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Global Currents article

The Islamic Call for a Free Egypt

When the Arab Spring began earlier this year, first in Tunis and then in Egypt, many in the West felt sympathetic. It was people power, after all, that rallied against longtime dictators, asking for the very democracy that the West cherishes so much.

But What If the “Bad Guys” Take Over?

But other people in the West saw a risk in this historic moment: What if the initially democratic Arab Spring would be a midwife to a series of Islamist dictatorships? The deposed dictators of Tunis and Egypt were unmistakably authoritarian, but they were also secular, while their opponents included religiously motivated parties like the Muslim Brotherhood. So, what if these Islamists took advantage of democracy to establish their own dictatorships? What if these “bad guys,” as former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reportedly put it in a recent meeting in Washington, emerged triumphant instead of the “good guys”?

I am very familiar with this democracy-is-dangerous-for-Muslims argument, for it has been used in Turkey, my country, for decades. The Kemalists, the ideological followers of Turkey’s secularist founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, found the imagined legitimacy of their authoritarianism in their secularism. In other words, a bit like the medieval “divine rights of kings,” we were subjected to the undivine rights of Kemalists, deriving from their supposed access to “science and reason.”

The people who buy this argument often make two crucial assumptions. The first one is that secular people and their parties, by definition, must be more liberal. But there is hardly any empirical evidence to believe so. (Just look at Turkey, and see how the Kemalists have behaved badly with regards to free speech or minority rights, as I explained here.)

The second, and perhaps more credible, assumption is that a political view inspired by religion, and particularly Islam, must be authoritarian. There are, of course, various examples to support that view, but there are examples to the contrary as well.

The Pro-Democratic Grand Imam?

One of the latter came recently from none other than Ahmed al-Tayyeb, The Grand Imam of Al-Azhar in Cairo, one of the top centers of Islamic learning in the world. In a news conference that made its way to global headlines, the grand imam called for “the establishment of a modern, democratic, constitutional state” in Egypt, based upon the separation of powers and guaranteeing equal rights to all citizens. He also urged “the protection of places of worship for the followers of the three monotheistic religions” and considered “incitement of confessional discord and racist speech as crimes against the nation.”

In the same declaration, Imam al-Tayyeb also said that the principles of sharia, or Islamic law, should remain “the essential source of legislation,” while Christians and Jews should have their own tribunals. (Perhaps like the “millet system” of the Ottoman Empire, in which various religious communities were subject to their own laws.)

I am sure that the advocacy of Islamic law here will ring many alarm bells. But it should be noted that Islamic law is already a part of legislation in Egypt. Moreover, there is no problem in deriving laws from a tradition (whether that be Islamic, Roman or “Common”), as long as the tradition is reformed to cope with modern human rights standards. So, Al-Azhar will perhaps need to revisit some problematic aspect of classical Islamic law — such as the bans on apostasy or blasphemy — for Egypt really to become a “modern, democratic, constitutional state” with shariah as its “essential source of legislation.”

Beyond the False Choice between Secularism and Islamism

Such a synthesis between democracy and Islam is not only possible. It is also the most promising path for the future of the Muslim world. To see why, the Westerners and the Muslim secularists who are obsessed about keeping the Islamic pious out of the game should understand that this very exclusion has led to more radical forms of political Islam.

In other words, the modern Middle East has been haunted by two fiercely opposing yet similarly illiberal trends: secular authoritarianism versus Islamist authoritarianism. Epitomized by dichotomies such as the Shah versus Khomeini, or Nasser (and Mubarak) versus the Muslim Brotherhood, these two extremes have created a vicious cycle, which blurred the evolution of democracy, in which natural aspirations of the Middle Eastern peoples, including those of the Islamic pious, could have been answered.

The key question is whether this vicious cycle can be broken, and whether Muslim nations can find their own way to freedom. Voices from the Arab Spring, such as that of Imam Ahmed al-Tayyeb, and recent success stories such as Turkey, in which a party with Muslim values (the incumbent Justice and Development Party) fosters economic progress and democratic reform, are examples which claim “yes!” We just need more of them.

Mustafa Akyol
Mustafa Akyol is a Turkish journalist and the author of the books The Islamic Jesus (St. Martin's Press, February 2017) and Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty (W.W. Norton, July 2011).
Deadly Violence & Conflict Transformation article

The Future of Catholic Peacebuilding

TIMOTHY SHAH

Among the most pressing of the challenges posed by modernity is violent conflict: bloody struggles between peoples, inside and across borders, over scarce resources as well as a sense of threatened identities. How is it possible to build peace and new, sustainable forms of community in the face of this challenge?

The heads of several of the international Catholic organizations most deeply involved in peacebuilding joined scholars in Rome on June 30 for a conference on “The Future of Peacebuilding: Contributions from Catholic Theology, Ethics, Praxis.” The Contending Modernities blog asked the organizer of the conference as well as a key participant—Gerard Powers and Maryann Cusimano Love, respectively—to share their thoughts on Catholic peacebuilding, based on reflections they presented at the conference.

Held at the Christian Brothers’ Casa La Salle in Rome, the meeting was organized by the Catholic Peacebuilding Network (CPN), based at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and co-sponsored by nine other academic institutes, development agencies, and peace organizations affiliated with the CPN: the Bernardin Center for Theology and Ministry, Catholic Theological Union; Caritas Internationalis; Catholic Relief Services; the Center for Human Rights and International Justice, Boston College; the Institute for Policy Research, The Catholic University of America; the Institute for Theology and Peace, Germany; the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego; the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame; the Order of Friars Minor; and Pax Christi International.

With an audience of diplomats, aid workers, peacebuilding practitioners and academics, the conference focused on three questions: What constitutes effective and authentically Catholic peacebuilding? How can Catholic peacebuilding practices inform and be informed by Catholic theology? And what are future challenges for Catholic peacebuilding?

The text of the talks and video of the conference are available at http://cpn.nd.edu/.  For a fuller treatment of these questions, see Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis, edited by R. Schreiter, S. Appleby, and G. Powers (Orbis 2010).

Timothy Samuel Shah
Timothy Samuel Shah is Editor of the Contending Modernities Blog. He is Associate Director and Scholar in Residence of the Religious Freedom Project at Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs and Adjunct Research Professor with Notre Dame's Kroc Institute. With Monica Duffy Toft and Daniel Philpott, he is co-author of God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics.
Deadly Violence & Conflict Transformation article

Catholic Contributions to Modern Peacebuilding

Some people say that Catholic Social Teaching is the Church’s Best Kept Secret.  If that is true,  Catholic peacebuilding may be Catholic Social Teaching’s Best Kept Secret.  From South Sudan and Central America to Congo and Colombia, the Catholic Church is a powerful force for peace, freedom, justice and reconciliation.  But that impressive and courageous peacebuilding work of the Catholic community is often unknown, unheralded and under-analyzed.

