Being. Throughout the nineteenth century, even while advancing the rights of man­—free assembly, free speech, a free press, and the franchise—the liberal republican heirs of the revolution, along with unholy allies like Germany’s Bismarck, sought to close Catholic schools, shut down monasteries, and dissever the Church’s bishops from the authority of the pope, all with the hope and expectation of hastening the Church’s inevitable exit from history.

This slice of history might seem to complicate judgments about the “brave opposition of secular modernity to Catholicism” or about the “deep hostility of the church for the modern world and [this hostility’s] dreadful consequences.”  But these are precisely the summary judgments that historian Robert Orsi delivers on the Church in his recent blog post on The Immanent Frame in a forum on the launch of Contending Modernities.  He attacks directly the very premise of the project: that Catholics, Muslims and secular people can engage in an ongoing scholarly conversation about modernity that would increase the sphere of justice and mutual understanding.  The problem, he explains, is that one party to the conversation, the Catholic Church, is implacably opposed to modernity’s achievements.

Orsi’s bilious broadside is a strange one for a historian of Catholicism.  Holder of the Grace Craddock Nagle Chair in Catholic Studies at Northwestern University, Orsi is an accomplished scholar, widely and rightly lauded for his textured histories of Catholic life, including The Madonna of 115th Street: Faith and Community in Italian Harlem, 1880-1950 (Yale University Press, 1985; 2nd ed., 2002).  But in his determination to cast the Church as an almost perfect foe of liberal modernity, Orsi offers little more than scant acknowledgment of liberal modernity’s historical campaign against the Church—and hence, modernity’s illiberalism, for one mark of liberalism is surely religious freedom.

The Church’s Long—and Deep—Engagement with Modernity

He ignores, too, the Church’s own assiduous and sincere engagement with the modern world through its series of social encyclicals beginning in 1891 with Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum and continuing right up through Pope Benedict XVI’s Caritas in Veritate.   In this engagement the Church rejects some dimensions of modernity but conditionally endorses others.  Much of its teaching and ministry has been directed towards those who have fallen into modernity’s shadows: workers caught in the gears of modern industry’s machines; immigrants and refugees left homeless by modern sovereign states; the elderly whom modern families have left isolated; the orphans whom modern cities have left on their sidewalks; and millions of unborn children who are denied the chance ever to make a choice by modern legal regimes that enshrine the reproductive choice that Orsi “cherishes.” Orsi ignores the Church’s advocacy of international law and cooperation since the early twentieth century; Pope Benedict XV’s call for forgiveness among European nations at the end of World War One; the Church’s predominant role in the “third wave” of democratization from 1974 to 2008, when it helped to toppled dictatorships in Poland, Chile, Brazil, and the Philippines; the work of the Missionaries of Charity in Calcutta; and the Church’s provision of one quarter of the resources that go to fight AIDS in Africa.

Orsi fails to allow, too, that the Church has sometimes learned from modernity, as Pope Benedict XVI acknowledged in his 2006 Christmas address when he credited the Enlightenment with prompting the Church to arrive—eventually—at its own endorsement of religious freedom (though on grounds that differ sharply from modernist positivism and skepticism).  In this connection, the Jesuits are a striking case that fits awkwardly in Orsi’s scheme. In many ways, the Society of Jesus—the Pope’s own shock troops—epitomized anti-modernist Catholicism. Yet, as John McGreevy subtly recounted at the launch of Contending Modernities, in the course of the nineteenth century, many European-born Jesuits serving in the U.S. who were originally horrified by American religious freedom came to see the virtues of a system that enabled them to build strong, independent Catholic institutions. Rather than reject or embrace modernity wholesale, these Jesuits—in McGreevy’s rendering—were instrumental in producing an alternative, Catholic modernity that enabled the Church to flourish in the new, hyper-modern American context.

In addition, Orsi ignores the fact that the Church has often come to acknowledge and repent of the failures of its leaders and members in their engagement with the modern world, as did Pope John Paul II in the more than one hundred mea culpas that he voiced during his pontificate towards over 21 groups and historical episodes, and as has Pope Benedict XVI in his numerous apologies to victims of clerical sexual abuse.

At times Orsi hints that the traffic between Catholicism and modernity might run along a two-way street, alluding to “the shortcomings and failures of liberal modernity” and to the Catholics who sometimes “stood in courageous and necessary opposition” to modernity’s horrors, but these references are parenthetical and prefatory to his stentorian verdicts.

A Better, Broader Conversation

It is just such a one-way street Contending Modernities takes pains to avoid.  The Catholic part of the conversation will involve a tradition that opposes, teaches, learns from, apologizes to, and argues with the modern world, always according to the criterion of its eternal commitments.  Islam is similarly situated, manifesting its own multivalence towards modernity.  When secularism joins these two traditions, the conversation becomes more complex than a two-way street, perhaps something more like a metropolitan traffic system with its mergers, roundabouts, freeways, and perhaps a blind alley and one or two dead ends.

So let Contending Modernities’ conversation proceed.  Numerous good questions will be raised.  Here is one.  Orsi charts a historical vector in which modernity struggles but succeeds, while the Church resists.  Schama, too, tells of modernity’s march and the Church’s resistance, though for him modernity is ruthless rather than heroic while the Church is outnumbered rather than obtuse.  But if the Church really is as hopelessly out of step with modernity as Orsi imagines, or if it really is as hopelessly overwhelmed by modernity as Schama suggests, it leaves one wondering: Why on earth is the Church still around?

Daniel Philpott
Daniel Philpott is associate professor of political science and peace studies at the University of Notre Dame.  He is a coauthor, with Monica Duffy Toft and Timothy Samuel Shah, of the forthcoming God's Century: Resurgent Religion in Global Politics, and author of the forthcoming Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation.
Contending Modernities article

The Public Launch of Contending Modernities

Left to right: Scott Appleby, Ibrahim Negm, Jane McAuliffe, John McGreevy.
Left to right: Scott Appleby, Ibrahim Negm, Jane McAuliffe, John McGreevy.

On Nov. 18 and 19, 2010, dozens of scholars, religious leaders, business people, and friends and alumni of Notre Dame gathered in New York for the inauguration of Contending Modernities: Catholic, Muslim, Secular.  On Nov. 18, Rev. John I. Jenkins, C.S.C., president of Notre Dame, introduced the keynote speakers:  Shaykh Ali Gomaa, Grand Mufti of Egypt; Jane Dammen McAuliffe, president of Bryn Mawr College and past president of the American Academy of Religion; and John T. McGreevy, professor of history and dean of Notre Dame’s College of Arts and Letters. The remarks of Shaykh Ali Gomaa and Jane Dammen McAuliffe are posted below; John McGreevy’s remarks are posted above.
Continue reading “The Public Launch of Contending Modernities”

Scott Appleby
Scott Appleby (Ph.D. University of Chicago, 1985) is the Marilyn Keough Dean of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs. Appleby, a professor of history at Notre Dame, is a scholar of global religion who has been a member of Notre Dame’s faculty since 1994. He graduated from Notre Dame in 1978 and received master’s and Ph.D. degrees in history from the University of Chicago. From 2000-2014, he served as the Regan Director of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. Appleby co-directs, with Ebrahim Moosa and Atalia Omer, Contending Modernities, a major multi-year project to examine the interaction among Catholic, Muslim, and secular forces in the modern world.