The heads of several of the international Catholic organizations most deeply involved in peacebuilding joined scholars in Rome on June 30 for a conference in Rome on “The Future of Peacebuilding: Contributions from Catholic Theology, Ethics, Praxis.”  The conference was sponsored by the Catholic Peacebuilding Network (CPN), based at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and 9 other academic institutes, development agencies, and peace organizations affiliated with the CPN.

With an audience of diplomats, aid workers, peacebuilding practitioners and academics, the conference focused on several questions.

What Is Catholic about Peacebuilding?

The speakers highighted several cases of Catholic peacebuilding.  In the keynote address, Cardinal Peter Turkson, president of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, gave a personal reflection on insights he has gained from his peacebuilding work in his native Ghana.  Fr. William Headley, dean of the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego, drew lessons from the Church’s peacebuilding in Burundi, especially the engagement of Catholic Relief Services and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops with the Church in Burundi.  Marie Dennis, co-president of Pax Christi International, provided an overview of Pax Christi’s long-standing support for the multi-faceted peacebuilding work of the Catholic Church in Sudan. In his first public address since being elected secretary general of the Vatican agency Caritas Internationalis, Michel Roy, described the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative in Northern Uganda.  I highlighted the Church’s engagement with armed actors in Colombia.

One could view the Church’s peacebuilding role in these and other conflicts through the standard metrics of social science or conflict resolution theories.  To some extent that is valid, for, as Headley noted, we must humbly acknowledge that many of the “practical resources [Catholics] use for conflict analysis, mediation, trauma healing, [and] reconciliation were developed outside of the Catholic context” by other faith groups, secular NGOs, scholars, and governments.  But there is more to it than that, according to Headley.  “Ethical reflection, theology and spirituality are not project activities, skills or management tools” of secular NGOs.  Reflecting on lessons learned from two decades of peacebuilding work, Claudio Betti, director of Special Operations for the Sant’Egidio Community in Rome, made a similar point: “the Church is not and never will be only part of ‘civil society.’”  Without underestimating the importance of peacebuilding skills and strategies, Cardinal Turkson emphasized the Church’s capacity to address the personal dimension of peacebuilding: “Violence manifests itself through people, so peacebuilding starts with changing the heart…. As Christians we have faith and grace to change hearts.”

What secular approaches to peacebuilding miss is the peacebuilding power of faith; not faith in general, but particular kinds of faith – in this case Catholic.   One can only understand what the Catholic Church is doing in Ghana, Sudan, or Burundi if one understands that its mission and self-understanding is shaped by a specific set of Catholic beliefs, practices and institutions – and the effectiveness of the Church’s peacebuilding is derived in large measure from its Catholic identity.

The point here is not that Catholic peacebuilders should retreat into a parochial ghetto.  Engaging with other religious bodies, civil society groups, and governments in promoting peace is part of what “catholic” peacebuilding means.  But peacebuilding can be narrow and sterile when it is not animated by the Church’s rich tradition of spirituality, theology and ethics.

What Makes Catholic Peacebuilding Effective?

Conference participants highlighted several elements of effective peace building.

First, peacebuilding is effective when it is strategic — that is, when it addresses all factors (military, economic, political, cultural), and all actors, at all levels – and also addresses how these actors, factors, and levels relate to one another.  Roy noted that the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative in Northern Uganda was distinctive because it undertook peacebuilding from the village level to the United Nations and included not just a formal role in the official peace process but also mediation of local conflicts, trauma healing, efforts to reintegrate rebels into their communities, and extensive relief and development programs.

The same was true of the Church’s work in Sudan.  Dennis noted that, as violence flares anew in South Sudan, the “Catholic community is present and fully engaged, using international networks to expose brutality, accompanying communities caught in the violence, making strong public statements in an effort to protect those being harmed, promoting reconciliation, [and] encouraging the development of just political processes and structures.”

Second, this mulit-level, multi-faceted approach to peacebuilding is possible only if peacebuilding is done through Church structures and Catholic institutions – i.e., episcopal conferences, Caritas agencies, Catholic educational institutions, and Catholic lay organizations.  In some ways, it is less complicated and easier to work as an independent NGO with its own programs and accountable only to itself.  But Catholic peacebuilding is successful, not because of a few activists working at the margins of Church life, but when peacebuilding is integral to and animates the life of Catholic institutions.  Moreover, even then, the disparate work of many different kinds of Catholic institutions and other actors must be integrated and coordinated.  That is the insight behind the Catholic Peacebuilding Network, which connects a variety of Catholic peacebuilders in new ways that enable them to respond to needs identified by the Church that cannot easily be met by any one or two institutions alone, or by the same types of institutions.

Third, genuine peacebuilding must be sustained, robust, and long-term; there are no easy or quick solutions to violent conflict, especially conflicts of long-standing duration.  Short-term engagement – e.g., the week-long seminar – can sometimes be helpful, but what is most helpful is an intentional, systematic, long-term process of accompaniment.   Maryann Cusimano Love, associate professor of political science at the Catholic University of America, noted that one difference between the peacebuilding initiatives of political institutions, such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission and new offices at the U.S. State and Defense Departments, is that the government programs have an understanding of peacebuilding that is far less robust and lacks the “moral imagination” and long-term engagement of most Catholic approaches.

How Can Catholic Peacebuilding Inform, and Be Informed By, Theology and Ethics?

Several speakers commented on the need for the further development of a theology of peace that is comparable in scope and sophistication to the Church’s teaching on the use of force.  For example, how would our understanding of peacebuilding change if the Church’s teaching on inter-religious dialogue, Christology, reconciliation, human rights, development and ecclesiology were seen through a peacebuilding lens?  If we reflect on “lived” Catholic peacebuilding, it becomes clear that there are areas where practice might inform theology and vice-versa.

Fr. Robert Schreiter, a professor at the Catholic Theological Union, cited several challenges for the theology and praxis of Catholic peacebuilding:  “shaping policies and practices for ius post bellum”; giving greater attention to social forgiveness; and translating a theology and ethics of peacebuilding into terms intelligible to peacebuilders of other faiths and the secular world, and making it accessible to grassroots communities.  I would add two other examples: the role of the Church in facilitating peace processes, a widespread practice about which there has been little systematic reflection, and approaches to self-determination and secession, about which there is also a dearth of reflection in official Catholic teaching.

Concluding Thoughts

I might be the last person on the planet not to have a Facebook page.  But if I had a Facebook page, I could choose my “interests” – like skiing, skydiving, pinochle…. or peacebuilding!  In the world according to Facebook, peacebuilding is an “interest” – with its own symbol! I suppose that is something to be celebrated.  But in the world according to Catholic social teaching, peacebuilding can never be a mere interest, an optional activity that a few of us might engage in.  No! For Christians, peacebuilding is not an interest but an imperative; it is our vocation.  As Schreiter emphasized, peacebuilding “is more than something the Church can do” because of its global reach and ubiquitous presence in many areas of conflict.  “It is something the Church must do if it is to be faithful to its Lord, … an utter requirement for our participation in God’s reconciling action in the world.”

Finding ways to make peacebuilding more authentically Catholic, more effective, and more theologically grounded is a continuing challenge for Catholic peacebuilders.

Gerard Powers
Gerard Powers is director of Catholic Peacebuilding Studies at Notre Dame's Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. He also coordinates the Catholic Peacebuilding Network and is co-editor (with Schreiter & Appleby) of Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics and Praxis (2010).
 
Deadly Violence & Conflict Transformation article

Catholic Ideas, Institutions, and Imagination: Three Keys to Peacebuilding

Three “I”s—ideas, institutions, and imagination—are crucial for understanding how Catholicism contributes to the wider society and to peacebuilding initiatives in particular.

Institutions

The good news is that we are currently witnessing an explosion of new peacebuilding institutional development in key political institutions.  The UN established the UN Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) five years ago.  Many countries have similarly established offices for peacebuilding within their foreign affairs organizations, such as the United States Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the US Department of Defense’s new core missions in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.

The idea has gained ground that building peace that will last requires more than negotiating peace agreements among combatants, and more than deploying UN peacekeepers to enforce ceasefires and peace accords.  There is greater recognition of the idea that peacebuilding requires a greater number of activities and functions, including and integrating development, diplomacy, and defense, for a longer time frame, and by a greater number of actors, state and non-state alike.

These expanded ideas gave rise to new institutions, which are crucial because ideas and norms don’t exist in a vacuum or in the minds of individuals.  For norms to be implemented, to affect social and political change, they must be institutionalized in organizations and their practices and policies.

Here is where the good news ends regarding the growth of peacebuilding ideas in secular institutions.  These institutions were created with severe capacity gaps, and those remain five years later.  All these institutions were created with no new allocations of money and personnel.  Instead, money and people were shifted from other parts of these organizations, amidst strong turf battles.  The lack of resources signaled a lack of commitment to these new institutions that has hurt and marginalized them, making it difficult for these organizations to have any operational capacity in the field, or to be taken seriously.

For example, over five years countries have voluntarily donated $343 million to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, but only $205 million has been allocated.  Contrast that with Caritas Internationalis, with the $5 billion annual budget of its member organizations. And that is only a portion of the Catholic organizations building peace.  Operating for over 2,000 years, with reach into every country, the Church has a lot of “bandwidth.”  The practical, functional, and institutional capacities that the Church can apply toward building peace are unparalleled.

Ideas

Not only are these new institutions weak, but the ideas of peace and peacebuilding they are pursuing are also limited.  They use the term peacebuilding, but they do not mean what we in the Catholic Church mean by peacebuilding.  They have a very short term focus, on negative peace, on cessation of hostilities, often by or with force, through peacekeepers or increasing the capacity of national security sector forces, and they focus heavily on states and combatants.  They do not focus on ideas prominent in Catholic peacebuilding—participation, reconciliation, right relationship, and long-term sustainability.

Participation is a hallmark of Caritas Internationalis and Catholic Relief Services, stemming from the principle of the sanctity of human life and dignity.  In contrast, in UN peace negotiations and processes, women were entirely excluded from the talks 98% of the time.  A key criticism of UNPBC consultations has been the exclusion of women’s groups.  When these new institutions talk about reconciliation, they do not mean what the Church means—healing of individuals and communities of the traumas induced by conflict, restoration of right relationship.  Instead they mean demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of armed groups, and police and security sector reforms, often with impunity and payment for those armed actors—peace at any price.  This has led to the critique of many UN brokered peace accords as amounting to men with guns excusing and paying off other men with guns for the violence they have done against women.

Imagination

Why do secular organizations often have such limited ideas and institutional practices of peacebuilding?  Because of a failure of imagination, the critical leaven to building peace.

How can people build peace who have never known peace?  To build a robust, just peace, we have to be able, as Kroc Institute peacebuilding scholar John Paul Lederach notes “to imagine ourselves in a web of relationships that includes our enemies.”

The Catholic moral and religious imagination offers many fruitful principles and practices. In our sacraments of communion and reconciliation; in our beliefs in a relational, Triune resurrected God; in our institutional structures that seek to realize these relationships of local and global church, of the Body of Christ; in Catholic social teaching of protection of human life and dignity, preference for the poor, solidarity and subsidiarity, we regularly exercise moral muscles for the common good—a rich moral imagination the world needs.

Too often our governments aim low in building peace, seeing only a world of bad choices among lesser evils. Catholic peacebuilders see a different world, where communion, peace and love are possible.  Imagining peace in war-torn areas is a challenging but crucial first step in realizing peace.

Maryann Cusimano Love
Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love is an Associate Professor of International Relations in the Politics Department of The Catholic University of America and New York Times BestsellingAuthor. Her recent books include Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda (4th Edition, 2010), Morality Matters: Ethics and the War on Terrorism (forthcoming at Cornell University Press), and "What Kind of Peace Do We Seek?," in Schreiter, Appleby, and Powers, eds., Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis (Orbis, 2010).
 
Global Currents article

Pakistan: Between Betrayed Dream and Desire to Rebuild

What Pakistan Has Become

“The first duty of a government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State…. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State…. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State….you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.”

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, August 11, 1947

Unfortunately, Pakistan’s polity today does not reflect the ideals set by her founder, outlining a pluralistic democracy and religious freedom. Many believe that if this message by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in his Presidential address in the inaugural session of Pakistan’s constituent assembly had served as the state’s guiding principles, the country would have avoided crucial problems she is facing today. Subsequent regimes pushed the country closer and closer to a theocratic model for grounding political legitimacy and national unity.

Today, in 2011, places of worship, religious leaders, schools for girls, police stations, army bases, and advocates of liberalism and moderation are attacked almost daily by religious extremists trying to impose their version of religion. People offer their prayers in the shadow of armed guards. As Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and allied groups establish their hold in several parts of the country, minority religions as well as some Muslim sects face an existential threat.

Since 2005, the death toll from suicide and other attacks runs into the thousands each year. The vanguards of a theocratic vision of the Pakistani polity use coercive power—effectively granted to them under laws such as the blasphemy laws—to silence dissenting voices such as those of Dr. Mohammad Farooq Khan, an Islamic scholar and psychiatrist; Governor Salman Taseer, critic of the blasphemy laws and advocate of religious freedom and the rights of minorities; and Minister Shahbaz Bhatti, the first Federal Minister for Minorities. All three of these leading stalwarts for tolerance and freedom were murdered in the last ten months.

The Struggle for Pakistan’s Soul Is Not Over

However, the struggle to shift the direction of Pakistan has not ceased. This battle—which is nothing less than a battle for Pakistan’s soul—continues in intense debate and political struggle, which assume many forms in the country’s public life. Despite the number of laws and policies discriminating on the basis of religion, their rationale is increasingly challenged.

While democrats refer to Jinnah’s speech to argue for separating state from religion, their opponents quote the “Muslim way of life” as the raison d’être for a “separate homeland” or and the partition of India in 1947. Indeed, they even cite some of Jinnah’s own speeches, in which he refers to “Islamic principles of social justice.” Furthermore, political parties and pressure groups of various shades that insist that the state must have an exclusive Muslim identity argue that Jinnah never used the term “secular” to define the state of Pakistan. Religio-political parties and the country’s political establishment increasingly equated secularism with “godlessness” in order to amass support for the “Ideology of Pakistan” and a militaristic social psyche based on Islamo-nationalism.

Liberals and democrats countered this argument by saying that learning from experience should be good enough. After all, how well have successive Islamization campaigns—beginning in the 1950s and accelerating in the 1970s—served Pakistan? What does the historical record show? Jinnah may not have expressly warned against theocracy or religious hegemony, but as a matter of fact he never prescribed shariah law as the basis of the polity or the law of Pakistan.

Furthermore, Pakistani “secular” thinking draws upon the historical religious and cultural plurality of the Indian subcontinent and the cultural produce consequences of living together for centuries rather than suppressing religious diversity. The Pakistani secular mind frankly admires the inclusive secularism practiced in neighboring India—recently adopted in Nepal and increasingly practiced in Bangladesh also—in which the state refrains from privileging a single religion or from maiming, discouraging or suppressing any religions. On the contrary, the state, at least officially aspires to play the role of a neutral arbiter.

Towards a New Pakistan

Violence and bigotry in Pakistan are a result of serious misadventures with religion, misadventures for which the political establishment and its collaborators are to be blamed. Religious liberties became the first casualty when the state assumed the role of defining and imposing religion—and one particular brand of religion at that—on public life. This in the face of the fact that the religious ethos of ordinary people carries—or at least carried till it was made to change—the visible imprint of Buddhist, Zoroastrian, Hindu and Sikh religious traditions, as well as the tradition of Muslim Sufi thought and practice. The Christian community in Pakistan is deservedly admired for its contributions in education and health care, and it has played a significant role in promoting interfaith and social harmony. This rich diversity was marginalized and suppressed.

Faith groups from majority and minority communities, along with liberals, democrats, and seculars, have made commendable efforts to stand together to save Pakistan from religious bigotry and build it into a modern, tolerant state. While the overall change or transformation of society and state is yet to be achieved, it must be underscored that these forces have enjoyed some significant successes in this long struggle.

Apart from their contribution to various social movements—for example, struggles for worker’s, women’s, and minorities’ rights—this critical mass of Pakistanis was able to defeat the Shariah Bill of 1998 and the insertion of a religion category in the National Identity card in 1992. More recently, a countrywide campaign had the separate electorate based on religious apartheid abolished in 2002, and another campaign won amendments to the Hudood laws—the laws governing Shariah-sanctioned criminal penalties—in 2006.

Pakistan today needs broad-based reforms. And however pessimistic some people might be about the future of this great South Asian nation, recent successes show that serious reforms can happen. The government and people need to make a collective effort to rectify past mistakes and ensure religious freedom for all citizens. The undying spirit of the Pakistani people and their enduring commitment to true democracy—which braved executions, imprisonments, flogging and torture to oppose and defeat four despotic military regimes in 60 years—demonstrate that a new Pakistan can be built.

I dedicate the following lines to the human rights defenders and peace workers in Pakistan.

Crying Is No Choice

With melting eyes and trembling hands

I stand aside my house in the street

My intestines boiling with fear amassed

Yet crying is no choice

Bodies falling one after another

We forget the count, each time we end

Bare hands pick injured, with heavy heart and cursing looks

While the armed fell innocent

Street where people sang and danced

Children grow up mourning

A fake ideology stands exposed

Yet crying is no choice

We have cried enough

A bullet has no eyes to weep

The gun has no tears

Alas it has not

God give bullet an eye, and let the gun have tears

It is time for them to cry

 

Peter Jacob
Peter Jacob studied law, political science and rural development and has been associated with human rights and peacebuilding work in Pakistan for since 1988.
Authority, Community & Identity article

Lessons for Interreligious Dialogue Today

I concluded my last post on Manila 1960 with two questions: Why did Manila 1960 take place under the peculiar circumstances described so far? And why did Manila 1960 remain a forgotten episode in the history of Interreligious Dialogue? Let me answer with two simple statements: Interreligious Dialogue is inseparable from the political field, and Manila 1960 was forgotten because a new religious elite rose to take control of Interreligious Dialogue.

Interreligious Dialogue is Indebted to the Political Field

In the case of the Manila meeting, the significance of the political setting is perfectly transparent.

First, the impulse to organize the encounter was given by a highly political institution, UNESCO, which at the time was still strongly influenced by the secular policy articulated by Julian Huxley, its first director-general, in his 1946 book, UNESCO: Its Purposes and Philosophy (London 1947, and just re-printed in 2010). Second, the meeting was set inside the context of a ten-year plan to promote mutual understanding between East and West and this—in the late 1950s—had primarily no religious connotation. “East-West-relations” were first of all political power relations.

As soon as one looks beyond the Manila episode, this aspect of Interreligious Dialogue becomes even more obvious. From the 1960s onwards, the efforts of the United Nations in Interreligious Dialogue were overtaken by the activities of numerous inter-religious institutions that came to specialize in Interreligious Dialogue. To name but a few examples: The Temple of Understanding (1960), World Conference of Religions for Peace (Kyoto 1970), Committee of Religious Non-Governmental Organizations at the United Nations (1972), World Council of Religious Leaders / Millennium Peace Summit (2002), Tripartite Forum on Interfaith Cooperation for Peace (2005), and the Initiative for a UN Decade of Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (2006)

All these institutions cooperate intensively with the UN. At the same time, they more or less follow their own agenda—most frequently centered around peace issues. And they do this on three levels: On the level of high-ranking religious representatives that are committed to those institutions (either ex officio or out of personal conviction), on the level of “inter-religious experts” who are quite frequently in salaried employment with those institutions, and finally on the level of individual activists linked to those institutions by different networks and quite often without any formal religious qualification (the ominous “people on the ground”).

The establishment of those institutions can be interpreted in at least two ways. One way is as a religious “usurpation” of the political field, an argument recently put forward by Jeanne Favret-Saada (in Jeux d’ombres sur la scène de l’ONU: Droits humains et laïcité, Paris 2010). Another way is as a “politicization” of religious debates, as critically discussed by Catherine Cornille (in The Im-Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue, New York 2008). Regardless of which interpretation one wants to follow, Interreligious Dialogue is taking place on the border of the religious and the political field, and it is difficult to understand one without the other.

In front of this background, however, a second question becomes even more interesting and important: If Manila 1960 really stands at the beginning of a loose though increasingly important tradition of this type of encounter, why is it more or less forgotten?

A New Religious Elite Commandeered Interreligious Dialogue

The participants in Manila 1960 were certainly no representative sample of religious believers. They held over-average academic degrees and positions. They were closely linked to Western academia, even though they came from different parts of the world. And they were embedded in the milieu of international diplomacy and cooperation that Pax Romana and UNESCO represented from the late 1940s up to the early 1960s.

So the Manila conference brought together representatives of a rather distinct section of society with links to religious, political and academic milieus, alike.

Their respective intellectual skills notwithstanding, those people were neither formal religious representatives nor experts in Interreligious Dialogue—neither in terms of training, nor in an institutional sense of the word. All of them were obviously religiously committed and informed. All of them had experiences in religious encounters. But they were not linked to any of the inter-religious institutions that were about to emerge from the mid-1960s onwards inside global civil society. In a way, they belonged to an “old guard” of international diplomats who became interested in inter-religious encounters, rather than inter-religious activists seeking to shape international politics.

And this was probably the reason why the protagonists of Manila 1960 were to be forgotten in the first place. They stand between two phases of inter-religious encounters. They foreshadowed future developments and were at the same time still linked to an older generation.

If this is true, the Manila episode tells us as much about the past as the present-day state of Interreligious Dialogue. It stands for the long tradition of elite approaches to inter-religious encounter. More episodes outside these meetings of experts and elites need to be uncovered and recounted—in their official and unofficial versions—in order to arrive at a complete picture of this important history.

Karsten Lehmann
Karsten Lehmann is head of social sciences statistics at the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural dialogue. He was previously Senior Lecturer in Religious Studies at Bayreuth University in Germany, and for the 2011 calendar year a Research Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs of Georgetown University. With his colleague Stefan Kurth, he publishd an edited volume on research methods in religious studies (Religionen erforschen - Kulturwissenschaftliche Methoden in der Religionswissenschaft, forthcoming 2011).
Authority, Community & Identity article

Interreligious Dialogue, Too, Can Marginalize

In my previous post on Manila 1960 as a forgotten yet fascinating chapter in the history of Interreligious Dialogue, I made a distinction between hagiography and unofficial history. In a way, I learned about the 1960 conference on “The Present Impact of the Great Religions of the World upon the Orient and the Occident” the “wrong” way around—by first getting acquainted with the unofficial story and only later with the somewhat more flattering self-portrait.

While working in the Pax Romana archives at the Bibliothèque Cantonale et Universitaire Fribourg, I came across letters concerning the organization of the conference as well as the transcript of the discussions. The transcript had been prepared for a later publication that never materialized. Later on, I found the official documentation, published by Pax Romana and now accessible online on the Pax Romana website.

Taken together, these sources offer two mutually complementary perspectives, both of which are essential for understanding the Manila meeting.

The Official Story

A short look at the table of contents of the official documentation reveals three interesting aspects.

First, most of the people contributing papers to the conference had no formal religious authority, legitimized either by office or charisma. Second, there were quite a lot of university teachers, e.g. in history (Das Gupta, Husain, Yahia, Shibata), philosophy (Nakamura, Louvaris, Matsumoto), and education (Greenberg, Kraemer). But there was only one priest (Father de la Costa) and no monk, no bishop, and no other religious teacher. Third, all of them were linked to the Western academic milieu, whether by academic training, position, or long residence in Europe or the US. The voices of indigenous religious authority were not heard because they were not present.

Browsing more intensively through the ten public lectures given in the morning-sessions of the Manila-conference, one recognizes two further facts that help characterize the meeting.

On one hand, all the participants of the conference tried to make their own fundamental religious position known. More or less to the exclusion of all else, they worked hard to introduce each other—on a rather abstract level—to the basic concepts and categories of their respective religions. Whether this was actually necessary or not, is difficult to tell. But at least the Manila participants themselves seemed to have had the impression that the other participants needed this rudimentary background. So, here we have a group of sophisticated academics more or less describing their personal religious position to each other in the simplest and most basic of terms.

On the other hand, the participants stuck closely to the topic proposed by the organizers: They all commented on the role of religions in the world of the early 1960s. Most of them described this world as industrialized, materialist, and secular—as, in short, modern. And they described religion as adding value that was necessary though increasingly marginalized. There were actually just two exceptions to this rule. In his paper on Hinduism, S. B. Das Gupta underlined the compatibility between Hinduism and modern society, in line with nineteenth-century Hindu reformer Swami Vivekananda, and Mahmud Hussain presented a similar approach to Islam.

These exceptions notwithstanding, all the papers make clear that the conference was not only an encounter between different religious positions but also a meeting of a religious unity in the face of a modern society that was perceived as secular and non-religious. Or, as the Polish Journalist Jerzy Turowicz put it a little bit reluctantly:

« On a constaté, peut-être non sans certain surprise, des fortes convergences entre les attitudes des différentes religions. […] Evidemment elles ne constituent pas une base pour une synthèse englobant des différentes religions, un syncrétisme, qui pour les catholiques, et probablement aussi pour les croyants des autres religions ne serait ni désirable ni admissible. […] Les convergences témoignent seulement du fait que chaque religion contient une certaine sagesse naturelle et qu’une correspondance existe entre l’expression religieuse et les exigences de la nature humaine. » (TUROWICZ, Jerzy, Les grandes religions et le monde d’aujourd’hui, in: Pax Romana 14,1 (1960), p. 12f, here: 12.)

The Unofficial Story

What the official documentation does not allude to are the afternoon sessions of the conference, moderated by Olivier Lacombe. These sessions were restricted to a small number of participants. In order to learn more about them, one has to dig into the respective boxes of papers in the Pax Romana archives.

The transcripts first of all create the impression of an extremely “civilized” encounter, without a hint of contentious argument or mutually exclusive positioning.

The encounter was so polite, perhaps, because it was so contained. Whether due to social constraints or personal preferences, the discussions were actually dominated—in more or less equal parts—by Das Gupta, Pannikar, Kraemer, and Greenberg. The two Muslim representatives rose rather rarely to speak. When they did so, it was mostly to answer questions addressed directly to them. And the same holds true for the Roman Catholic, the Orthodox, the Buddhist, and the Shinto representatives.

The UNESCO representative, Jacques Havet, who had already attended the human rights seminar of Pax Romana in Limburg an der Lahn, nine years earlier, actually seems to have taken a back seat, too. However, he raised two interesting questions that concern UNESCO even now. One was the question of the compatibility between technological development and religious attitudes. As it happens, in fact, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was just about to be established, in 1965. The other was the question of religious exclusiveness in the face of religious plurality.

An Interest in the Non-Monotheist Other & in the Everyday

Finally, the transcript highlights two seemingly contradictory realities.

On one hand, it was not Islam that triggered the most intense discussions in Manila. It was rather the East Asian and South Asian religions that were the subject of sustained inquiry and discussion. In this respect, the conference seemed to be dominated by the religious interest of the monotheistic speakers in the religious traditions they considered most distant from their own position.

On the other hand, the discussions were much more down-to-earth than the official papers might suggest. Most of the time, the participants did not discuss abstract religious questions. In contrast to their own presentations, they focused instead on practical and immediate issues, such as the social position of the family, the everyday side of missionary work, and the influence of increasing leisure time on religious observance.

So what do we learn from these complementary stories? To answer that question, we need to pursue two further questions: Why did Manila 1960 take place under the peculiar circumstances described so far? And why did Manila 1960 remain a forgotten episode of Interreligious Dialogue? We’ll pursue these questions in my next and final post on Manila 1960.

Karsten Lehmann
Karsten Lehmann is head of social sciences statistics at the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural dialogue. He was previously Senior Lecturer in Religious Studies at Bayreuth University in Germany, and for the 2011 calendar year a Research Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs of Georgetown University. With his colleague Stefan Kurth, he publishd an edited volume on research methods in religious studies (Religionen erforschen - Kulturwissenschaftliche Methoden in der Religionswissenschaft, forthcoming 2011).
Gender, State & Society article

The Hijab Hurdle in Sports

The International Federation of Association Football, better known by the acronym FIFA (because of the French name of the organization), is joining other athletic governing bodies in derailing the aspirations of some Muslim women to excel in sports. This month a referee in Bahrain barred the Iranian national women’s team from competing against the Jordanian women’s team in a bid for a spot at the 2012 Olympics. Also this month USA Weightlifting barred Kulsoom Abdullah of Atlanta, Georgia from the Senior Nationals competition this July in Iowa.

In both cases the reason cited was the hijab included in their uniforms.

At stake is much more than the configuration of athletic uniforms. With modern advances in hijab design, these decisions are unnecessary from an athletic point of view. Of much greater significance is the negative impact of such poor decisions on the advancement of Muslim women in society and, more broadly, on the participation of religious believers in public life.

A Wall Instead of a Wahl

In both international soccer and weightlifting, Muslim women are woefully under-represented. This is not due to a lack of desire among Muslim women to participate. Instead, from North America to Iran we see Muslim women desiring to engage in the modern world, seeking opportunities to develop and share their talents, including their athletic prowess.  Yet these women face artificial barriers erected by others.

It is important to note that men per se are not the barrier, for some men are partners with women in dismantling the obstacles to female advancement. This spring sportswriter and women’s barrier-basher Grant Wahl ran for President of FIFA on a platform that included a commitment to appoint a woman as general secretary of the all-male FIFA leadership.  Yet 74-year-old Sepp Blatter, who has staunchly kept FIFA leadership all male, all the time, was reelected for a fourth term. Thus, alas, the Iranian women hit a wall instead of a Wahl inside FIFA.

Between Cultural Rocks and Secular Hard Places

The real barriers Muslim women face are cultural prejudice and lack of religious accommodation, or sometimes even anti-religious sentiment.

On the one side some Muslim women face culturally (not religiously) rooted attitudes on the part of some Muslim men that militate against women’s advancement.  On the other, some secularists seek to ban all religion at all levels and among all participants in public. Both block public engagement by Muslim women who wear a headscarf according to their understanding of feminine modesty in their faith. (Ironically, more than a few anti-religion secularists pride themselves on their support for women’s rights.)

Of course, safety is vital in sports. And some opponents of hijab-wearing athletes cite safety concerns.

But there is an obvious way forward: Create sports-safe hijabs.

Fortunately, someone has already thought of this, devising practical ways for hijab-wearing Muslim women to participate—safely—in modern sports.

Practical Alternatives to the Sidelines

In 2007 in Quebec Canada, during a U12 (under the age of 12) Quebec Soccer Federation tournament, a referee demanded that eleven-year-old Asmahan Mansour remove her hijab because by having it on, she was violating a soccer rule on safety. Mansour refused to remove her hijab and as a result, she was prohibited from participating in the tournament. The Quebec Soccer Federation supported the referee, stating that he was adhering to the rules of FIFA , namely: “A player shall not use equipment or wear anything (including any kind of jewelry) that could be dangerous to himself or another player.”  The danger cited was the potential risk of strangulation.

However, savvy hijab design could offer an alternative to the sidelines such as a hijab with Velcro or other emergency-release.

Elham Syed Javad, an Iranian-born French-Canadian Muslim, had precisely this idea in mind when she created her sports attire design company ResportOn.

In 2007, after hearing that five Muslim girls in Montreal were dismissed from a tae kwon do tournament for wearing hijabs, Elham Javad decided to create a hijab that would allow Muslim women to participate in sports with full movement and safety. After observing Muslim girls playing sports, Elham created the ResportOn head covering, which is attached to a camisole, from athletic material that is not only flexible but also clings firmly to players’ bodies.

She assigned the product the perfect tagline: “Be Yourself. Unveil your performance.”

If the ResportOn design does not meet the safety requirements of international sports, then organizations such as FIFA should at the very least offer Javad and others the opportunity to unleash their design creativity on this problem—one that is surely solvable.

Naked Public Square?

“Extremism” was how Mustafa Musleh Zadeh, the Iranian ambassador to Jordan, described FIFA’s decision, comparing the FIFA ban on women in headscarves playing soccer to the Afghan ban on women in sports under the Taliban.

Labeling the decision “extremism” seems a bit, well, extreme. Yet the Iranian ambassador may have a point. One can’t help but wonder to what extent secularist extremism, which tries to block religious actors from engagement in the public square, had an impact on the decision of FIFA, a Euro-leaning organization, to uphold the ban on the Iranian women’s team.

But does this space need to be devoid of all religious expression in order to be “public”?

Religious Symbol vs. Religious Practice

According to FIFA regulations (Law 4, Decision 1):

Players must not reveal undergarments showing slogans or advertising. The basic compulsory equipment must not have any political, religious or personal statements.

 

A player removing his jersey or shirt to reveal slogans or advertising will be sanctioned by the competition organiser. The team of a player whose basic compulsory equipment has political, religious or personal slogans or statements will be sanctioned by the competition organiser or by FIFA.

But is the hijab a slogan? Or something different—and something more?

It is important to differentiate between a religious symbol or statement, e.g. a cross on a t-shirt, and a normative religious practice, e.g. wearing the hijab as do some Muslim women in order to follow their faith’s call to feminine modesty. For a Christian, wearing a cross on a t-shirt is an option—nowhere prescribed by Christian scriptures or tradition—and the cross would be a symbol, however revered by Christians. By contrast, for a Muslim woman, wearing a hijab is less a “slogan” or “statement” meant to communicate something to someone else than a matter of her own obedience to the binding commands of God.

(It is true that Muslim women are not commanded to wear the hijab in so many words. However, as Notre Dame professor Mahan Mirza explains elsewhere on the Contending Modernities blog, “the classical consensus [is that] Muslim women are commanded to be modest and ‘hide their beauty’ except for when they are with an inner circle of males. This has always been understood…as suggesting that something akin to the headscarf should be worn, although the extent of its practice and its exact form have varied in different societies through history.”)

One measure of difference between a religious symbol (or a slogan or statement) and a normative religious practice is what we might call “the bumper sticker test.” That is, would it retain its meaning on a bumper sticker?  A cross could go on a bumper sticker—it is a symbol that makes a statement.  By contrast, the religious meaning of the hijab is in its wearing. The hijab is a response of faith by the believer who chooses to wear it, whereas a hijab on a bumper sticker would be just a picture (and, all by itself, an opaque one at that). Even if the hijab picture symbolized something religious it would not in any way be on par with a Muslim woman’s personal act of wearing one.

Come as You Are

In a world filled with inter-religious tensions, precisely non-religious activities such as sports can provide a public space in which those who are different can find ways to participate together.

However, requiring sameness in public spaces strips them of their public character, holding them hostage to narrow, private prejudice. If our public realms are to be inclusive and reflect the true diversity of humanity, then these spaces, including soccer fields and weightlifting mats, need to include the freedom for religious believers to be who they are—and to come as they are.

Jennifer Bryson
Jennifer S. Bryson is a Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC. from 2009-2014 she served as Director of the Islam and Civil Society Project at The Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, New Jersey. She studied Political Science as an undergraduate at Stanford, medieval European intellectual history for an M.A. in History at Yale, and Greco-Arabic and Islamic studies for a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, also at Yale.
Sajda Ouachtouki
Sajda Ouachtouki works at the Walt Disney company on the digital economy and Global Internet governance. She received in Master's in public affairs from the Woodraw Wilson School for Public and International Affairs at Princeton University in 2017. She graduated from Princeton in 2013.
Gender, State & Society article

Contending Modernities in France: Muslim Expression vs. Secular Integrity

Last month, on April 11, 2011, France became the second country in Europe, following Belgium, to ban the wearing of the full Islamic veil or burqa. The law was approved in October 2010 after a year of intense debate. Nine out of ten French people support it, according to a recent survey. France had already banned the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols such as veils, Jewish skullcaps, and crucifixes in schools in 2004.

Under the new law, women who wear face-covering Muslim veils in “public places” in France face a fine of about $200, compulsory “special classes” on citizenship, or both. Husbands and fathers found to have forced women and girls to wear the full veil risk a year of prison and a fine of about $40,000, with both penalties doubled if the victim is a minor.

Within hours of the ban becoming law, two women wearing full face veils were arrested. Apparently, however, they were arrested for participating in an illegal protest—outside Notre Dame cathedral in central Paris—and not for wearing the veil. Police say they were released shortly after being questioned.

President Nicolas Sarkozy has described the burqa as a “sign of debasement.” Michele Alliot-Marie, the former interior minister, said it “cuts [women] off from society and rejects the very spirit of the French republic, founded on a desire to live together.”

This direct clash between the religious practice of some Muslims and a law that many French leaders and citizens believe is a logical extension of France’s secularism could not be of more direct interest to Contending Modernities. We therefore asked two of our regular commentators—M. Christian Green and Mahan Mirza—to offer their reflections on France’s burqa ban.

Timothy Samuel Shah
Timothy Samuel Shah is Editor of the Contending Modernities Blog. He is Associate Director and Scholar in Residence of the Religious Freedom Project at Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs and Adjunct Research Professor with Notre Dame's Kroc Institute. With Monica Duffy Toft and Daniel Philpott, he is co-author of God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics.
Gender, State & Society article

Burqas, Blobs, and Bans in “La Belle France”

A recent search of the term “burqa” on CartoonStock.com turned up a plethora of images of women in black and blue veils.  In one image a black-clad woman in a delivery room gives birth to a tiny, similarly garbed miniature, as a nurse proclaims, “It’s a girl!”  In another, a woman in a black niqab, with only her eyes exposed, sits in front of a computer featuring the webpage “Hidden Facebook.”   In yet another, a close replica of the angst-ridden figure in the Norwegian artist Edvard Munch’s famous painting “The Scream,” stands before a minaret and a woman in a blue burqa symbolizing Europe’s horror at the specter of Islamic symbols in its midst.  The black and blue images call to mind the big red blob—creeping Communism, of course—that terrorized American moviegoers in the 1950s.

“Burqa Chic” in Chicago

In a clothing boutique in Chicago’s famed shopping mecca, Water Tower Place, I was recently approached by a woman in a black headscarf and body-covering cloak, her face exposed and offset by rimless eyeglasses, one of the boutique’s signature mohair scarves in a bright and plummy shade draped around her shoulders and over the veil.  She asked if I needed assistance.  I thanked her and replied that I was just looking.  As I left the boutique to run a few errands, something about her seemed familiar.  Sometime during the next hour or so I remembered. More than the face, it was her voice that cinched the realization. I returned to the store, approached the saleswoman, and addressed her by name.

It turned out that this saleswoman, of South Asian origins, had previously represented the clothing line at a nearby department store, before going to work for the company for several years in New York, and then returning to Chicago.  She mentioned that not all of her previous customers recognized her “with the veil.” I was intensely curious about the veil, but as a stalwart for privacy in world in which privacy—including privacy in faith, where desirable—is increasingly an antique notion, I demurred.   Even as the American public has embraced the practice of demanding faith statements from its political leaders, it occurred to me that this woman’s religion was really none of my business.

Secularism and Dissimulation

On April 11, 2011, the controversial 2010 “Burqa Ban” law, officially the Bill Against Facial Dissimulation in Public Places took effect in France, banning face-covering veils—the burqa and niqab, but not the hijab or headscarf—in all public places.  Even as someone who studies law and religion, this issue—dating back to France’s 2004 Law on the Principle of secularism and the Wearing of Symbols or Clothing Denoting Religious Affiliation in Schools, Colleges and High Schools or even back to France’s 1905 Law on the Separation of Church and State or the French Revolution for the historically minded—just never grabbed me.  As a feminist concerned about the hypersexualization of women’s bodies in our culture, I was more likely to be concerned about women taking off their clothes, not covering up.  And what was with the constant scrutiny of what women wear anyway?  It all reeked of that pernicious “women-in-miniskirts-deserve-to get-raped” mentality.  As a child of the 1980s “preppy” era, I remembered, from a fashion perspective, when “status” meant piling on as many clothing layers as possible, a practice which spawned many interesting innovations and embellishments to the uniforms in my Catholic girls’ school, even in hot and humid southern Louisiana.  I was the first to get away with a black leather biker’s jacket, soon followed by others who, like me, interpreted the meaning of the school’s “Rebel Girl” mascot a bit too literally.

But as the rhetoric rose, I pricked up my ears.  In January 2010, the French National Assembly considered a 188-page report on the wearing of the “voile intégrale” as a threat to the French republican values of “liberty, equality, and fraternity” and, above all, as a challenge to the French program of secularism known as “laïcité.” With the several hundred pages of accompanying testimony transcripts and other appendices, the documentary behemoth comes in at 658 pages. Printed and bound, it resembles one of those volumes of the United States tax code that some American politicians like to trot out in the halls of Congress every April 15. But the French law that went into effect this April 11 apparently won’t deplete anyone’s bank account, unless you count the salaries to be paid to instructors in the “special classes” that French women will be required to attend, along with paying a fine, if they are caught publicly en voile.  In a down academic job market for instructors in religion, ethics, and political theories of citizenship, teaching those classes could be a pretty good employment gig.

At Once Ancient and Modern

The lengthy first section of the French’s parliament’s report takes pains to note that the wearing of the veil is, at once, of “ancient origin” and a “recent development.”  Like many such arguments, and with a commitment to originalist interpretation that United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia would admire, it emphasizes repeatedly the practice’s lack of a specific textual basis in the Qur’an, aside from general commands of modesty.  Even in the face of testimony from women who wear the veil on their motivations for doing so and the meaning of the veil in their lives, the report drafters, in their theological and anthropological wisdom, constantly return to their insistence that the veil is not an “obligatory prescription” in Islam.  But whether it was originally obligatory says nothing about its modern meaning.  As French historian Joan Wallach Scott has impressively argued, for the women who wear it, the veil may be part of the very essence of being a modern, French, Muslim woman.

Of course, those more “recent” meanings, in a context in which the majority UMP party French President Nicholas Sarkozy last month decided to emulate the New York Congressman Peter King in conducting a national debate on secularism and Islam, are potentially even more problematic.  The debate was retitled “Secularism: To Live Better Together” and produced a 26-point “Pacte Républicain” to better instantiate “laïcité” in French politics and society.

The French veil report, which contains way more than 26 points, suggests that the veil is a “rogue sign of a quest for identity” (signe dévoyé d’une quête d’identité) and the “standard of radical, communitauriste movements” (l’étendard des mouvements communitaristes et radicaux”).  Among the specific supposed threats to French values, no Western feminist can avoid some amount of concern about liberty and equality, particularly if women are coerced by their families or communities into wearing the veil, which could involve violations of their civil or political rights, or if their wearing of the veil disadvantaged them in education or employment, which would violate their economic, social, and cultural rights—not to mention their religious freedom.  But then then state, particularly a state with as grand a mission as suggested in the French veil report, should have the mission and the duty to protect women—and men, too—who wear religious garb from those sorts of human rights violations.

Refusing to Be a Person

Where the French veil report gets really interesting, at least to this reader, is in its assertion that the veil is a threat to “fraternity.” For “fraternity,” it turns out, invokes a number of conceptions of citizenship and civility that the French are concerned to protect.  In a May 4, 2010, New York Times editorial provocatively, and rather sexually suggestively, titled “Tearing Away the Veil,” Jean-Francois Copé, majority leader of the National Assembly and mayor of the town of Meaux, where some of the early headscarf cases emerged, maintained that the wearing of the veil represents a refusal to exist as a person in the eyes of others” and renders the wearer a “shadow among others, lacking individuality, avoiding responsibility.”  In Copé’s view, these veiled women are faceless—and possibly threatening—blobs within the French body politic.

The Copé editorial was followed in the Times just over a month later by philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s spirited defense of the veil, inspired by the Spanish rejection of a burqa law and titled, “Veiled Threats?,” which elicited 757 reader comments from around the world, many of them quite incendiary in their opposition to the veil.  That article was followed by response by Nussbaum, titled “Beyond the Veil,” which drew an additional 199 responses. Clearly, between the French veil report’s many pages and Nussbaum’s many responders, much ink has been spilled and many electrons transmitted over the veil issue.  How had this been under my radar for so long?

“Mirror of the Soul” and the Reciprocity of Recognition

Aside from legitimate security concerns that would require women to submit photos of their faces for identification and passport purposes, could there be so much riding on the presence of a face-obscuring cloth when it comes to citizenship and civility? Just a few weeks before the Copé editorial I had read an article, also in the New York Times, about a condition called Moebius Syndrome—a rare, conditional condition that causes facial paralysis and leaves those afflicted with it unable to form the facial expressions that are so important in social interactions.  Another article around that time in the Chronicle of Higher Education described an economic recessionary trend away from conference interviews for academic jobs and toward telephone interviews instead, noting that this could be disadvantageous for candidates who “don’t come across as well to potential employers if they’re not looking them in the eye.” My search for the telephone interview article turned up another article titled, “Why Darwin Would Have Loved Botox” on Darwin’s theories about the evolutionary origins of facial expressions as the “language of emotion.”  For their part, the French veil report drafters drew upon French, Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas’ theory of the face as the “mirror of the soul.”

I find myself somewhat persuaded by these medical, professional, and evolutionary psychological testimonies to the importance of facial expression—but not to the extent of banning the burqa.  Perhaps the most compelling concern that I have against the veil involves considerations of reciprocity, a term that does come up in the French discussion of fraternity, and is also crucially linked to justice in the Aristotelian theory from which I draw frequently scholarly sustenance.  One could also draw on contemporary German philosopher Jürgen Habermas’ theories of communicative action and intersubjectivity, as well. They can see me, but I can’t see them.  More pointedly, in my unveiled and emotion-reflecting state, I make myself vulnerable in a way that they do not.  This bugs me.

But what irks me equally and also raises vulnerability concerns—and it is a trope that occurs again and again in the French veil report—is the overwhelming scope of the French public sphere.  Reflections on the relationship between public and private are a staple of liberal political thought, and feminist theory has often noted the ways in which women are relegated to—and sometimes trapped—within the private realm.  But full publicity is frightening, as well.  There is nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, nowhere to escape those aspects of community that seem threatening, including the omniscient and omnipresent State.

My ultimate conclusion that the saleswoman’s reasons for wearing the veil were, in a sense, nobody’s business but her own was a plea for this kind of privacy—and of individuality.  My continuing curiosity about those reasons, on the other hand, suggests the demands that recognition of religious identity makes of us in a pluralistic society.  Recognition exists in an interesting tension with reciprocity.  Does reciprocity demand a certain amount of recognition? Is it possible to recognize—even respect—another’s religion without full reciprocity of belief? These are some of the crucial questions when it comes to religion—and the veil—in a pluralistic and democratic modernity.

M. Christian Green
M. Christian Green is a scholar, teacher, researcher, writer, and editor working in the fields of law, religion, ethics, human rights, and global affairs.  Green is currently a senior fellow at the Center for the Study of Law and Religion, a general co-editor and the book review editor for the Journal of Law and Religion, and editor and publications manager for the African Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. She blogs at Cakewalks and Climbingwalls.